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SUMMARY
Essay I: Uniform Mortgage Regulation and Distortion in Capital Allocation
The U.S. economy is significantly influenced by local features, but most federal
policies are national. In this essay, I study the unintended consequences of the uni-
formity of the national conforming loan limit (CLL) before 2008 on bank lending in
local jumbo mortgage markets. When the national CLL increased, the jumbo share
of residential mortgage markets in low-income counties was significantly reduced rel-
ative to high-income counties. I find that banks responded to the exogenous national
shock by significantly increasing jumbo approval rates in low-income counties. The
economic magnitude is large: a county with a $10,000 lower median income is associ-
ated with, on average, a 6 percentage-point (or 11.77%) higher jumbo loan approval
rate compared to a county with a $10,000 higher median income. The results are not
driven by credit supply changes, borrower quality changes, home price anticipation,
or the demand channel. Consistent with the competition mechanism in which lenders
expand jumbo credit to defend market share, I also find that banks in low-income
counties lower jumbo mortgage rates and later suffer from worse mortgage perfor-
mance. Furthermore, smaller and less informed banks expand jumbo credit more
aggressively, and, as a result, riskier borrowers receive more credit. Overall, my re-
sults highlight negative consequences of the uniformity of federal policy in mortgage
markets by showing how it can lead to distorted bank lending and reduce efficiency
of credit allocation across regions.
Essay II: Housing Market Integration and Economic Convergence
In this essay, I find that the increasing housing market integration in recent
decades has contributed significantly to the convergence of output, income, and total
employment growth across U.S. states. States with integrated housing markets also
converge in their utilization of the home equity line of credit and in the prevalence of
x
real-estate secured loans, which suggests the collateral channel as a key transmission
mechanism through which housing market integration contributes to the economic
convergence. To establish causality, I identify exogenous variations in state-level
house prices using real estate related foreign direct investments that are orthogonal
to state economic conditions. My findings are robust to controls for banking inte-
gration and geographic proximity, and are not driven by the performance of the real
estate industry or changes in local demand. I also obtain similar results at the MSA
level.
Essay III: Global Diversification with Local Stocks: A Road Less Traveled
In this essay, I document a great heterogeneity in the degree of global financial
integration at the firm-level and delve into its implications for international portfo-
lio diversification. Specifically, I estimate the degree of integration for about 14,000
sample firms per year, on average, from major developed markets over the period
1995-2014, using the R-square method. The key findings are: (i) The R-square, our
measure of integration, is very widely distributed across sample firms, within and
across countries; (ii) The firm-level integration is significantly affected by the three
attributes tested country, industry, and style; style exerts the greatest effect, followed
by country and industry; (iii) ‘Local’ stocks that are least driven by the common global
factors are significantly more effective in portfolio risk diversification than either do-
mestic or ‘global’ stocks; this result holds during the recent global financial crises;
(iv) Systematically identifying local stocks and holding them optimally, investors can
significantly benefit from the enhanced the mean-variance efficiency within the fa-
miliar confines of developed markets. In light of the stark heterogeneity in global
integration at the granular level, inferences of the diversification gains solely from
stock market indices, the usual practice, are likely to understate the potential gains
that world stock markets can provide.
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CHAPTER I
UNIFORM MORTGAGE REGULATION AND
DISTORTION IN CAPITAL ALLOCATION
1.1 Introduction
The U.S. economy is strongly influenced by local features, however, federal policy is of-
ten nationally uniform and does not reflect differences in regional economic conditions
across the country.1 Economic theory provides the insight of such uniform pricing:
consumers in areas with low costs can subsidize consumers in high-cost areas. How-
ever, is the uniform feature of such policies optimal? Does it lead to distorted agency
incentives and inefficient capital allocation? In this paper, I analyze the unintended
consequences of the nationally uniform conforming loan limit— the maximum dollar
amount of a home loan that government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) can guarantee—
in the context of U.S. residential mortgage markets, through which most households’
borrowing occurs. I specifically examine how bank lending can be distorted by such
uniformity across regions, which leads to inefficient credit allocation.
One way the national housing finance system explicitly affects local residential
mortgage borrower access to credit is through GSEs, such as the Federal National
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpo-
ration (“Freddie Mac”). They purchase mortgages directly from the loan originators,
and either hold them in their portfolio or issue mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to
investors, which constitutes their dominant role in fostering the development of the
secondary market. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are restricted by law to purchasing
1For example, the U.S. Postal Service delivers all first-class mails to any customer at a fixed price,
independent of location.
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single-family mortgages with origination balances below a specific amount, known
as the “conforming loan limit” (CLL) that is set annually by The Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). A mortgage of a size above the CLL (i.e.,
a jumbo mortgage) cannot be purchased by GSEs and thus has lower liquidity and
a higher yield. Jumbo mortgages are attractive to banks, in part because of jumbo
loans’ higher rates, and in part because of wealthy borrowers’ extraordinary credit
quality and their potential to establish deeper business relationship with banks. Prior
to 2008, the CLL was increased annually and was uniform across all regions through-
out the U.S., except for Alaska, Hawaii, Virgin Islands, and Guam.2 When CLL
increases, the share of jumbo loans declines since some old jumbo mortgages become
conforming loans under a higher CLL. However, the reduction of jumbo share is
different across regions, due to regional heterogeneity of economic development and
housing market structures. To interpret, the jumbo share may not be significantly
reduced in high-income counties with a sufficiently large number of expensive homes,
but it can be dramatically reduced in low-income counties. This regional variation in
jumbo share reduction stems entirely from the nationwide uniformity of the CLL that
is largely indenpendent of local lending environment and economic forces.3 I exploit
this regional variation in local jumbo markets to examine the direct effects of such
spatially uniform pricing of conforming mortgage on bank lending and credit supply
distortion across local jumbo markets.
I begin by examining the aggregate credit supply at the county level after the
CLL increased at the beginning of 2006. As the jumbo share shrinks after the CLL
2Limits for Alaska, Hawaii, Virgin Islands and Guam are 50% higher. Virgin Islands was desig-
nated a high cost area in 1992 and Guam in 2001.
3Each year the conforming loan limits are based on the national median home prices from October
to October reported by the Federal Housing Administration (FHFA), which takes account for all
home prices across 3,142 counties in the U.S. Thus, the contribution of single county home prices
to the national CLL change can be largely ignored, and the change in nationwide CLL is highly
independent to county local economic forces.
2
increases, this effect is especially large in low-income areas where there are fewer ex-
pensive houses. Specifically, I focus on jumbo market segment in each county and
compute the approval rates considering all banks and credit unions that receive jumbo
loan application in that county.4 I find that, following the increase in CLL, banks ex-
pand their jumbo credit supply in low-income counties by approving significantly more
jumbo mortgage applications than those in high-income areas. To quantify the eco-
nomic magnitude of regional variation in raised jumbo approval rates, a county with
a $10,000 lower median income is associated with, on average, a 6 percentage-point
(or 11.77%) higher jumbo approval rate. A back-of-the-envelope exercise implies a
$12.6 billion additional jumbo mortgage credit supplied to lower-than-average-income
counties during the 2006-2007 period.
As a higher CLL makes jumbo mortgages scarce assets and naturally leads to
more intense credit market competition, I next examine whether interbank competi-
tion acts as a determinant of credit supply increase. Theory provides controversial
interpretations. Banks in a concentrated market could encourage more entry in an
effort to internalize the benefits of assisting the borrowers ([132]; [150]); alternatively,
banks with market power may favor established borrowers over new ones, and thus
lenders may have less incentive to finance newcomers in a less competitive credit mar-
ket ([162]; [32]). My empirical results, in the context of jumbo market, show that
the effects of reduced jumbo share on bank lending are particularly acute for counties
where the credit market is competitive. This finding is consistent with the view that
banks compete for a smaller pool of jumbo borrowers by extending credit supply, and
thus create adverse selection problems for their competitors ([56]; [5]).
Next, by utilizing rate spread data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) dataset, I show that banks lower the interest rates of jumbo mortgages
4Specifically, in forming the sample of jumbo mortgage lenders I include banks regulated by
the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), thrift institutions, and credit unions.
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especially in areas where the credit market competition is more intense. Moreover, a
larger increase in jumbo approval rate is associated with relatively poorer loan perfor-
mance. This association is economically and statistically more significant for banks
that have higher exposure to jumbo loan lending. These results further lend support
to the competition channel through which banks expand jumbo credit and lower loan
price to defend market share.
I also take a number of steps to rule out alternative explanations of the main
finding. First, I rule out the possibility that bank-specific changes can drive my
results by conducting a within-bank test. Using bank-county-year level data, I add
bank-year fixed effects to account for all cross-lender variations that change over time,
which eliminates the time-varying bank-specific changes that can explain our results.
Intuitively, this test examines whether the same bank lending to the same county
behaves differently before and after the new CLL was introduced. Second, I examine
whether the change in loan quality can explain the raised jumbo approval rates in low-
income areas. In particular, I use two approaches: (i) Estimate the baseline regression
using a subsample of borrowers with similar credit quality before and after the CLL
increase, and (ii) use a difference-in-difference framework in combination with the
propensity score matching methodology over the period of 2007-2008. More details
will be discussed in Section 4.3.2. Overall, my results remain robust after controlling
for loan quality change. Third, I rule out the possibility that the increased approval
rates are driven by higher securitization rates through adding a control variable that
captures the county-level securitization intensity. Fourth, I verify that neither house
price expectation nor demand channel can explain my findings. Fifth, I estimate a
placebo regression one year after the CLL increase and find no statistically significant
effect of jumbo share reduction on bank lending. Finally, I conduct a battery of
robustness checks and verify that these results are robust to a variety of estimation
techniques and variable definitions.
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Furthermore, I investigate the substantial heterogeneity of lenders and borrowers
across differential characteristics that may be hidden under the documented signif-
icant increase of jumbo loan approval rates in low-income counties. In particular, I
find that smaller and less informed lenders expand jumbo credit more aggressively
by raising approval rates, and the magnitude of this effect increases with the degree
of local credit market competition. These results suggest that banks acquire private
information through lending in jumbo market so that they can soften price competi-
tion through creating adverse selection problems for their competitors ([94]). Small
banks that are less geographically diversified and less informed banks that have infor-
mation disadvantage have especially strong desire to defend market shares for fear of
being left out by their competitors. Exploiting variations in borrower characteristics,
I demonstrate that borrowers receive more credit if they have (i) a higher loan-to-
income ratio, i.e., lower credit quality, or (ii) refinancing mortgage applications rather
than home-purchasing loans.
This paper contributes to a number of existing literatures. First, it adds value to
the stream of literature that studies the effects of uniform federal policies. For ex-
ample, [100] examine the impacts of the uniformity of GSE mortgage rates on wealth
transfer through regional redistribution and highlight a direct mechanism by which
credit market can serve to insure regional shocks. [116] shows that the regional uni-
formity of GSE mortgage rates lead to credit rationing. In particuular, the lack of
regional variation in mortgage rates leads to the credit rationing of marginal bor-
rowers in regions with borrower-friendly laws. My paper complements these findings
by highlighting a direct channel through which uniform pricing regime in mortgage
market can distort bank lending and lead to inefficient credit allocation across regions.
This paper also enriches the literature on the connection between credit market
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competition and the strategic use of private information ([56]; [94]; [5]), entrepreneur-
ship and the formation of new incorporations ([23]), credit standards ([156]), the mar-
ket structure of nonfinancial sectors ([36]), small-firm borrowing costs ([153]), and the
supply of complex mortgages ([61]). These papers show convincingly that credit sup-
ply shock and credit market competition among banks influence their lending strate-
gies and loan terms. Different from the existing literature, my study investigates
how lenders redistribute credit across regions due to a shock triggered by the spatial
uniformity of federal policy.
Finally, this paper adds to the emerging literature on understanding the causes and
effects of the credit expansion in mortgage markets. Related literature has focused
on supply growth in mortgage credit (e.g., [136], [137]; [74]; [60]) and on mortgage
credit demand ([2] [2], [3], [4]). Different from these studies, this paper contributes to
the literature by highlighting a competition channel which can also drive the recent
mortgage credit expansion in jumbo market segment. Furthermore, my results es-
tablish the heterogeneity in lenders’ responses and suggest that banks with liquidity
and information disadvantages tend to lend more aggressively and compete with their
rivals to defend market shares.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses institutional setting. Sec-
tion 3 describes data and sample. Section 4 presents the main results and the eco-
nomic mechanism and rules out alternative explanations. Section 5 provides evidence
of heterogeneity of lenders and borrowers. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Background and Identification Strategy
1.2.1 Jumbo mortgage market segment
Jumbo loans are especially attractive to lenders for several major reasons. First,
the jumbo/nonjumbo spread, which has varied between 15 and 25 basis points over
6
the past two decades, leads to an enhancement of lender’s income.5 Due to the role
of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), securitization of residential mortgages
has grown rapidly since the early 1980s ([75]). Since the legislative goal of these two
government sponsored entities (GSEs) is to promote access to mortgage credit for
low- and moderate-income households, they operate under a special charter limiting
the size of mortgages that they may purchase or securitize. Any mortgages above this
size limit are called jumbo loans and cannot be purchased by the GSEs. As noted in
[128], some of the increase in yields for jumbos reflects differentials in liquidity since
GSEs enhance liquidity for nonjumbo loans but not jumbos.
Second, the extraordinary credit quality of wealthy borrowers makes jumbo mort-
gage lending continue to be a bright spot for lenders. In contrast to nonjumbo loans,
lenders keep jumbos on their balance sheets, in part because of their lower liquidity
and in part because they see jumbo mortgages as a safe investment to hold, versus
selling them as mortgage-backed securities.
Third, anecdotal evidence suggests that lenders are driven by the incentive of
building long-term connection with jumbo borrowers. Lenders can benefit from this
deeper relationship with affluent consumers in various ways, and most of the time
they can expand businesses other than mortgage originations. For example, lenders
are willing to target jumbo borrowers and sell them other financial products and
services, in an effort to expand businesses in the local market.
1.2.2 Identification strategy
This paper examines the effect of uniform jumbo mortgage limit on bank lending by
employing the nationwide change of conforming loan limits (CLLs). As previously
5For jumbo/nonjumbo spread, see for example [6], [128], and [2].
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discussed, GSEs may only purchase mortgages below the conforming loan size limit.6
The loan size limit increases every year by the percentage change of the national
average of single-family housing prices, based on a survey of major lenders by the
Federal Housing Finance Board. Prior to 2008, the size limit was uniform across all
counties throughout the U.S., except for high-cost areas including Alaska, Hawaii,
Virgin Islands and Guam, where the limit is 50% higher. For example, the CLL
for single-family homes experienced a 16% increase, the most significant increase
in history, from $359,650 in 2005 to $417,000 in 2006, and this limit is constant
throughout the U.S. Because the loan limit changes only as a function of national
average home price, local housing market conditions have little contribution to the
change.
While counties have differentials in economic development and housing market
structure, the nationwide uniform CLL serves as an instrument for regional variations
in local jumbo mortgage shares. Some recent studies, for example, [2] and [7] utilize
the CLL as an exogenous instrument for credit access and investigate its impact on
home prices and economic outcomes. Different from these studies, I focus instead on
the jumbo mortgage segment and investigate credit redistribution across regions.
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of CLL change as the identification strategy. High-
income areas have relatively more expensive houses and more mortgages qualified as
jumbos, but low-income areas have much fewer jumbo loans. When the CLL increased
from $359,650 to $417,000 in 2006, a proportion of loans that were jumbo loans above
the old 2005 CLL became conforming loans in 2006 (the blue parts), and the new
6The GSE guidelines that identify a mortgage loan that conforms to GSEs include not only
loan size, but also borrower’s loan-to-value ratio, debt-to-income ratio, credit score and history,
documentation requirements, etc. Although GSEs may only purchase some of the mortgages below
the conforming size limit, none of the jumbo loans can be sold to GSEs. As a result, in this paper the
analysis focusing on jumbo market segment is not affected by the conforming loan criteria despite
of the size limit.
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Figure 1: The effects of the change in conforming loan limit: low-income vs. high-
income areas
This figure shows the effects of the change in the conforming loan limit (CLL) on low-income and
high-income areas. At the beginning of 2006, the nationwide CLL increased from $359,650 to
$417,000. Each bar indicates the mortgage market structure, from the smallest mortgages at the
bottom to the largest ones on the top. The blue area plus the red area in each bar indicate the jumbo
mortgages in the area above the old CLL. The red area in each bar indicates the jumbo mortgages
in the area above the new CLL.
jumbo loan shares in the low- and high-income areas are affected differently: in low-
income areas with fewer expensive homes, as the red parts show, the new jumbo
share is exogenously reduced to a significantly lower level under the new CLL, while
the jumbo share in high-income areas is not heavily reduced (in a relative sense)
because there are more expensive homes in these areas. However, the number of
lenders almost remain at a constant level right after the CLL change. This regional
variation is exploited as the identification strategy to examine the effect of jumbo
share reduction on bank lending strategy and credit supply, i.e., how lenders in low-
and high-income areas respond differently to the increase in the uniform CLL.
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1.3 Data and Sample Selection
The data of mortgage applications and originations are obtained from the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) dataset. The main sample covers loan applications
from 2005 to 2007. All regulated financial institutions with more than $30 million
in assets, such as commercial banks, credit unions, and mortgage companies, must
report required data. The HMDA data include loan applications’ information on
the lender’s identity, the location of the property, the dollar amount of the loan,
application year, and whether or not the loan was accepted or sold to a third party.
Borrower information is also provided, such as borrower’s reported income, race, and
gender.
Using HMDA data I compute the county-level and the bank-county-level approval
rates (ARs) of jumbo loan applications, as a measure of credit supply to jumbo
segment. The county-level AR equals the ratio of all accepted jumbo loans over all
jumbo loan applications across all banks in the county, where the ratio is based on
either the number or the volume of jumbo loans. The bank-county-level AR equals the
ratio of jumbo loans accepted by a bank in a county over all jumbo loan applications
to the bank in the county, based on either the number or the volume of jumbo loans.
To control for borrowers’ credit risk in a geographical area, I include the average
number of the log of the applicant’s income in the county, the average loan-to-income
ratio, the share of the population that is minority, and the share of female appli-
cants in the property’s county. I also include the county-level income growth rate
to absorb variation in economic development and mortgage demand. The county-
level income per capita and income growth rate are obtained from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. To control for the trend of the house price growth, I obtain the
MSA- and state-level housing price index (HPI) from the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA), then classify the counties overlapping with the MSAs and match cor-
responding HPI with counties. Unmatched counties are matched with the state-level
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HPI.
Using lender identity, I then merge HMDA data with the bank-level data from the
Reports of Condition and Income for commercial banks (“Call Reports”). I follow
[128] and merge each application with the Call Report from the fourth quarter of the
year prior to the mortgage application.7 All unmatched institutions from the HMDA
dataset are then matched manually using the bank’s name and county name. The
bank control variables include size (log of assets), leverage (the capital-asset ratio),
accounting profits (net income to assets), balance-sheet liquidity (investment and
traded securities to assets), share of deposit finance (ratio of deposits to total assets),
deposit costs (interest expenses on deposits to total deposits), letters of credit in total
assets, unused loan commitments in total assets, real estate loans in total assets, and
commercial and industrial loans in total assets.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the merged datasets in the pre- and
post-2006 periods, and for high- and low-income counties separately. I report the
means and standard deviations of variable distributions at the county-year level.
High- and low-income counties are splited by the median value of county income per
capita in pre- and post-2006 periods separately. For high-income counties, the change
in approval rates between pre- and post-2006 periods is very marginal, while the
change of low-income counties is much larger. The count-(volume-) based approval
rate increases from 45.6% (46.6%) in the pre-2006 period to 51.9% (53.5%) in the
post-2006 period.
7To merge with the HMDA bank identification number, I use the Call Report identification
number (RSSD ID) for banks regulated by the Federal Reserve (FR), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) certificate ID (item RSSD9050 in the Call Report) for banks regulated by the
FDIC, with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) ID (item RSSD9055 in the Call
Report) for banks regulated by the OCC, with the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) ID (item
RSSD9037 in the Call Report) for thrift institutions regulated by the OTS, and with the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA) Charter ID (item RSSD9039 in the Call Report) for credit
unions regulated by the NCUA.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics of all mortgage, bank, and socio-economic variables at the
county level before and after the increase of conforming loan limit (CLL) in 2006. Mortgage ap-
plication data are from HMDA loan applications and originations from 2005 to 2007. County-level
socio-economic variables are based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Bank-
related data are obtained from the Reports of Condition and Income for commercial banks (“Call
Reports”). The CLL increased from $359,650 in 2005 to $417,000 in 2006. The Pre-06 period refers
to the entire year of 2005, and the Post-06 period refers to two entire years of 2006 and 2007. High
(low) income counties are classified as counties with higher-(lower-)than-median county-level median
income in the given year. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
High Income Counties Low Income Counties
Pre-06 Limit Change Post-06 Limit Change Pre-06 Limit Change Post-06 Limit Change
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Dependent variables
Jumbo Acceptance Rate (Count) 0.509 0.191 0.508 0.181 0.456 0.262 0.519 0.287
Jumbo Acceptance Rate (Volume) 0.532 0.197 0.533 0.195 0.466 0.274 0.535 0.297
Jumbo Retention Rate (Count) 0.509 0.236 0.523 0.225 0.631 0.307 0.662 0.315
Jumbo Retention Rate (Volume) 0.538 0.239 0.546 0.230 0.648 0.309 0.672 0.319
Mortgage application
No. of Loan Applications 24146 66247 23291 61251 3799 13424 3201 12008
No. of Loans Issued 10646 28816 9760 24580 1573 5734 1298 4712
No. of Jumbo Loan Applications 2672 15408 2064 12463 146 1809 96 1228
No. of Jumbo Loans Accepted 1371 7878 996 5927 73 911 44 545
No. of Jumbo Loans Retained 379 1983 287 1557 21 204 13 116
County Median Income (’000) 35.018 7.647 36.672 8.935 24.849 2.817 25.588 2.949
County Income Growth (%) 4.746 5.145 5.287 7.688 3.367 3.931 2.556 5.287
Log(Applicant Income) 4.088 0.257 4.162 0.268 3.852 0.178 3.909 0.187
Loan-to-income Ratio 2.018 0.463 2.008 0.450 1.841 0.359 1.789 0.351
Minority Applicant Fraction 0.068 0.083 0.074 0.087 0.088 0.112 0.083 0.111
Female Applicant Fraction 0.246 0.046 0.248 0.043 0.254 0.044 0.254 0.052
Bank Controls
Log(Assets) 15.420 0.888 15.680 0.908 15.781 0.738 16.157 0.739
Leverage 0.105 0.007 0.103 0.005 0.105 0.009 0.102 0.008
Accounting Profits 0.695 0.035 0.696 0.029 0.693 0.041 0.695 0.032
Liquidity 0.168 0.033 0.165 0.027 0.163 0.041 0.159 0.035
Loans/Assets 0.695 0.035 0.696 0.029 0.692 0.042 0.694 0.034
Deposits/Assets 0.692 0.051 0.709 0.037 0.667 0.062 0.687 0.054
Deposit Cost 0.041 0.006 0.037 0.005 0.041 0.007 0.036 0.005
Letters of credit/Assets 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Unused Loan Cmt/Assets 0.548 0.273 0.500 0.326 0.609 0.247 0.557 0.212
C&I Loans/Assets 0.116 0.021 0.109 0.015 0.116 0.021 0.105 0.016
Real Estate Loans/Assets 0.386 0.044 0.383 0.039 0.378 0.044 0.374 0.036
Securitization Ratio 0.685 0.091 0.662 0.081 0.620 0.113 0.597 0.108
1.4 Lender Response to Reduced Share of Jumbo Markets
1.4.1 Econometric model and main results
This section provides main results of how lenders respond to reduced jumbo shares
across regions. County median home price measures the overall house price level in a
county and thus can be a proxy for the extent to which the county is affected by the
CLL limit change. However, if median house price is used as an explanatory variable
to explain credit supply, it causes a reverse causality problem and an omitted variable
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problem. For example, high credit supply to local borrowers can further increase the
local home prices. It is also possible that the lender and borrower’s anticipation of
future home prices can strengthen the association between credit supply and home
price. Instead, county median income serves as a better explanatory variable in
the specification. There are several reasons for the use of median income: First, as
Figure 2 illustrates, county-level median income and median house price are positively
correlated; second, the estimation does not suffer a reverse causality problem because
credit supply in a county does not affect the contemporaneous county median income;
third, other county-specific factors that affect both income and credit supply can be
captured by county fixed effects.
Figure 2: Correlation of county income and county home price
This figure plots the scattered dots and the fitted line of county income and county home price.
County income is the logarithm of county per capita income obtained from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). County home price is the logarithm of the median price per square foot obtained
from Zillow.com. The solid line is the fitted line of the scattered dots and the shaded area is 95%
confidence interval of the fitted line.
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Specifically, I use aggregate county-level data and estimate
ARit =a+ b1CountyIncomeit × Postt + b2CountyIncomeit + b3Postt
+ Loan Controlsit + Bank Controlsit + County Controlsit + ci + θt + εit, (1)
where ARit is the jumbo mortgage approval rate in county i in year t. Importantly, I
compute AR by focusing on jumbo applications with the loan amount above $417,000
for all sample years instead of post-2006 period only. This attempt helps alleviate
the concern that the pools of jumbo borrowers before and after 2006 are different.8
Two measures of approval rates are constructed: the first one equals the fraction of
approved jumbo loan applications to total jumbo loan applications made by all lenders
in county i in year t, where the fraction is based on the number of jumbo loans; the
second measure is similar, but the fraction is based on the volume of jumbo loans.
CountyIncomeit is the median income in county i in year t. Postt is a dummy variable
equal to one for all years in or after 2006, and zero prior to that. The coefficient of
interest is b1, which measures the change in the approval rates between high-income
counties and low-income counties before and after the CLL change in 2006.
In the estimation specification, I include three sets of control variables. The first
set includes the following average county-level characteristics of the loan applicant
pool obtained from HMDA data: the log of applicant income, the ratio of the loan
size to applicant income (loan-to-income ratio), and the shares of female and minority
loan applicants in the county.9 The second set includes average bank characteristics
from the Call Report: the log of bank total assets, leverage (the capital-asset ratio),
accounting profits (net income to total assets), balance-sheet liquidity (investment and
traded securities to total assets), share of deposit (ratio of deposits to total assets),
deposit costs (interest expenses on deposits to total deposits), letters of credit in total
8I also estimate specifications using the strict cutoff of CLL in 2005 to define jumbo loan bor-
rowers, i.e., loans above $359,650 are defined as jumbo loans in 2005, and find similar results.
9I construct county-level income and loan-to-income ratio by averaging across all of the mortgages
in a county in a given year.
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assets, unused loan commitments in total assets, share of real estate loans to total
assets, and share of commercial and industrial loans to total assets. Third, I also
control for the county-level income growth rate and the housing price index (HPI)
growth rate and its lagged value. Importantly, Equation (1) includes county fixed
effects (ci) to control for any county-specific credit demand shocks and year fixed
effects (θt) to control for time-varying factors that are constant across counties. As
there may be additional autocorrelation in the residual, I cluster the standard errors
by county.
Table 2: Regional variation in lender responses to uniform CLL increase
This table examines the changes in the approval rates for jumbo mortgages at the county-year level
before and after the conforming loan limit increased from $359,650 to $417,000 at the beginning
of 2006. The sample period is from 2005 to 2007. The dependent variables in columns 1-4 (5-8)
are jumbo loan approval rates based on total number (volume) of jumbo loans at the county level.
County Income is county per capita income obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Log(County Income) is the logarithm of county per capita income. The indicator variable Post takes
the value 1 for two entire years from 2006 to 2007 and 0 for the year of 2005. HPI Growth is the
county-level housing price index growth rate, and HPI Growth Lag is its lagged value. Columns
2, 4, 6, and 8 include borrower, bank, and county controls. All regression controls are defined in
Appendix A. All regressions include county fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var. Jumbo AR (Count) Jumbo AR (Volume)
County Income*Post -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County Income 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(County Income)*Post -0.188*** -0.151*** -0.205*** -0.170***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028)
Log(County Income) 0.436*** 0.453*** 0.480*** 0.530***
(0.143) (0.157) (0.143) (0.158)
HPI Growth 0.306*** 0.299*** 0.314*** 0.307***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.073) (0.073)
HPI Growth Lag 0.285*** 0.261*** 0.287*** 0.260***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.086) (0.086)
Observations 7,506 7,482 7,506 7,482 7,506 7,482 7,506 7,482
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.138 0.156 0.140 0.157 0.136 0.161 0.139 0.162
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Table 2 presents the results. The variable of interest is the interaction of CountyIncome
and Post dummy. Column 1 shows that count-based approval rates significantly in-
crease more in low-income counties after the CLL change at the beginning of 2006.
The inclusion of county fixed effects demeans CountyIncome variable. The result
implies that a standard deviation decrease in county median income (7.972×$’000)
increases the jumbo approval rate, on average, by 4.78 percentage points. This effect
is not trivial compared to the unconditional mean approval rate of 50.96%. Column
2 adds borrower, lender and county controls and shows that the coefficient of interest
remains economically and statistically significant. Columns 3 and 4 replace county
median income with its logarithm value in the estimation regressions and show that
the coefficient of interest remains negative and statistically significant with a much
larger magnitude. Columns 5 through 8 estimate the same baseline regression using
the volume-based approval rate as the dependent variable. The coefficient of inter-
est remains statistically significant and become slightly larger in magnitude relative
to the results in columns 1 through 4. These results indicate that, after the CLL
increases, jumbo loan approval rates in low-income counties are significantly larger
than those in high-income counties. This finding suggests that in low-income areas
where the reduction of jumbo loan share is larger, lenders tend to increase credit sup-
ply through increasing the approval rate. Figure 3 illustrates the empirical finding
in Table 2. After the increase of CLL in 2006, the average jumbo approval rate in
low-income counties raised by about 6.3%, from 45.6% to 51.9% which exceeds the
average approval rate in high-income counties (50.8%) in post-2006 period.
1.4.2 Economic mechanism
1.4.2.1 Determinants of lender responses: competition channel
Having documented the increase in jumbo approval rate after jumbo shares decline,
this subsection examines in detail the underlying economic mechanism. As the CLL
change triggers a jumbo market share reduction that is exogenous to local economic
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Figure 3: Average jumbo loan approval rates for low-income and high-income counties
This figure plots the average jumbo loan approval rates for low-income and high-income counties
before and after the CLL increases at the beginning of 2006. Red dashed line plots the average
approval rates for low-income counties. Blue dashed line plots the average approval rates for high-
income counties. A county is classified as low-income (high-income) if its per capita income is below
(above) the median value of all county incomes in 2005.
conditions, the credit market for jumbo mortgages becomes more competitive since
lenders face a smaller pool of potential jumbo borrowers. This effect is especially
stronger in low-income counties.
In the context of bank-firm relationship, theory offers competing hypotheses about
how interbank competition ought to influence access to bank credit. For example,
as [132] and [150] suggest, banks with market power should guarantee more entry
so that they can internalize the benefits of assisting the firms at later stage if such
entrants turn out to be successful. In addition to this channel, [162] and [32] show
that the less competitive the conditions in the credit market, the lower the incentive
for lenders to finance newcomers, because banks with market power may favor their
established borrowers over new ones. In this paper I focus on the jumbo loan market
in which the lending mechanism may differ from the relationship lending to the firm.
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It is not certain whether jumbo mortgages work as “transaction loans” (i.e., loans
that involve “arm’s length” transactions), or “relationship loans”. Thus, it remains
as an important empirical question to examine how the competitiveness of the jumbo
loan credit market affects the behavior of lenders.
This subsection empirically tests the competition channel through which the ap-
proval rate increase can be explained. I first conduct a test to examine the impact of
lender competition in jumbo market by constructing a county-level local competition
measure, jumbo Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Jumbo HHI) that is defined as the sum
of squared banks’ market shares of jumbo loans in a given county, where the shares are
based on the number of accepted jumbo loan applications.10 One can be concerned
that counties where credit markets are more competitive tend to be the ones with
higher income, so the heterogeneity in the effect of reduced jumbo share captures the
effect of income variation and not difference of competition. To mitigate this concern,
I then conduct a test based on a subsample that includes only high-income counties.
This test more directly explores the variation of competition across counties within a
high-income subsample, and provides robustness of the effect of competition on credit
supply increase.
Table 3 presents the results. Panel A reruns the baseline regression of Equation (1)
by controling for the county-level jumbo competition measure HHI in the estimation
model. The coefficient on the competition measure in column 1, −0.173, suggests
that moving from fully competitive (i.e., HHI = 0) to fully concentrated (i.e., HHI
= 1) would cut jumbo approval rate by 17.3 percentage points. This magnitude
is substantial relative to the unconditional mean of jumbo approval rate, 50.96%.
Columns 3 and 4 confirm the robustness of the coefficient on the interaction term to
the use of volume-based competition measure.
10I also construct a similar HHI measure, where the shares are based on the volume of accepted
jumbo loan applications, and obtain similar results.
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Table 3: Competition channel and the increase in jumbo approval rate
This table examines how credit market competition changes the approval rates for jumbo mortgages
at the county level before and after the increase of conforming loan limit at the beginning of 2006.
The dataset is at the county-year level from 2005 to 2007. Panel A adds Jumbo HHI as a measure
of jumbo lenders competition to test its relation with jumbo loan approval rates. Jumbo HHI count
(volume) is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) which is defined as the sum of the squared count
(volume) fractions of issued jumbo loans by each lender in a given county over all issued jumbo
loans in the given county. Panel B only focuses on high income counties which are above the median
value of county per capita income, and the high- and low-competition counties are classified by the
median Jumbo HHI (count) measure across the high income counties. In both panels, the dependent
variables in columns 1-2 (3-4) are jumbo loan approval rates based on total number (volume) of
jumbo loans at the county level. Log(County Income) is the logarithm of county per capita income
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The indicator variable Post takes the value
1 for two entire years from 2006 to 2007 and 0 for the year of 2005. All regressions control for
borrower, county, and bank characteristics. Borrower controls include applicant income and loan-to-
income ratio. County controls include county income growth, minority fraction, and female fraction.
Bank controls include total assets, leverage, accounting profits, liquidity, deposit ratio, deposit costs,
letters of credit, C&I loans, and real estate loans. All regression controls are defined in Appendix A.
All regressions include county fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A. Competition measures of jumbo loan lenders: jumbo HHI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Jumbo AR (Count) Jumbo AR (Volume)
Log(County Income)*Post -0.159*** -0.160*** -0.184*** -0.183***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Log(County Income) 0.431*** 0.430*** 0.530*** 0.520***
(0.102) (0.103) (0.106) (0.107)
Jumbo HHI (Count) -0.173*** -0.195***
(0.024) (0.026)
Jumbo HHI (Volume) -0.149*** -0.095***
(0.023) (0.025)
Observations 6,562 6,562 6,562 6,562
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.335 0.330 0.320 0.302
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Table 3: (Cont.) Competition channel and the increase in jumbo approval rate
Panel B. Subsample analysis: high income counties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Jumbo AR (Count) Jumbo AR (Volume)
Low High Low High
Competition Competition Competition Competition
Log(County Income)*Post -0.240 -0.030*** -0.248 -0.038***
(0.165) (0.009) (0.168) (0.011)
Log(County Income) 0.912** 0.027 0.955** 0.148**
(0.371) (0.056) (0.374) (0.065)
Observations 1,553 1,816 1,553 1,816
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.177 0.638 0.173 0.586
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results based on the subsample of high-income
counties. I find that, for low-competition counties in this subsample, the coefficient of
the interaction term is statistically insignificant (column 1), but it turns statistically
significant at the 1% level for the group of high-competition counties (column 2). The
results are robust to the use of volume-based approval rate as the dependent variable
(columns 3 and 4).
Overall, Table 3 provides confirmative evidence that the jumbo share effect is
particularly acute for counties where the jumbo loan market is competitive. Given
a same reduction of jumbo market share, lenders operating in highly competitive
markets tend to raise approval rates more than lenders operating in less competitive
markets. This finding is consistent with the spirit of empirical evidence in the context
of bank-firm relationship, which documents that new borrowers face greater difficulty




If the increase in jumbo approval rate is caused by lender competition, it can be
reflected in the loan pricing. Specifically, if the reduction of jumbo loan borrowers
is larger in low-income areas while the number of lenders remains relatively stable,
intense competition between lenders may push down the jumbo mortgage rate to
defend jumbo loan market share. HMDA data provides a certain extent of mortgage-
level price information that takes the form of a “rate spread”. Lenders must report
the spread (difference) between the annual percentage rate (APR) on a loan and the
rate on Treasury securities of comparable maturity–but only for loans with spreads
above designated thresholds.11 So rate spreads are reported for some, and not all,
home loans that have high rates.
Exploiting the rate spread data, I test the above hypothesis by estimating
RSit =a+ b1CountyIncomeit × Postt + b2CountyIncomeit + b3Postt
+ Loan Controlsit + Bank Controlsit + County Controlsit + ci + θt + εit, (2)
where RSit is the mean or median value of jumbo mortgage rate spreads in county i in
year t. CountyIncomeit and Postt are defined as in Equation (1). ci, θt are county-
specific fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered
at the county level. If large reduction of jumbo loan borrowers in low-income areas
induced high competition between lenders, one can expect to see a positive b1, i.e.,
a lower mean or median value of rate spread for jumbo loans in low-income areas in
the Post period.
Table 4 reports the results. The dependent variable in columns 1-4 (5-8) is the
median (mean) value of jumbo loan rate spread in a given county in a year. Column
1 shows that the coefficient of the interaction term, 0.005, is statistically significant
11The thresholds vary across borrower and mortgage characteristics. See, for example,
https://www.ffiec.gov/ratespread/newcalc.aspx for more information.
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Table 4: Competition channel and jumbo mortgage price
This table examines the changes in the rate spread for jumbo mortgages at the county level before
and after the conforming loan limit increased from $359,650 to $417,000 at the beginning of 2006.
The dataset is at the county-year level from 2005 to 2007. The dependent variable in columns 1-4
(5-8) is the median (mean) value of jumbo mortgage rate spread in a county in a given year. The
rate spread data is obtained from the HMDA database. County Income is county per capita income
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Log(County Income) is the logarithm of
county per capita income. The indicator variable Post takes the value 1 for two entire years from
2006 to 2007 and 0 for the year of 2005. HPI Growth is the county-level housing price index growth
rate, and HPI Growth Lag is its lagged value. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 include borrower, bank, and
county controls. All regression controls are defined in Appendix A. All regressions include county
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var. Median Jumbo Rate Spread Mean Jumbo Rate Spread
County Income*Post 0.005** 0.007** 0.005** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
County Income -0.001 -0.006* 0.001 -0.006**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Log(County Income)*Post 0.231** 0.274** 0.247** 0.246**
(0.110) (0.121) (0.105) (0.112)
Log(County Income) -0.032 -0.340*** 0.072 -0.287**
(0.089) (0.126) (0.087) (0.119)
HPI Growth -0.380 -0.379 -0.531* -0.526*
(0.297) (0.297) (0.290) (0.290)
HPI Growth Lag 0.684** 0.669** 0.244 0.244
(0.337) (0.337) (0.358) (0.357)
Observations 3,713 3,689 3,713 3,689 3,713 3,689 3,713 3,689
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.075 0.086 0.076 0.086 0.052 0.069 0.053 0.07
at the 5% level. It suggests that after the new CLL in 2006 became effective, a
decrease of $10,000 median county income value is, on average, associated with a 5
basis points drop in the rate spread for jumbo mortgages. Column 2 confirms this
finding by including a full set of borrower, county, and bank controls. Columns 3 and
4 test its robustness using the log value of county income and find similar results.
Columns 5-8 use the mean value of jumbo loan rate spread as the dependent variable
and further confirm this finding. Overall, results of Table 4 lends support to the
competition channel that lenders compete for a smaller market share and lower the
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jumbo mortgage price for borrowers.
1.4.2.3 Proxy for loan performance
Do lenders compete more aggressively as a response to reduced jumbo loan borrowers
because they simply act to defend market share or because they have better infor-
mation about borrowers? the competition channel indicates that banks can simply
expand their jumbo credit without carefully screening borrowers, which can result in
relatively poor performance of jumbo loans. In contrast, fewer mortgages are quali-
fied as jumbo loans after the new CLL, and thus bank’s capacity constraint can be
less binding and they can obtain better information about borrowers. If this is the
case, banks are able to screen borrowers more carefully and price the loans more
precisely. To investigate this alternative “capacity constraint” hypothesis, I test how
the increase of approval rate affects mortgage performance.
I again estimate panel regressions, although I measure the data by bank-year
rather than county-year. Regarding residential mortgage performance, the Call Re-
port provides data on non-performing 1-4 family loans (NPL=1-4 family loans 90 or
more days past due plus loans no longer accruing interest) and 1-4 family loans charge-
offs. Specifically, I construct four measures of mortgage performance: NPL/total 1-4
family loans, NPL/total 1-4 family loans (constructed using only first liens), family
loans charge-offs/total family loans, and family loans charge-offs/total loan charge-
offs. In particular, the last variable captures both family loans performance and key
aspects of overall lending environment. For example, when the economy is bad, family
loans perform relatively poorly because bad economy pushes down bank loans in gen-
eral, not because banks give out bad family loans. Thus, the last variable addresses
this concern by teasing out the relative performance of family loans to overall bank
loans.
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Specifically, I estimate the following regression specification
Performancejt = a+ b1Jumbo AR Increasejt + Bank Controlsjt + ζj + θt + εjt,
(3)
where Performancejt is one of the four performance measures defined above for bank
j at the end of year t. JumboARIncreasejt is the percentage change in jumbo loan
approval rate for bank j from year t− 1 to year t. bj, θt are bank-specific fixed effect
and year fixed effect, respectively. I cluster at the bank level for standard errors and I
estimate the models over the period 2005-2008. In addition, I construct a subsample
of “intensive” jumbo loan lenders, which defines “intensive” by using the fraction of
a bank’s issued jumbo loans over total issued family loans. In this subsample, we
include only the bank-years in which the jumbo fraction is above its median value.
Table 5 reports the results. To streamline the table, I report only the coefficients on
the increase of jumbo approval rates (JumboARIncrease). Panel A of Table 5 reports
the results of the full sample. The coefficient on JumboARIncrease suggests that an
increase of jumbo approval rate is associated with a higher level non-performing family
loans. However, the coefficients for the family loans charge-offs are not economically
or statistically significant. More importantly, Panel B of Table 5 focuses on the
intensive jumbo mortgages lenders and shows that the positive relation between the
increase of jumbo loan approval rates and bad loan performance is stronger, both
economically and statistically. For example, the coefficient in column 1 increases
from 0.0004 (Panel A) to 0.0013 (Panel B). The coefficient on JumboARIncrease
in column 4 of Panel B increases to 0.0081 and becomes statistically significant at
the 1% level. The economic magnitude is large: a 10% increase in jumbo approval
rate is associated with an 8.1 basis point increase in the ratio of family loans charge-
offs relative to total loan charge-offs. These results indicate that banks with larger
exposure to jumbo loan lending exert stronger effect of raised jumbo approval rates
on bad loans, which is consistent with the competition channel that banks compete
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Table 5: Jumbo approval rate increase and loan performance
This table examines the impact of the increased approval rate of jumbo loans on bank loan perfor-
mance. The dataset is at the bank-year level from 2005 to 2008. Panel A uses the full sample. Panel
B uses a subsample of banks with intensive exposure to jumbo mortgage lending. This subsample
includes banks with the ratio of jumbo mortgage origination volumes/total mortgage origination
volumes (from the HMDA data) above its median value. In both panels, the dependent variables in
columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 are NPL/family loans (1-4 family loans 90 or more days past due plus loans
no longer accruing interest/total 1-4 family loans), NPL/family loans only based on first liens, family
charge-offs/family loans (1-4 family loans charge-offs/ total 1-4 family loans), and family charge-
offs/loan charge-offs (1-4 family loans charge-offs/ total loans charge-offs), respectively. Jumbo AR
increase is the percentage change of the number-based approval rate in this year relative to the
previous year of a bank in a given year. All columns include bank controls. All regression controls
are defined in Appendix A. All regressions include bank fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A. Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPL/ NPL/Family loans Family Charge-offs/ Family Charge-offs/
Dep. Var. Family loans (First lien only) Family loans Loan charge-offs
Jumbo AR increase (Volume) 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0000 -0.0015
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Observations 9,546 9,544 9,546 8,831
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0565 0.0449 0.0166 0.0138
Panel B. Intensive jumbo loan lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPL/ NPL/Family loans Family Charge-offs/ Family Charge-offs/
Dep. Var. Family loans (First lien only) Family loans Loan charge-offs
Jumbo AR increase (Volume) 0.0013** 0.0014** 0.0002* 0.0081***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Observations 7,012 7,010 7,012 6,362
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0485 0.0365 0.00894 0.00765
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more aggressively for market share without carefully screening borrowers.
1.4.3 Alternative explanations and robustness checks
Although the identification strategy and county fixed effects resolve several empirical
concerns by exploiting the exogenous reduction of jumbo market shares, I address
some remaining concerns in this section.
1.4.3.1 Lender characteristics change
The findings of increase in jumbo mortgage originations in low-income counties is
consistent with the view that lenders compete for the scarce asset. However, this
finding could be driven by the fact that lenders in low-income counties have different
characteristics after the CLL change in 2006, such as better credit availability. To
test this notion, I run a specification at the bank-county-year level and add bank-year
fixed effects so that I can focus on the same bank lending to the same county before
and after the new CLL, and evaluate the difference in lending. This approach also
acts as a very strong robustness test for the county-level regression reported earlier
because I now focus on a more homogeneous sample of lenders and can also fully
account for potentially confounding factors that can impact lending decision, such as
credit supply.
When conducting this within-bank test, I evaluate the CLL effect on the same
bank lending to the same county. Therefore, this test removes potential biases from
unobservable bank characteristics from the credit supply side. Specifically, the re-
gression model is as follows:
ARijt =a+ b1CountyIncomeit × Postt + b2CountyIncomeit + b3Postt
+ Loan Controlsijt + County Controlsit + ci + ηjt + θt + εijt, (4)
where ARijt is the jumbo mortgage approval rate by bank j in county i in year t. I
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compute approval rates based on jumbo loan applications in a range of $417,000—
$600,000 for both 2005 and 2006-07 periods, so that I can compare similar borrowers
in both periods. CountyIncomeit and Postt are defined as in Equation (1). ci is
county-specific fixed effects. Importantly, I include bank-year fixed effects (ηjt) to
control for any time-varying shocks to a bank, including credit supply change and any
other factors that may affect lending decision. Standard errors are double clustered
at the county and bank levels.
Table 6: Regional variation in lender responses to uniform CLL increase: within-bank
tests
This table runs within-bank tests and examines the changes in the approval rates for jumbo mort-
gages at the county-year level before and after the conforming loan limit increased from $359,650
to $417,000 at the beginning of 2006. The sample period is from 2005 to 2007. The dependent
variables in columns 1-4 (5-8) are jumbo loan approval rates based on total number (volume) of
jumbo loans in the range of $417,000 to $600,000 at the bank-county level. County Income is county
per capita income obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Log(County Income) is
the logarithm of county per capita income. The indicator variable Post takes the value 1 for two
entire years from 2006 to 2007 and 0 for the year of 2005. HPI Growth is the county-level housing
price index growth rate, and HPI Growth Lag is its lagged value. Columns 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8
include borrower, bank, and county controls. Columns 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 include county, year, and
bank-year fixed effects. Columns 2 and 6 include county, year, and bank fixed effects. All regression
controls are defined in Appendix A. A Standard errors in parentheses are double clustered at both
the county and bank levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var. Jumbo AR (Count) Jumbo AR (Volume)
County Income*Post -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County Income 0.003*** 0.008 0.007*** 0.007 0.003*** 0.008 0.007*** 0.007
(0.001) (0.051) (0.003) (3.970) (0.001) (0.996) (0.003) (1.111)
HPI Growth 0.185*** 0.153*** 0.185*** 0.153
(0.049) (0.023) (0.049) (0.319)
HPI Growth Lag 0.082* 0.096 0.079* 0.093
(0.045) (0.097) (0.045) (0.068)
Observations 235,831 49,577 50,349 48,452 235,831 49,577 50,349 48,452
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.390 0.262 0.243 0.260 0.390 0.262 0.243 0.260
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Table 6 reports the results of the within-bank test. I again find that banks increase
jumbo loan originations to low-income counties in the post-2006 period. After con-
trolling for county, year, and bank-year fixed effects, the results imply that a $10,000
decrease in county median income increases the jumbo approval rate, on average,
by 100 basis points after the new CLL becomes effective (columns 1 and 5), and
the results remain robust after controlling for county-specific and loan characteristics
(columns 2 and 6). Even after additionally controlling for house price trend, the
coefficients remain statistically significant (columns 4 and 8). These results strongly
support the view that lenders lend more aggressively after the jumbo share declines.
1.4.3.2 Borrower quality change
Although in approval rate calculation I focus on similar groups of jumbo borrowers
with the loan amount above $417,000 for both 2005 and 2006-07, there still might be
a potential concern of differential borrower quality: If the pool of jumbo borrowers
in 2006 was better in quality than those in 2005, the increase of approval rate may
not be a result of the reduced jumbo share but rather a reflection of better borrower
quality.
I test for such concerns by comparing the approval rates for the post-2006 jumbo
loan borrowers and the subset of 2005 jumbo loan borrowers that have similar char-
acteristics with post-2006 borrowers. Specifically, I use the lowest reported applicant
income and the highest loan-to-income (LTI) ratio among jumbo loan applications in
2006 as thresholds, and pick 2005 jumbo loan applicants that have higher-than-06-
lowest income AND lower-than-06-highest LTI ratio (both adjusted for inflation rate)
to form the subset of borrowers. Then I re-calculate the county-level approval rate in
2005 based on the subset of borrowers in each county in 2005. If the borrower quality
concern is the case, one would expect to see a similar approval rate on the subset
of 2005 jumbo loan borrowers who had similar characteristics with 2006 jumbo loan
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borrowers. However, the results in Table 7 show the opposite. Columns 1-4 show that
the impact of reduced jumbo share on bank lending after 2006 remains significant,
as the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant. The results are
similar for the volume-based measures of approval rates (not reported).
One may still worry that the increase in jumbo mortgage origination can be a
result of other borrower or lender characteristics or some county-specific factors, in
addition to income and LTI ratio. To further mitigate this concern, I then exploit the
effect of an event of the county-level conforming loan limit changes at the beginning
of 2008. The national conforming loan limit for mortgages that finance single-family
one-unit properties remained constantly at $417,000 during 2006-2007, with limits 50
percent higher for four statutorily-designated high cost areas: Alaska, Hawaii, Guam,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Beginning in 2008, various legislative acts increased the
loan limits in certain high-cost counties in the United States to reflect local price
differences. More specifically, there are two sets of loan limits: “General” and “High-
Cost”. The “High-Cost” areas are determined by Fannie Mae’s regulator, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 temporarily
increased the loan limits in high-cost areas. A total of 293 counties were determined
by FHFA as high-cost areas and thus utilized various CLLs higher than $417,000 for
mortgages to finance single-family one-unit properties.12 Other counties that were not
determined as high-cost areas are “General” areas. Then, the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008 permanently changed Fannie Mae’s charter to expand
the definition of a “conforming loan” to include “high-cost” areas on loans originated
on or after January 1, 2009. As a result, for those counties determined as high-cost
areas and thus had raised CLL, the potential pool of jumbo loan borrowers shrunk
and the competitiveness increased given a relatively steady number of lenders in the
area.
12The map of the high-cost areas in 2008 is shown in Figure A1.
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Table 7: Alternative explanations: borrower credit and securitization ratio improve-
ments
This table examines alternative explanations of the impacts of the CLL change on the approval
rates for jumbo mortgages at the county-year level. The sample period is from 2005 to 2007. The
dependent variables in columns 1-6 are jumbo loan approval rates based on total number of jumbo
loans at the county level. In columns 1-4, I calculate approval rates in each county for jumbo loan
applications in 2005 based on a subset of borrowers who are BOTH above the lowest income of
2006 applicants AND below the highest LTI ratio of 2006 applicants, with income adjusted by the
inflation rate. County Income is county per capita income obtained from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). Log(County Income) is the logarithm of county per capita income. The indicator
variable Post takes the value 1 for two entire years from 2006 to 2007 and 0 for the year of 2005.
Columns 5-6 further control for county-level securitization ratio which is defined as the weighted
average securitization ratio of banks in a given county (weighted by bank market shares), and for
each bank the securitization ratio is computed as the total volume of securitized mortgages divided
by the total volume of issued mortgages. Other regression controls are defined in Appendix A. All
regressions include county fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Jumbo AR (Count)
Subsample LTI Income Control for Sec ratio
County Income*Post -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County Income 0.008* 0.006* 0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(County Income)*Post -0.147*** -0.122*** -0.151***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.027)
Log(County Income) 0.243 0.191 0.453***
(0.162) (0.149) (0.157)
Securitization Ratio (Cty Mean) -0.625*** -0.631***
(0.113) (0.112)
Observations 6,903 6,879 6,903 6,879 7,482 7,482
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.180 0.185 0.181 0.186 0.156 0.157
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To evaluate the effect of the determination of high-cost areas, I first identify con-
trol counties that are highly similar to the high-cost areas but are unaffected by this
determination. Specifically, I use comprehensive information on county-level socioe-
conomic, borrowing, and lending characteristics to find similar control samples before
the determination of high-cost areas. Second, to further establish the empirical ro-
bustness of this approach, I follow [1] and construct a synthetic control sample loan by
loan, by selecting similar loans that resemble relevant observable loan characteristics.
For each of the loan applications submitted in the “treated” counties, i.e., the coun-
ties that were determined as the high-cost areas, I identify a loan application most
similar to it that was submitted elsewhere in the country over the year. Once a loan
application is matched with one in the treated area, I remove it from the potential
pool of control loan applications. The full list of variables considered for both county-
and loan-level matching is summarized in Panel A of Table 8. The panel shows that
for each observable characteristics the samples have very similar properties.
The basic county-level regression specification based on a classic difference-in-
difference framework has the following form:
ARit =a+ b1Treatedi × Postt + b2Treatedi + b3Postt
+ Borrower Controlsit + Bank Controlsit + County Controlsit + ci + θt + εit,
(5)
where ARit is the approval rate in county i in year t. Treatedi is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if county i is determined as a high-cost area and zero
otherwise. Postt is a dummy variable equal to one for all years in or after 2008,
and zero prior to that. Borrower and bank control variables listed in Panel A of
Table 8 are county-level averages. The coefficient of interest is b1, which measures the
change in the approval rates between treated and control counties before and after
the high-cost determination in 2008.
The results are reported in columns 1-6, Panel B of Table 8. Even with a small
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Table 8: Reduction of jumbo share and approval rate increase: difference-in-difference
analysis and propensity score matching
Panel A presents summary statistics of county-level and loan-level key variables as of end-2007 in
matched treated (counties that are determined as “high-cost” areas by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA) in 2008 and matched with control counties based on the listed observables) and
matched control (counties that are not determined as “high-cost” areas and matched with treated
counties based on the listed observables) counties. Panel B reports estimates of panel regressions at
the county-year level in columns 1-6, where the dependent variables are the number-(volume-)based
jumbo loan approval rates in columns 1-3 (4-6). Columns 7-9 report the regressions at the loan-year
level, where the dependent variable is the Accept dummy that takes the value of 1 if the jumbo
mortgage application is accepted by the bank and 0 otherwise. The sample period is from 2007 to
2008. The indicator variable Post takes the value 1 for the year of 2008 and 0 for the year of 2007.
In columns 1-6, Treated is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the county is determined
as a “high-cost” county in 2008 and 0 otherwise. The included control variables are listed in Panel
A and defined in Appendix A. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the county level. In columns 7-9, Treated is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if the jumbo mortgage is submitted in a “high-cost” county that is determined in
2008 and 0 otherwise. The included control variables are listed in Panel A and defined in Appendix
A. All regressions include county, bank, and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are
double clustered by bank and county. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
Panel A. Summary statistics for treated and control counties/mortgages
County-level Loan-level
Control Treated Control Treated
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Borrower Controls
Log(Applicant Income) 4.381 4.743 Log(Applicant Income) 5.650 5.327
LTI Ratio 2.910 2.849 LTI Ratio 3.760 3.442
Minority Fraction 0.141 0.148 Minority Dummy 0.129 0.192
Female Fraction 0.270 0.270 Female Dummy 0.174 0.224
Lender Controls
Log(Assets) 16.171 15.509 Log(Assets) 19.777 19.058
Leverage 0.108 0.109 Leverage 0.091 0.092
Accounting Profits 0.691 0.685 Accounting Profits 0.514 0.610
Liquidity 0.152 0.164 Liquidity 0.124 0.150
Loans/Assets 0.691 0.685 Loans/Assets 0.514 0.610
Deposits/Assets 0.687 0.705 Deposits/Assets 0.626 0.674
Deposit Cost 0.035 0.038 Deposit Cost 0.037 0.035
Letters of credit/Assets 0.001 0.001 Letters of credit/Assets 0.003 0.002
Unused Loan Cmt/Assets 0.429 0.418 Unused Loan Cmt/Assets 0.378 0.499
C&I Loans/Assets 0.114 0.110 C&I Loans/Assets 0.096 0.112
Real Estate Loans/Assets 0.363 0.385 Real Estate Loans/Assets 0.244 0.307
Securitization Ratio 0.658 0.636 Securitization Ratio 0.642 0.581
BHC Dummy 0.996 0.937
County Controls
County Income Mean (’000) 38.365 54.282 County Income Mean (’000) 40.306 49.010
County Income Growth (%) 4.705 4.616 County Income Growth (%) 3.768 4.240
No. of matched units 20 76 No. of matched units 7,334 305,993
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Table 8: (Cont.) Reduction of jumbo share and approval rate increase: difference-in-
difference analysis and propensity score matching
Panel B. High cost areas and jumbo mortgage approval rates
County-level Loan-level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Var. Jumbo AR (Count) Jumbo AR (Volume) Accept
Treated*Post 0.076** 0.087** 0.129** 0.106*** 0.123** 0.282** 0.045** 0.041** 0.024**
(0.028) (0.036) (0.055) (0.027) (0.053) (0.108) (0.020) (0.019) (0.012)
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 383,925 383,925 383,925
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.219 0.251 0.225 0.260 0.277 0.344 0.111 0.112 0.113
matched sample comprising 154 county-year observations, the coefficient of the in-
teraction term is still significant at the 5% level, and it is robust to the inclusion of
various control variables and county and year fixed effects. This finding shows that
after the high-cost area determination, the treated counties that had a reduced pool
of jumbo loan borrowers experienced an increased jumbo credit supply.
Then I estimate loan-level regressions on a matched sample of loan applications.
Particularly, the specification has the following form:
Acceptedijt =a+ b1Treatedi × Postt + b2Treatedi + b3Postt
+ Borrower Controlsijt + Bank Controlsijt + County Controlsit
+ ci + θt + γBank + εijt, (6)
where subscripts i, j, and t denote counties, loan applications, and years, respectively.
Acceptijt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the application is accepted
and zero otherwise. Treatedi is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the
application is submitted in county i that is determined as a high-cost area, and zero
otherwise. Borrower- and bank-specific controls are based on each loan application.
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I also control for county, year, and bank fixed effects.
Columns 7-9, Panel B of Table 8 report the loan-level regression results. The
coefficients of the interaction term are positive and highly significant, which implies
that the loan application in the treated counties after the determination in 2008 is
more likely to be accepted. Overall, the results are consistent with the findings in
Table 2, which suggests that our results are not driven by potential changes in loan
quality.
1.4.3.3 Securitization rate
Could the increase in jumbo mortgage approval rate be driven by the enhanced bank
liquidity due to high securitization rate? This is possible if the majority of accepted
loans below CLL are conforming loans, and banks sell conforming loans due to the
secondary market activities of the GSEs which further increases banks’ balance sheet
liquidity. Even after the within-bank tests and the results with bank-year fixed effects,
I still conduct an additional test to address this concern.
I include a county-level aggregate securitization rate as an additional control vari-
able that proxy for the average banks’ balance sheet liquidity in each of the counties.
Specifically, in each year I calculate the securitization ratio of the number of secu-
ritized mortgages over total number of accepted mortgages for each bank, then in
each of the counties I calculate the weighted securitization ratio considering all the
banks that are operated in the county, where the weight is defined as number of mort-
gages issued by each bank in a given county over the total issued mortgages in that
county.13 This variable controls for the regional variation in average banks’ balance
sheet liquidity at the county level.
13To precisely capture the effect of CLL increase on higher securitization rate of nonjumbo loans, I
construct a similar measure of county securitization rate that only involves nonjumbo loans, and use
it as an additional control variable in the baseline specification. This variable captures the regional
variation in the increased number of securitized nonjumbo loans due to the effect of CLL change.
After controlling for this variable, I obtain very similar results as in columns 5, 6 and 11, 12 of Table
8.
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If the increase of credit supply were driven by the increase of bank liquidity,
then county securitization rate as a control variable would absorb much variation
in approval rate changes, leaving the variable of interest less significant. However,
columns 5 and 6 in Table 7 show that after controlling for county securitization ratio,
the coefficient of interaction term remains negative and statistically significant. In
addition, the magnitude of the coefficient is even larger than the results in Table 2.
1.4.3.4 House price expectation
Another possible alternate explanation for the increase in jumbo approval rate could
be due to an expectation of the increase in future house prices. Higher house price
growth expectations lower the estimated loss given default, thereby enabling lenders
to increase credit supply and target riskier clients ([136]). If this expectation-based
hypothesis were the case, then the finding of credit supply increase would be more
prevalent in counties with higher expectation of house prices.
One way to test this hypothesis is to focus on areas where the expectations-based
channel is not prevalent. [85] point out that areas with extremely elastic housing
supply are unlikely to have large increases in house price growth expectations because
any upward pressure on house prices will lead to increased construction and thereby
a higher quantity of housing stock. Therefore, in very elastic counties house price
growth is bounded by the quick adjustment in housing stock.
I test the expectations-based hypothesis by focusing on counties with high housing
supply elasticity. I collect data on housing supply elasticity from [157] at the MSA
level, and assign the elasticity measure to counties overlapping with the MSAs. This
measure of elasticity is based on the percentage of land which cannot be developed
for housing, and captures the extent to which the area is land-constrained by its
geography. [157] computes and ranks the measure of supply elasticities for 95 MSAs.
I focus on the counties with high housing supply elasticity measures in the top tercile
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(where the measure of supply elasticity is greater than 2.21).14
Panel A of Table 9 provides results for the high-elasticity subsample after run-
ning the baseline regression in Equation (1). The results show no significant change
in the coefficient of the interaction term. The coefficient remains statistically and
economically significant for both count-based and volume-based approval rates. This
finding indicates that the increased jumbo approval rates in low-income counties after
the CLL change are not driven by areas with low housing supply elasticity, thereby
suggesting evidence against the increasing house price expectation hypothesis.
1.4.3.5 Demand channel
One may have a concern that the in jumbo loan approval rate can be driven by
the income-based demand hypothesis which argues that the growth in individual
mortgage size is strongly positively related to the growth in household income ([80];
[4]). If this were the case, then the counties with low household income growth should
be less likely to experience a growth in mortgage credit.
To test this hypothesis, I obtain data on county-level per capita income and the
growth in per capita income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis over the sample
period 2005-2007. Then I focus on the counties with low per capita income (growth),
i.e., the counties with per capita income (growth) lower than its median value of the
full sample. In particular, the counties with low income growth have average annual
nominal growth rate of 1.27%, which suggests a real growth rate of -1.89% (the average
inflation rate during this period is 3.16%). Correspondingly, if the increase of credit
supply can be explained by the income-based demand hypothesis, then we should not
find such jumbo mortgage credit growth in areas with low income growth.
Panels B and C of Table 9 present the results. Panel B (Panel C) rerun the baseline
regression in Equation (1) for the counties with low per capita income (growth). In
14See [157] for more details on the measure of housing supply elasticity.
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Table 9: Alternative explanations: home price expectation and the demand channel
This table examines changes in the jumbo mortgage credit supply before and after the increase of
conforming loan limit (CLL) in 2006 and runs baseline regressions on different subsamples to test the
home price expectation hypothesis and the jumbo mortgage borrower income (demand) hypothesis.
The dataset is at the county-year level from 2005 to 2007. Panel A reports the regression estimates
on high land supply elasticity subsample, i.e., counties that overlap with metro statistical areas
(MSAs) with the land supply elasticities higher than 2.21 from Table VI in Saiz (2010). Panel
B (C) reports the regression estimates on low income (growth) subsample that comprises counties
with per capita income (growth rate) lower than its median value. The dependent variable in
Panels A, B, and C columns 1-4 (5-8) is the number-(volume-)based jumbo mortgage approval rate.
County Income is county per capita income obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Log(County Income) is the logarithm of county per capita income. The indicator variable Post takes
the value 1 for two entire years from 2006 to 2007 and 0 for the year of 2005. Columns 3, 4, 7,
and 8 include borrower, bank, and county controls. Borrower controls include applicant income and
loan-to-income ratio. County controls include county income growth, minority fraction, and female
fraction. Bank controls include total assets, leverage, accounting profits, liquidity, deposit ratio,
deposit costs, letters of credit, C&I loans, and real estate loans. All regression controls are defined
in Appendix A. All regressions include county fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.
Panel A. Land supply elasticity and jumbo mortgage approval rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High Supply Elasticity High Supply Elasticity
Dep. Var. Jumbo AR (Count) Jumbo AR (Volume)
County Income*Post -0.004*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County Income 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Log(County Income)*Post -0.135*** -0.119*** -0.143*** -0.140***
(0.040) (0.044) (0.046) (0.049)
Log(County Income) 0.216 -0.012 0.126 0.117
(0.274) (0.297) (0.334) (0.353)
Observations 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.218 0.222 0.211 0.215 0.262 0.265 0.248 0.252
37
Table 9: (Cont.) Alternative explanations: home price expectation and the demand
channel
Panel B. Borrower income and jumbo mortgage approval rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low Income Subsample Low Income Subsample
Dep. Var. Jumbo AR (Count) Jumbo AR (Volume)
County Income*Post -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
County Income 0.034*** 0.030* 0.035*** 0.034**
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016)
Log(County Income)*Post -0.444*** -0.448*** -0.447*** -0.455***
(0.120) (0.121) (0.123) (0.125)
Log(County Income) 0.790** 0.700* 0.818** 0.814**
(0.312) (0.385) (0.319) (0.385)
Observations 3,323 3,323 3,323 3,323 3,323 3,323 3,323 3,323
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.089 0.089 0.094 0.093 0.091 0.09 0.098 0.097
Panel C. Borrower income growth and jumbo mortgage approval rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low Income Growth Subsample Low Income Growth Subsample
Dep. Var. Jumbo AR (Count) Jumbo AR (Volume)
County Income*Post -0.007*** -0.004** -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
County Income 0.007* 0.008 0.010** 0.012**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log(County Income)*Post -0.212*** -0.128** -0.225*** -0.147**
(0.053) (0.058) (0.054) (0.060)
Log(County Income) 0.212 0.194 0.302* 0.319
(0.174) (0.204) (0.177) (0.200)
Observations 2,681 2,681 2,681 2,681 2,681 2,681 2,681 2,681
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.177 0.177 0.202 0.202 0.206 0.206 0.236 0.236
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both Panels B and C the coefficients of the interaction term remain negative and
statistically significant, which confirms that even in the counties with negative real
income growth rate, the increase in jumbo approval rate is still significant. Thus, it
cannot be that the results are driven by the income-based demand explanation.
1.4.3.6 Placebo test
Having put forward the idea that the increase in jumbo approval rate is associated
with the reduction in jumbo share caused by the CLL change in 2006, the main results
in Table 2 are in line with this view, but it is possible that the significant increase of
jumbo loan credit is not specific to this sample period. If the credit supply can be
explained by other factors instead of the CLL change, we may expect to find such
growth in jumbo mortgage credit during period when there is no CLL change.
To show the uniqueness of the impact of the CLL change on jumbo mortgage
credit supply, I perform a placebo test on data over Jan 2006-Dec 2007. This period
starts right after the new CLL became effective at the beginning of 2006, and ends
before the CLL change in “High-Cost” areas determined by the FHFA beginning in
2008. Therefore, the CLL remained unchanged for all counties during this placebo
period. However, I assume that there is a CLL increase at the beginning of 2007
and recalculate the independent variables accordingly. For example, Post indicator
during this placebo period is equal to one for 2007, and zero for 2006. Particularly,
the placebo regression runs the baseline specification in Equation (1) on the placebo
period using redefined independent variables.
Table 10 presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 show the baseline regression and
the placebo regression for the count-based approval rate as the dependent variable.
Column 3 then presents the result from the one-sided t-test that examines whether
the coefficient of the interaction term in the baseline regression (column 1) is signifi-
cantly larger in magnitude than that in the placebo specification (column 2). When
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Table 10: Regional variation in lender responses to uniform CLL increase: a placebo
test
This table compares our baseline results in columns 1 and 4 with similar estimations for an alternative
sample period. The results in columns 2 and 5 are based on panel regressions over the period from
2006 to 2007 (“Placebo”). The dependent variable in columns 1-2 (4-5) is the number-(volume-
)based jumbo mortgage approval rate. County Income is county per capita income obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). In columns 1 and 4 (2 and 5) the indicator variable Post
takes the value 1 for two entire years from 2006 to 2007 (2007) and 0 for the year of 2005 (2006).
Other regression controls are defined in Appendix A. All regressions include county fixed effects
and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Columns 36 show p-values of one-sided
t-tests to check whether the estimated coefficients based on different sample periods are significantly
different.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T-test (p-value) T-test (p-value)
Jumbo AR (Count) Baseline Jumbo AR (Volume) Baseline
Dep. Var. Baseline Placebo (06-07) >Placebo Baseline Placebo (06-07) >Placebo
County Income*Post -0.005*** -0.001 0.00 -0.005*** -0.001 0.00
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County Income 0.015*** 0.010 0.016*** 0.011
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
Observations 7,506 4,770 7,506 4,770
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.160 0.112 0.156 0.0948
we compare columns 1 and 2, it becomes clear that most of the results are absent
in the placebo period. Not only is the statistical significant of the coefficient ab-
sent in column 2, but also the magnitude shrinks (-0.005 in column 1 versus -0.001
in column 2). The very low p-value in column 3 formally shows that there is no
significant increase of jumbo loan credit in low-incomeareas when the CLL has not
changed. Columns 4-6 use the volume-based approval rate as the dependent variable
and confirm the robustness of the results.
Overall, Table 10 reflects the uniqueness of the relationship between jumbo ap-
proval rate increase in low-income areas and the CLL change. This supports the
claim that the impact of reduced jumbo mortgage share on jumbo credit supply ei-
ther appeared or strengthened, in economic and statistical terms, due to the CLL
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change.
1.4.3.7 Other robustness checks
Table 11 presents a battery of robustness tests to check whether or not our main
results are sensitive to changes in estimation techniques or variable definitions. First,
if credit supply has a trend over our sample years, the regression estimation would
not capture the real impact of CLL change on credit supply. Columns 1 and 5
show regression results where I include a linear time trend that is identical across all
counties. In order for the time trend to be reflected in the regression, I drop year
fixed effects. The estimations show that the results still hold. This suggests that
the coefficient of the interaction term is not driven by the overall direction the credit
supply moves across time.
Next, I verify that my findings are not an artifact of state-specific trends across
time. Columns 2 and 6 in Table 11 show the results of regression specifications where
I control for state-specific time trends. These results survive after including state-
specific time trends that allow each state to have different trends in jumbo loan credit
supply that could have coincided with the impact of CLL change on local areas.
In columns 3 and 7 I exclude counties with the lowest (i.e., bottom quartile)
median income and rerun the baseline specification. In this way I check whether our
results are driven by extremely high approval rates for jumbo loans in very-low-income
counties where there are only a few jumbo loan applications. This turns out not to
be the case and the results are robust to the exclusion of very-low-income counties.
Furthermore, I exclude all extreme values in the 1st and 99th percentile of the
distribution of ApprovalRate for both count- and volume-based measures. The results
in columns 4 and 8 show that our findings do not appear to be sensitive to the way
I exclude extreme values. The coefficients of interaction terms remain negative and
statistically significant.
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Table 11: Regional variation in lender responses to uniform CLL increase: robustness
checks
This table shows robustness tests for our baseline regressions to explain the regional heterogeneity of
jumbo loan approval rates after the conforming loan limit (CLL) increased in 2006. It is estimated
using baseline regressions and the dataset is at the county-year level from 2005 to 2007. Columns
1 and 5 include a linear time trend that is identical across all counties and drop year fixed effects.
Columns 2 and 6 include state-specific time trends that allow each state to have different trends
in jumbo loan credit supply and drop year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 7 are based on regressions
that exclude the lowest income counties (i.e., bottom quartile). Columns 4 and 8 are based on a
sample that excludes extreme approval rates (1% of the distribution on both sides). The dependent
variable is number-(volume-)based jumbo loan approval rate in columns 1-4 (5-8). County Income
is county per capita income obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The indicator
variable Post takes the value 1 for two entire years from 2006 to 2007 and 0 for the year of 2005.
All regressions control for borrower, bank, and county characteristics that are defined in Appendix
A. All models include county fixed effects. Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 also include year fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var. Jumbo AR (Count) Jumbo AR (Volume)
Excluding lowest Excluding Excluding lowest Excluding
Time Trends State-Time Trends income counties Extreme AR Time Trends State-Time Trends income counties Extreme AR
County Income*Post -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County Income 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Post 0.156*** 0.115*** 0.180*** 0.135***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
Year 0.028** 0.021
(0.013) (0.013)
Observations 7,506 7,506 5,507 4,509 7,506 7,506 5,507 4,509
Time Trends Yes Yes
State-Time Trends Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.151 0.157 0.211 0.346 0.156 0.161 0.210 0.332
The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is number-based jumbo loan approval rate.
Columns 5-8 use volume-based approval rate as the dependent variable and further
confirms its robustness. In addition, I use the logarithm of county income in the
regressions and confirm the robustness.
1.5 Heterogeneity in Lenders and Borrowers
The analysis thus far has focused on the average response of lenders to jumbo mort-
gage share reductions, suggesting that lenders significantly raise jumbo approval rates
42
in counties where the jumbo share reduction is larger. In addition, it is important to
understand heterogeneity in lenders’ responses to CLL change, and the difference in
approval rates for heterogeneous borrowers. For instance, locally concentrated lenders
may be especially sensitive to changes in jumbo market shares; less wealthy and liquid-
ity constrained borrowers may obtain more credit when lenders increase jumbo credit
supply. In this section, I aim to identify important heterogeneity in lenders’ responses
to jumbo mortgage share reductions and heterogeneity in borrowers’ characteristics.
1.5.1 Heterogeneous lenders
While the effect of the CLL change differs across regions, lenders in each region may
also very in characteristics such as liquidity and local informativeness and thus can
differ in their responses to the policy shock. As noted in [129], jumbo loans are
(i) less liquid in the capital market than conforming loans, since the latter can be
securitized through GSEs and trading of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) in the
secondary market, and are (ii) more private-information-intensive because they are
more costly to sell. Therefore, the importance of jumbo market to banks may vary
with bank-specific conditions. For example, small banks may differ from large banks
in reacting to the CLL change due to differentials in geographic diversification and
business bases; banks with differential informativeness of local markets may have
different incentives to defend market share.
1.5.1.1 Lender size: small vs. large banks
I first exploit lender size. To classify banks as small or large, I divide the sample
of banks based on total assets in 2005 (the first year in the sample period of my
analysis). A bank is classified as large if the total assets is above the top one percent
cutoff of the assets distribution, and classified as small if it below the top one percent
cutoff.
I have several reasons to exploit variation in bank size: (i) Small banks are more
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likely to rely on the originate-and-hold business model and thus keep jumbo mortgages
on their balance sheets, which lowers the liquidity of their portfolio; (ii) as jumbo
mortgage rates are higher relative to conforming loans and thus serve as an important
source of income for small banks that do not have many other sophisticated means in
generating profits; (iii) small banks tend to be more locally concentrated, therefore
they have stronger desire to maintain business connection with their local wealthy
borrowers since they cannot easily find substitution in other regions.
Panel A of Table 12 tests the hypothesis that the CLL policy shock should af-
fect small banks more than large banks by running the baseline specifications for
small banks (columns 1-4) and large banks (columns 5-8) separately. In columns 1-4
(columns 5-8) I only focus on the subsample of jumbo loan applications to small (large)
banks and recalculate the approval rate and the corresponding borrower characteris-
tics as control variables. The negative and significant coefficient on the interaction
term for all columns 1-4 confirms that the jumbo share reduction leads to a higher
approval rate of jumbo loans for small banks, and this result is robust to the inclusion
of a large set of control variables. Columns 5-8 show that the top one percent largest
lenders do not increase jumbo credit supply significantly in low-income areas after the
CLL change. The results in Table 12 suggest that small banks lend more aggressively
than large banks when the pool of jumbo loan borrowers shrinks.
1.5.1.2 Lender informativeness
I next exploit informativeness heterogeneity across bank-county pairs. If banks differ
in the extent to which they are informed of local credit markets, they can differ in
the strategic use of information to defend market share of jumbo loans.
Theory suggests that the strategic role of acquiring information in jumbo loan
segment may interact with the structure of the banking industry. Banks lending in a
competitive credit market can differ from those lending in a relatively concentrated
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Table 12: Heterogeneity in lenders and jumbo approval rate increase
This table examines changes in the jumbo mortgage credit supply before and after the increase of
conforming loan limit (CLL) in 2006 and runs baseline regressions on different subsamples to examine
the heterogeneity of lender size. The dataset is at the county-year level from 2005 to 2007. In Panel
A, columns 1-4 (5-8) are based on a subsample that includes jumbo loan applications to small (large)
banks. A bank is classified as large if the total assets is above the top one percent cutoff of the assets
distribution, and classified as small if it below the top one percent cutoff. The dependent variable in
columns 1-4 (5-8) is the number-based jumbo mortgage approval rate calculated using the subsample
of small (large) banks. County Income is county per capita income obtained from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). Log(County Income) is the logarithm of county per capita income. The
indicator variable Post takes the value 1 for two entire years from 2006 to 2007 and 0 for the year
of 2005. Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 include borrower, bank, and county controls. Borrower controls
include applicant income and loan-to-income ratio. County controls include county income growth,
minority fraction, and female fraction. Bank controls include total assets, leverage, accounting
profits, liquidity, deposit ratio, deposit costs, letters of credit, C&I loans, and real estate loans. All
regression controls are defined in Appendix A. All regressions include county fixed effects and year
fixed effects. Panels B and C estimate a first-difference cross-sectional regression. The dependent
variable in columns 1-2 (3-4) is the change in number-(volume-) based jumbo mortgage approval rate
before (i.e., in 2005) and after the CLL increase at the beginning of 2006 (i.e., in 2006 and 2007). In
Panel B, Inform Num is defined as the logarithm of the number of jumbo loans that a bank issued in
a county in 2005. In Panel C, Specialty Num is defined as the ratio of number of jumbo loans issued
by a lender to a county over the number of nonjumbo loans issued by the lender to the county, in the
year of 2005. Jumbo HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) in 2005 computed by summing
up the square of each bank’s market share in a county, where market share of the bank is defined as
the ratio of the number of jumbo loans issued by the bank over the total number of issued jumbo
loans by all banks in the given county in 2005. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A. Lender size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var. Small Banks’ Jumbo AR (Count) Large Banks’ Jumbo AR (Count)
Log(County Income)*Post -0.053** -0.073*** -0.004 -0.045
(0.024) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029)
Log(County Income) 0.068 -0.052 0.217 0.330*
(0.125) (0.169) (0.167) (0.194)
County Income*Post -0.001** -0.002** -0.001 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County Income 0.003 0.001 0.007* 0.009**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 5,877 5,877 5,877 5,877 5,419 5,419 5,419 5,419
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.230 0.229 0.235 0.234 0.139 0.139 0.141 0.141
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Table 12: (Cont.) Heterogeneity in lenders and jumbo approval rate increase
Panel B. Lender informativeness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. ∆ Jumbo AR (Count) ∆Jumbo AR (Volume)
Inform Num*Jumbo HHI 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Inform Num -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.095***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
∆Log(Applicant Income) -0.051*** -0.058***
(0.010) (0.010)
∆Log(LTI Ratio) -0.069*** -0.071***
(0.011) (0.012)
∆Minority Fraction -0.037** -0.034**
(0.017) (0.017)
∆Female Fraction 0.002 0.000
(0.012) (0.013)
Observations 50,094 49,853 50,094 49,853
Borrower Controls Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.117 0.118 0.111 0.113
Panel C. Lender specialty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. ∆Jumbo AR (Count) ∆Jumbo AR (Volume)
Specialty Num*Jumbo HHI -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.489) (0.495) (0.490) (0.496)
Specialty Num -0.197*** -0.202*** -0.199*** -0.204***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
∆Log(Applicant Income) -0.046*** -0.052***
(0.010) (0.011)
∆Log(LTI Ratio) -0.068*** -0.072***
(0.012) (0.012)
∆Minority Fraction -0.033* -0.030*
(0.018) (0.018)
∆Female Fraction 0.009 0.009
(0.013) (0.013)
Observations 60,344 60,037 60,344 60,037
Borrower Controls Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0946 0.0951 0.0927 0.0934
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market. As jumbo loan market is information-intensive ([129]), banks’ acquisition of
proprietary information serves a dual role. First, by conducting credit assessment,
banks can attract customers from their rivals, and thus extending market share.
Second, it allows banks to create an adverse selection problem for their competitors,
thereby softening price competition ([94]).15 I expect that the severity of this problem
increases with the degree of credit market competition.
Using the CLL change as an exogenous event that triggered a sudden reduction in
jumbo loan shares, I compare the pre-2006 and post-2006 periods in a first-difference
cross-sectional setting. By doing so I can test whether the interaction of banks’
informativeness and market competitiveness is associated with the increase in jumbo
approval rate. To measure the bank’s informativeness of a given county, I follow
[51] and use the log of the number (or volume) of jumbo loans that a bank provided
to a county in 2005 (before the CLL change at the beginning of 2006). The log-
transformation captures the decreasing marginal impact of number (or volume) of
loans on bank’s informativeness. To measure competitiveness of the credit market, I
compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) in 2005 by summing up the squared
banks’ market shares in a county, where market share of the bank is defined as the
ratio of the number of jumbo loans issued by the bank over the total number of issued
jumbo loans by all banks in the county in 2005.16
I use fixed effects to address the unobservable heterogeneity concern. In order to
precisely control for changes in credit demand at the county level, I first use county
fixed effects to focus on differences across banks within counties (see [114], [159], and
[51] for a similar application). This is important because the CLL change may impact
the jumbo loan credit demand to varying degrees in different counties. Second, since
15As noted in [56], for each bank the adverse selection problem stems from its inability to discrim-
inate between new borrowers and borrowers rejected by its competitors.
16I also compute the HHI using market shares based on jumbo loan volumes, and obtain similar
results.
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banks are active in multiple countries, I include bank fixed effects to control for bank-
specific factors that might affect any changes in lending. The combination of bank
and county fixed effects allows me to focus on the informativeness measure that links
bank i with county j. Since these fixed effects capture (un)observed characteristics of
banks and destination counties, concerns about omitted-variable bias should be quite
limited.
In particular, the cross-sectional specification is
∆JumboARij =β · Informij ·HHIj + γ · Informij
+ ζ ·∆Bank-county Controlsij + δi + ηj + εij, (7)
where subscripts i and j denote banks and counties, respectively; β is a coefficient
vector of the interaction term and is the key variable of interest; Informij is the
informativeness variable at the bank-county level; HHIj is the measure of credit
market competitiveness at the county level, and its stand-alone base coefficient is
absorbed in the county fixed effects; δi and ηj are vectors of bank- and county-fixed
effect coefficients, respectively; and εij is the error term. ∆JumboARij is the change
in count-based (or volume-based) jumbo loan approval rate (AR) of bank i in county
j. In the specification, I also control for changes in bank-county level characteristics
such as the applicant income, the loan-to-income (LTI) ratio, the minority fraction,
and the female fraction. The applicant income and the LTI ratio are changes in
averages across all borrowers that submit applications to bank i in county j.
Panel B of Table 12 presents the results of the cross-sectional specification at the
bank-county level. Columns 1-2 show the specifications with count-based AR as the
dependent variable. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of the informativeness vari-
able (measured by log of the number of jumbo loans issued) is negative and significant,
and the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant. Column 2 shows
that the result is robust to the inclusion of borrower controls. Columns 3-4 use the
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alternative volume-based AR as the dependent variable and the results are very simi-
lar, both economically and statistically.17 Overall, the findings indicate that not only
do less informed lenders increase their approval rates to jumbo borrowers, but the
magnitude of this effect increases with the degree of local credit market competition
(measured by county-level HHI).
These results imply that informativeness and competition both play a role in
affecting banks’ lending strategy. Less informed lenders extend their lending to com-
pete for borrowers and market shares, and they lend more aggressively in the counties
where the jumbo credit market is more competitive. These findings are consistent
with the view that lending experience gives banks market power over their borrowers
([54]), which they can use to create adverse selection problems for competitor lenders
([56]; and [5]).
1.5.1.3 Lender jumbo loan specialty
In addition to lenders’ informativeness that captures the absolute heterogeneity in
information advantage across lenders, I then exploit the jumbo loan specialty that
focus on relative mortgage concentration within lenders. It is possible that some small
banks concentrate more on jumbo loans relative to their conforming loan businesses,
even though they may issue less jumbo loan credit in terms of the absolute quantity.
I focus on the variation in banks’ jumbo loan specialty for two major reasons.
First, since jumbo loans are information-intensive, lenders with jumbo loan specialty
have information advantage over their competitors, which provides incumbents with
an advantage over new lenders and thereby limits the number of competitors a market
can sustain in equilibrium. Second, as noted in [57], the information advantage of
some lenders creates adverse selection problems to their competitors and it represents
17I furthermore test the robustness to the use of alternative measure of informativeness (i.e., loan
volume-based measure) for both count- and volume-based approval rates. The results are available
upon request.
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an entry barrier. Taken together, given a change in jumbo loan share, banks can use
their specialty in jumbo loan segment to strategically compete with their competitors
and affect local market structures by extending or reducing mortgage credit.
I measure jumbo loan specialty using the ratio of number (or volume) of jumbo
loans issued by a lender to a county over the number (or volume) of nonjumbo loans
issued by the lender to the county, in the year of 2005. I then analyze whether the
extent to which lenders concentrated on their jumbo mortgage lending before the
CLL change would have affected their lending strategy after the CLL change when
the overall jumbo share of the residential mortgage market declined.
Specifically, I estimate the following first-difference cross-sectional specification:
∆JumboARij =β · Specialtyij ·HHIj + γ · Specialtyij
+ ζ ·∆Bank-county Controlsij + δi + ηj + εij, (8)
where subscripts i and j denote banks and counties, respectively; ∆JumboARij is the
change (from pre-2006 to post-2006 period) in count-based (or volume-based) jumbo
loan approval rate (AR) of bank i in county j ; Specialtyij is the jumbo loan specialty
variable that is defined above at the bank-county level; HHIj is the measure of credit
market competitiveness at the county level which is defined as in Equation (7); δi and
ηj are vectors of bank- and county-fixed effect coefficients, respectively; and εij is the
error term.
Panel C of Table 12 presents the results of Equation (8). Columns 1-2 (3-4) show
the specifications with the count- (volume-) based AR as the dependent variable.
Column 1 shows that the coefficient of the count-based jumbo loan specialty variable
and the coefficient of its interaction term with competition measure HHI are both
negative and significant. Column 2 shows that the result is robust to the inclusion
of borrower controls. Columns 3-4 show that the results are robust to the alternative
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volume-based AR as the dependent variable.18
Overall, the findings indicate that: (i) Lenders that have less expertise in jumbo
loans increase their jumbo credit supply to local borrowers, which is consistent with
the competition channel that they strategically increase lending to create the adverse
selection problem for their competitors; (ii) the magnitude of this effect decreases
in the degree of credit market competition at the county level (measured by HHI),
which suggests that asymmetric information can determine credit market structure
and thus limit the number of competitors a market can sustain in equilibrium.
1.5.2 Heterogeneous borrowers
In this subsection, I examine whether lenders’ responses to the CLL change are differ-
ent across categories of borrowers. Since credit market competition and information
asymmetry contribute to determine lenders’ responses to the reduction of jumbo loan
share across geographical areas, lenders may extend their jumbo credit across differ-
ent types of borrowers. This may be particularly the case if certain types of borrowers
are rationed out when the competition between lenders is less intense.
I first exploit the variation of jumbo loan credit growth across borrower quality.
Specifically, I use the loan-to-income (LTI) ratio to proxy for the borrower quality
since it provides important hard information in determining a borrower’s overall qual-
ity (see, e.g., [59]; [113]). The LTI ratio is defined as the ratio of the total amount
of jumbo mortgage over the reported applicant income in the HMDA data.19 I then
divide the mortgage origination sample into two groups based on borrower LTI ratios:
low quality (LTI ratio above median) and high quality (LTI ratio below median). To
18I furthermore test the robustness to the use of alternative measure of jumbo specialty (i.e., loan
volume-based measure) for both count- and volume-based approval rates. The results are available
upon request.
19Some previous studies have pointed out that the applicants’ income are upward biased (e.g.,
[139]). In computing LTI ratio using the reported applicant income from HMDA data I implicitly
assume that the income information of jumbo loan borrowers across geographic areas and across
different categories is inflated to a similar extent.
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examine the heterogeneity in LTI ratios, I run the baseline specification in Equation
(1) for the two groups separately.
Panel A of Table 13 reports the results for the high LTI ratio (columns 1-4) and
the low LTI ratio (columns 5-8) groups. In Panel A, the coefficient of the interaction
variable is negative and significant; in contrast, the coefficient of the interaction term
in Panel B are not only less significant but also smaller in magnitude. These results
show that after the CLL increase the jumbo mortgage credit growth is higher for
the high LTI ratio group. When lenders are looking for opportunities to extend their
market shares in a competitive lending environment, they tend to provide more credit
to risky jumbo loan borrowers who may have been rationed out in a less competitive
lending environment.
I then analyze whether the extent to which banks expand their lending after the
CLL change vary across different loan purposes. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it
is easier to shop a refinance than a purchase, in part because of the right of rescission
under the Truth in Lending Act that protects borrowers, and in part because many
lenders are prepared to assume full responsibility for settlement costs which reduces
the burden on borrowers.
Other than the above factors, home-purchase loans and refinancing loans may
differ from the lender’s perspective. For example, it is likely that some borrowers of
home-purchase loans are new to the credit market or have been rejected by another
lender, which implies higher information-gathering cost or higher risk. In contrast,
some refinancing loan borrowers have set up a reliable repayment record and thereby
are easier to enter a new mortgage with the same or a new lender. Consistent with
this adverse selection channel, I expect to see a strong effect of the CLL change in
low-income areas where the competition level is higher after the CLL increase.
Panel B of Table 13 runs the baseline regression in Equation (1) for refinancing
mortgage applications (columns 1-4) and home-purchase loan applications (columns
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Table 13: Heterogeneity in borrowers: loan-to-income ratios and loan purposes
This table examines changes in the jumbo mortgage credit supply before and after the increase of
conforming loan limit (CLL) in 2006 and runs baseline regressions on different subsamples to examine
the heterogeneity of borrowers’ loan-to-income (LTI) ratios. The dataset is at the county-year level
from 2005 to 2007. In Panel A, columns 1-4 (5-8) are based on a subsample that includes borrowers
with LTI ratios above (below) the median value of LTI ratio. The dependent variable is the number-
based jumbo mortgage approval rate calculated using the corresponding subsample. County Income
is county per capita income obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Log(County
Income) is the logarithm of county per capita income. The indicator variable Post takes the value 1
for two entire years from 2006 to 2007 and 0 for the year of 2005. In Panel B, columns 1-4 (5-8) are
based on a subsample that includes only mortgages with the refinancing purpose (home purchase
purpose). The dependent variable is the number-based jumbo mortgage approval rate calculated
using the corresponding subsample. In both panels, columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 include borrower, bank,
and county controls. Borrower controls include applicant income and loan-to-income ratio. County
controls include county income growth, minority fraction, and female fraction. Bank controls include
total assets, leverage, accounting profits, liquidity, deposit ratio, deposit costs, letters of credit, C&I
loans, and real estate loans. All regression controls are defined in Appendix A. All regressions include
county fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A. LTI ratios of borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Borrowers with high LTI ratios Borrowers with low LTI ratios
Dep. Var. Jumbo AR (Count) Jumbo AR (Count)
County Income*Post -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.001* -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County Income 0.012*** 0.010* 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Log(County Income)*Post -0.189*** -0.171*** -0.045* -0.051*
(0.025) (0.029) (0.024) (0.027)
Log(County Income) 0.347** 0.233 -0.040 0.108
(0.144) (0.217) (0.128) (0.172)
Observations 6,705 6,705 6,705 6,705 6,467 6,467 6,467 6,467
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.141 0.142 0.154 0.156 0.249 0.250 0.257 0.257
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Table 13: (Cont.) Heterogeneity in borrowers: loan-to-income ratios and loan pur-
poses
Panel B. Borrowers with different loan purposes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Refinancing borrowers Home purchase borrowers
Dep. Var. Jumbo AR (Count) Jumbo AR (Count)
County Income*Post -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County Income 0.017*** 0.015*** -0.005 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(County Income)*Post -0.150*** -0.134*** -0.020 -0.025
(0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
Log(County Income) 0.574*** 0.547*** -0.177 0.049
(0.137) (0.166) (0.163) (0.173)
Observations 6,862 6,862 6,862 6,862 5,985 5,985 5,985 5,985
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.190 0.191 0.195 0.196 0.112 0.112 0.118 0.118
5-8). In line with expectations, the results show that the jumbo mortgage credit
growth is higher for the refinancing mortgage applications than for the ones with the
home-purchase purpose.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I analyze the strategic response of lenders facing an exogenous reduction
of the jumbo share of local mortgage markets, by exploiting the change in uniform
conforming loan limit as the identification strategy. My results establish that, when
the local jumbo share is reduced, lenders expand credit to jumbo loan borrowers
and compete more aggressively to defend market share. Utilizing rate spread data
from HMDA, I also show that banks lower the interest rates of jumbo mortgages
especially in areas where the credit market competition is tougher. Furthermore, a
larger increase of jumbo approval rate is associated with a relatively poorer future
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loan performance. My results are consistent with the competition channel that banks
give out more jumbo credit without carefully screening borrowers. The effects are
especially pronounced in low-income areas where lenders have stronger incentive to
defend market share relative to efficiently price the loan. Overall, this paper suggests
an unintended consequence of the uniform federal pricing policy that lenders’ incen-
tives can be distorted across regions which can further lead to inefficiency of local
risk pricing and credit allocation.
Furthermore, on the lender side, smaller banks and banks that are less informed
of the local market and that are less specialized in jumbo lending tend to lend more
aggressively by expanding credit supply to local borrowers, and the credit expansion
grows with competition level of local credit markets. On the borrower side, risky
borrowers, i.e., those with higher LTI ratios, and refinancing loans are provided with
more credit. In short, my results suggest that lending experience gives banks market
power over their borrowers ([54]), which they can use to create adverse selection
problems for competitor lenders ([56]; and [5]).
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CHAPTER II
HOUSING MARKET INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC
CONVERGENCE
2.1 Introduction
The recent Great Recession highlights the importance of housing market to the U.S.
economy. One of the most notable trends in the U.S. housing market in recent decades
is that changes in house prices have become increasingly synchronized across regions.
The average absolute difference in annual growth rates of Housing Price Index (HPI)
across U.S. state pairs decreased from 9.6% in 1975 to 2.5% in 2016. During the
same period, a strong economic convergence across U.S. states has also occurred.
The average (across state pairs) absolute differences in the growth rates of real Gross
State Product (GSP), real income, and total employment have declined significantly
at a rate comparable to that of HPI growth.1 Motivated by these trends, our paper
investigates whether and how the inter-state housing market integration may have
contributed to the convergence of economic growth across U.S. states.
Several recent studies have documented the increasing co-movement in U.S. house
prices across regions and examined the determinants of this trend (e.g., [55]; [47], [45];
[107]; [98]; [117]). The patterns and causes of economic convergence across different
countries and regions, on the other hand, have always been an important topic for
both policy makers and researchers (e.g., [64]; [13]; [12], [11]; [145]; [14]; [76]; [143];
[106]). Despite the importance of these two phenomena, we are not aware of any
1See Figure 4 for details. Housing Price Index (HPI) data are from the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). GSP and state income data are from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). The state-level total employment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS).
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research that studies housing market integration as a potential driver of economic
convergence.
Both theory and empirical evidence show that the housing market can have a
major effect on economic activities. The affordability of real estate and changes of its
prices have a direct effect on the wealth and consumption of households ([78]; [135]),
a firm’s financial capacity ([10], [165], [92]), and regional employment and output
([138]; [3]; [44]; [158]; [130]).
As noted by [20], [115] and [102], the dynamics of asset values interacting with
borrowers’ credit limits (i.e., the collateral channel) can be a powerful transmission
mechanism of production shocks that can be propagated and amplified to other sec-
tors. Supporting the influence of housing market through the collateral channel, [77]
and [39] find that firms increase investment following positive price shocks that in-
crease the collateral value of firm assets. A few papers show that increases in housing
wealth foster entrepreneurship by allowing individuals to extract more equity from
their property to invest in their business (e.g., [3]; [44]; [158]).
We expect the housing market integration to influence the economic synchroniza-
tion of the states through the collateral channel. First, correlated changes in house
prices across states are likely to induce similar changes in collateral values, which in-
troduces related supply and demand shocks in the capital markets of these states. On
the supply side, improvements in collateral values alleviate the concerns of lenders on
borrowers’ debt repayment ability and lower the cost of capital for borrowers. On the
demand side, financially constrained individuals and firms will take advantage of the
increased collateral values and borrow more to invest in projects that they otherwise
do not have capital for. These similar shocks in both the supply and demand sides
of capital markets would likely result in related changes in investments, economic
growths, and employments, ceteris paribus (e.g., [11]; [76]; [145]).
Second, changes in collateral values can exacerbate business cycles (see [136],
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Figure 4: House price growth divergence and real economic growth divergence over
1975-2016
This figure plots the annual averages of HPI growth divergence in Panel A and real economic
growth divergence in Panel B-D for the period of 1975 to 2006. HPI growth divergence is the
absolute difference in HPI growth rates between a state pair. Real economic growth divergence
is the absolute difference in real GSP growth rates between a state pair in Panel B, the absolute
difference in real income growth rates between a state pair in Panel C, and the absolute different in
employment growth rates between two states in Panel D.
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among others). Using a dynamic economy model, [115]) point out that collateral val-
ues will deteriorate in business downturns, thus reducing debt capacity and depressing
investment, which will amplify the downturn. Moreover, in addition to reducing or-
ganic debt borrowing, depreciated house values increase the existing loan to value
ratio and may also create the classical debt overhang problem, which affects labor
mobility, decreases employment, and reduces investment (e.g., [95]; [62]; [21]; [133];
[26]). During good times, the increasing collateral values will increase firms’ debt
capacity and investment, which further enhances assets values and strengthens the
economic upturn. Given that changes in collateral values can exacerbate business
cycle, states that experience similar collateral value shifts may expect to converge in
growth patterns and have more synchronized business cycles. Thus, we expect house
price integration between states to increase the economic convergence among these
states.
Using a panel of all US state pairs from 1976 to 2016, we find a positive and sig-
nificant relation between house price co-movements and the lagged integration of the
states’ real GSP growth, real income growth, and total employment growth. These
findings are consistent with our hypothesis that real economic convergence follows
housing market integration. The economic magnitude is also significant: Moving
from the median to the 95th percentile of the housing market divergence distribu-
tion leads to seven percentage points, nine percentage points, and four percentage
points increase in the median divergence of state GSP growth, income growth, and
employment growth, respectively.
Studying the effect of housing market integration on the convergence of state
economies faces a number of challenges. First, a positive association between in-
terstate housing market integration and economic pattern co-movement might be
spuriously driven by some common omitted variables between states. For example,
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states with stronger economic, cultural, and political ties may have both more syn-
chronized economic fluctuations and more integrated housing market movements. To
mitigate this concern, we include state-pair fixed effects in our regressions, which
should remove the influence of state ties that are time invariant. Second, the re-
sponses of state economies to nation-wide shocks could be similar. If this is the case,
the documented trends in Figure 4 may be simultaneously driven by these nation-wide
shocks and result in a spurious correlation between housing market integration and
economy synchronization. To address the influence of macro-economic shocks and
time series trends, we control for year fixed effects and state specific time trend in our
regressions. Third, a concern of reverse causality emerges in that the integration of
economic activities may cause housing market integration. For example, [45]) show
that income and employment fundamentals contribute to the increases in housing
market integration after the housing bubble burst in 2000s. To partially mitigate
the concern of reverse causality, we use lagged housing market integration in all our
regressions. We also employ an instrumental variable approach to further address
these endogeneity concerns.
The ideal instrumental variable (IV) is one that can identify exogenous variations
in the co-movements of house prices that are not directly related to real economic
activity in these states. To construct the instrument, we rely on foreign shocks to
the domestic real estate markets that are orthogonal to the economic development
of the states. We extract foreign shocks to the real estate market in a state as the
residuals of regressing foreign direct investment (FDI) in the real estate sector of
the state on the overall FDI in the state together with state and year dummies.
The instrument is then computed as the absolute difference in real estate-related
FDI residuals between states i and j in year t. By construction, these residuals are
orthogonal to state-level economic conditions and are driven by shocks in foreign
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countries that lead to investment in the real estate market of U.S. states.2 The co-
movements of these residual FDI flows across states, on the other hand, may induce
correlations in house prices in these states. For example, capital flows from China
into the housing markets of Georgia and Texas would likely increase the correlation
of house prices between these two states. The first stage regression results indeed
show that the instrument variable is highly relevant to the inter-state housing market
integration. Our IV/2SLS regression estimates confirm that a higher degree of inter-
state housing market integration leads to more synchronized state economies. The
economic significance suggested by the instrumented coefficients is comparable to that
obtained from OLS regressions.
To further establish the validity of our results, we consider some alternative ex-
planations. First, [117]) show that bank integration is a key driver for the increasing
co-movements in house prices. Studies have also shown that bank integration affects
economic growths (e.g., Morgan et al., 2004). These papers suggest banking integra-
tion as a potential hidden factor behind the documented relation between housing
market integration and economic convergence. We take two approaches to show that
our results are unlikely to be driven by banking integration. First, controlling for
banking integration in all regression analyses has no influence on our findings. Next,
we show that the significant influence of housing market integration on economic
convergence is present in state pairs that were not financially integrated.
Second, state pairs that are geographically close to each other may share strong
2For example, the slowdown of Chinese economy and the overheated real estate markets in Canada
have driven investors from China and Canada, respectively, to invest in the U.S. real estate market.
As reported in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article, “Chinese Investors Pour Money Into U.S.
Property” (by P. Grant on May 25, 2016), “commercial property sales have slowed in the U.S. this
year - but Chinese investors are continuing to plow money into the market”, because “the Chinese
economy has slumped over the past year. Investors are looking abroad to protect their wealth against
the volatility at home”. Similarly, the WSJ article “Foreign Buyers Pump Up U.S. Home Prices”
(by L. Kusisto on July 18, 2017) reports that “The recent surge in foreign buying was driven largely
by Canadians flocking south to escape their own overheated real-estate markets”. The overheated
real estate market in Canada not only made U.S. home prices “look like a bargain”, but also “helps
give Canadians the cash to invest in vacation properties to the south”.
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social, economic, cultural, and political ties, which in turn causes both housing in-
tegration and the synchronization of economic activities (e.g., [14]). This argument
suggests geographic distance as another potential hidden factor of our findings.3 To
address this concern, we split our sample into two groups based on the median value
of state-pair geographic distance and find strong results not only in the group of states
that are closely located, but also in the group of states that are located far from each
other. This finding suggests that our results are unlikely to be driven by geographic
proximity between states.
We next examine whether housing market integration influences economic syn-
chronization through the hypothesized “collateral channel”. We employ two tests to
confirm the collateral channel. First, we divide industries into collateral-intensive and
non-collateral-intensive subgroups within a state and calculate the economic growth
divergence measures for these subgroups respectively. We find that the effect of hous-
ing integration on economic growth synchronization is particularly strong for the
collateral-intensive industries but not significant for the non-collateral-intensive in-
dustries. Second, if the economic growth synchronization is related to the housing
collateral channel, we should observe increases (decreases) in real estate secured loans
in the house-booming (busting) states. To empirically test this conjecture, we com-
pute measures of the prevalence of real estate secured loans in individual states, and
find that these measures converge between states as the level of inter-state housing
market integration increases. An alternative way of borrowing against real estate
assets is using the equity line of credit. Comparing to real estate secured loans, the
equity line of credit maybe a more flexible and quicker way for borrowers to tap into
their increased house values. Using the home equity line of credit (HELOC) data, we
find that the utilization of HELOC converges as the housing markets between states
3We measure state distance based on the latitude and longitude points of two state capital cities
and employ the “Haversine” formula to calculate the great-circle distance between two points.
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become more integrated. Collectively, results based on real estate-secured loans and
HELOC provide strong and direct support for the collateral channel.
We then assess two alternative channels through which housing market integration
may influence real economic convergence. First, the boom and bust of real estate
industry itself could be driving our results, especially for those states, such as Nevada
and Florida, where the real estate sector accounts for a large share of state economy.
We re-estimate the economic growth synchronization measures after excluding real
estate industries and still find strong impact of house price co-movements on the
synchronization of the growth rates of non-real estate industries. Second, if increases
in house prices improve individuals perception about their future wealth, individuals
may increase their current consumption level and drive up local demand for goods
([27]) and employment at non-tradable industries ([138]). Consequently, these local
demand shocks instead of collateral shocks may create co-movements in local economic
growths. To test for this alternative mechanism, we exclude industries that are most
likely to be affected by local demand shocks, i.e., non-tradable industries, and focus
our attention on highly tradable industries such as manufacturing and mining that are
least influenced by local demand. If our findings are driven by local demand shocks
instead of the collateral channel, we would expect the influence of housing market
integration on economic synchronization to be significantly affected when we remove
from the sample the sectors that are most sensitive to local demand. However, the
results show that this is not the case. The direction and significance of the results
remain unchanged or even become stronger in some cases when we remove the non-
tradable sectors from the regressions.
Our paper adds to a new and growing literature on the increasing housing market
integration in the U.S. and across countries ([47] [47], [45]; [107]; [98]; [117]). While
these papers focus on documenting the pattern and determinants of the housing
market integration, we provide one of the first sets of evidence on the consequence
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of the housing market integration. A paper that is closely related to ours is [130].
They find that external housing market conditions influence local economic growth
in financial connected markets, which they interpret as suggesting that capital flows
lead to growth divergence. Our paper differs from theirs in both research question
and empirical design. We focus on the convergence of economic growths across states
rather than the level of growth in individual states. While the financial market plays a
crucial role in our finding through the collateral channel, we do not find that financial
integration per se drives the influence of housing market integration on economic
convergence.
Our paper builds on the large literature on economic convergence across states in
the U.S. (e.g., [64]; [13]; [11]; [24]); [76]). Our results suggest an important new mech-
anism, i.e., house price co-movement, through which the housing market dynamics
could influence the convergence of U.S. state economies.
Our paper also complements the literature that focuses on the importance of the
collateral channel in effecting changes in real economic activity (e.g., [20]; [115]; [136];
[39]; [138]; [3]; [158]). More broadly, our findings contribute to a rapidly emerging
literature on the relation between housing market and the real economy ([3]; [44];
[130]; [140]; [141]; [158]; to name a few). The turmoil of housing market crisis and the
enduring Great Recession have motivated researchers to study how and why housing
market influences the real economy. Our evidence shows that the degree of integration
is a housing market characteristic that gets transmitted to the other sectors of the
economy and the collateral channel is the likely underlying transmission mechanism.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data and vari-
able construction. Section 3 discusses the empirical method and results. Section 4
shows the economic mechanism of the collateral channel and examines alternative
explanations. Section 5 presents additional robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
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2.2 Data
Our sample includes all possible pairs among 50 U.S. states plus Washington D.C.
from 1975 to 2016. It contains yearly measures of housing market integration for state
pairs. The state-level Housing Price Index (HPI) used to construct the measures of
housing market integration is from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Over-
sight (OFHEO). We measure economic growth convergence between states based on
GSP, income, and total employment. The annual values for GSP and state income
variables are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The annual state-level
total employment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The real Gross
State Product (GSP) data from the BEA are available from 1987, and thus the first
calculated GSP growth rate is for 1988. As a result, the sample period for the baseline
regression analysis is from 1988 to 2016. To conduct a robustness check on a longer
period, we back out the GSP data from 1977 to 1986 using the time series of Quantity
Indexes for Real GDP by state from the BEA. As we will show later, our results are
not sensitive to the starting year of the regression sample. We obtain comparable
results for alternative samples that start from either 1978 or 1995.
Measures on banking integration between two states are based on the state-level
bank lending data from the Call Reports. We use the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC)’s state-level Summary of Deposits data to construct alternative
measures of banking integration. We gather other state-level information, such as
population and industry composition, from the BEA. Nominal values are converted
to real values using the Consumer Price Index “All Items Less Shelter” from the BLS.
2.2.1 House prices co-movement
We retrieve state-level, repeated-sales, quarterly nominal HPI from the OFHEO web-
site (www.fhfa.gov) for the period of 19752016. These data are available for all U.S.
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states plus Washington D.C. since 1975.4 We first calculate quarterly HPI growth
rates, and then calculate annual HPI growth rates by compounding quarterly rates.
The average annual HPI growth rate by state is reported in Table 14. The average
annual HPI growth rate across all fifty states and D.C. is 1.16%. As indicated by the
standard deviations of the state-level time-series averages, there is a good amount of
variation in HPI growth rates across both states and years.
We follow [106] to construct our integration variables. Specifically, for each state
pair, i and j, and each year, t, we construct the divergence of HPI growth rates
between the two states using the absolute difference of real annual HPI growth rates:
HPI growth divergenceijt = |HPI growthit −HPI growthjt|, (9)
A lower divergence value indicates a higher housing market integration between the
two states. Panel A of Figure 4 presents time series plot of the evolution of housing
market integration from 1975 to 2016. As in Landier et al. (2017) and Cotter et al.
(2014), we also find a significant downward trend in the HPI growth divergence, sug-
gesting that U.S. housing markets across different states have become more integrated
through the years.
We also follow Morgan et al. (2004) to construct three alternative measures of
integrations: (i) the correlation of quarterly HPI growth rates between two states
over a rolling 5-year (20-quarter) window, (ii) the covariance of quarterly HPI growth
rates between two states over a rolling 5-year (20-quarter) window, and (iii) the
absolute difference in HPI growth residuals between two states.5 To compute the
growth residuals, we first regress the state-level HPI growth rate on state and year
fixed effects, and extract the residuals for each state year. Then we take the absolute
difference of the two state residuals as a measure for housing market integration
4See Calhoun (1996) and Cotter et al. (2015) for a detailed discussion on the quality and coverage
of the HPI index.
5Our results are robustness when we use a rolling 3-year (12-quarter) window to estimate the
correlation and covariance measures.
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Table 14: State-level house price and economic growth rates
This table reports state-level annual averages of the growth rates of house price index (HPI), GSP,
income and total employment from 1975 to 2016. The state-level annual averages of HPI growth
rates are computed using the quarterly HPI data. GSP Growth, Income Growth, and Employment
Growth are average annual growth rates based on Gross State Product (GSP), state income, and
total state employment, respectively. Nominal values are converted to real values using the Consumer
Price Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
HPI GSP Income Employment
Growth (%) Growth (%) Growth (%) Growth (%)
State Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Alabama 0.92 8.93 2.21 2.20 2.42 1.93 0.96 1.99
Alaska 0.09 4.15 2.06 6.63 2.87 5.18 2.04 2.26
Arizona 0.05 4.42 4.16 4.08 4.07 3.25 3.17 2.51
Arkansas 1.28 8.63 2.45 2.39 2.58 2.28 1.12 1.83
California 3.39 9.46 3.22 2.65 3.09 2.49 1.77 2.06
Colorado 2.05 5.45 3.49 2.81 3.57 2.70 2.22 2.17
Connecticut 1.33 7.73 2.43 3.07 2.48 2.64 0.78 1.55
Delaware 3.87 7.90 2.76 3.48 2.55 2.92 1.60 2.09
District of Columbia 0.95 5.85 1.29 1.88 1.79 2.87 0.50 2.87
Florida 1.21 7.78 3.55 2.85 3.69 2.83 2.69 2.33
Georgia 0.25 4.32 3.50 2.85 3.37 2.69 2.05 1.97
Hawaii 3.54 15.88 2.15 2.55 2.33 2.19 1.48 1.82
Idaho 0.46 4.30 3.28 3.58 2.99 2.55 2.04 2.13
Illinois 0.69 6.78 1.84 2.35 1.79 2.22 0.65 1.79
Indiana 0.63 5.36 2.11 3.20 2.00 2.38 0.85 2.26
Iowa 0.08 3.55 2.17 3.11 1.79 2.89 0.63 1.69
Kansas 0.17 3.43 2.09 2.07 2.17 2.13 0.83 1.34
Kentucky 0.52 3.27 1.96 2.73 2.24 2.02 0.76 1.40
Louisiana 0.72 4.35 1.18 3.22 2.39 2.15 0.86 1.78
Maine 2.60 7.77 2.03 2.36 2.35 2.53 1.07 1.79
Maryland 1.55 6.08 2.65 2.04 2.56 2.13 1.33 1.27
Massachusetts 2.23 7.76 2.85 2.77 2.59 2.60 0.87 1.37
Michigan 0.67 6.03 1.24 3.94 1.57 2.89 0.64 2.46
Minnesota 1.23 4.72 2.78 2.68 2.59 2.47 1.27 1.23
Mississippi 0.38 4.08 1.97 2.52 2.29 1.96 0.74 2.09
Missouri -0.27 4.75 1.91 2.42 2.10 1.88 1.02 1.68
Montana 1.63 5.75 1.93 2.36 2.23 2.47 1.24 1.61
Nebraska 0.65 3.61 2.56 2.53 2.27 2.62 0.86 0.82
Nevada 0.84 7.04 4.26 4.19 4.95 3.69 3.87 2.93
New Hampshire 0.35 3.40 3.68 3.58 3.43 3.28 1.72 2.06
New Jersey 1.34 8.60 2.30 2.47 2.33 2.30 0.96 1.63
New Mexico 1.80 7.39 2.83 3.42 2.98 1.92 1.73 1.92
New York 0.79 4.72 1.99 2.05 2.06 2.30 0.70 1.39
North Carolina 1.63 10.00 3.14 2.63 3.19 2.65 1.63 1.82
North Dakota 1.83 6.78 3.39 6.00 2.32 6.81 1.04 1.66
Ohio 0.07 3.70 1.77 2.74 1.61 2.05 0.54 1.65
Oklahoma 0.26 4.76 2.29 2.72 2.64 2.91 1.12 1.67
Oregon 2.40 7.56 3.55 3.79 2.83 2.58 1.74 2.28
Pennsylvania 0.87 4.66 1.94 1.90 1.92 1.64 0.66 1.35
Rhode Island 2.04 8.59 2.03 2.62 2.11 2.39 0.69 1.88
South Carolina 0.42 3.74 2.99 2.47 2.98 2.05 1.52 1.72
South Dakota 0.78 7.39 3.17 2.94 2.41 3.75 0.98 1.39
Tennessee 0.55 3.62 2.82 2.58 2.91 2.28 1.37 2.07
Texas 0.74 4.33 3.44 2.34 3.77 2.48 2.17 1.25
Utah 1.58 6.11 3.82 2.83 3.87 2.38 2.74 2.03
Vermont 1.14 5.23 2.91 2.81 2.75 2.33 1.33 1.97
Virginia 1.87 14.51 2.83 1.99 3.06 2.14 1.55 1.44
Washington 2.71 6.66 3.12 2.52 3.46 2.50 2.17 2.37
West Virginia 0.70 4.77 1.25 2.20 1.61 1.79 0.35 2.08
Wisconsin 0.65 8.36 2.26 2.06 2.20 1.97 1.00 1.62
Wyoming 1.15 6.12 2.13 3.99 2.92 3.94 1.31 2.59
U.S. Average 1.16 6.28 2.58 2.91 2.65 2.63 1.35 1.86
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between the states. As we will discuss in Section 5, our results are robust to these
alternative measures of housing market integration.
2.2.2 Measures for real economic convergence
We obtain state-level, annual GSP, income, and employment data from the BEA
website (bea.gov). Using these data, we calculate the annual growth rates for GSP,
income, and employment. Table 8 presents the state averages of these variables. The
average growth rate across 51 regions is 2.58% for GSP, 2.65% for income, and 1.35%
for employment. While the variation of these economic growth rates is generally
smaller than that of the HPI growth rate, there are still ample variations for these
economic growth rates across states.
Similar to the housing market integration measure, for each state pair, i and j,
and each year, t, we measure the divergence of economic growth using the absolute
difference of real annual economic growth rates:
Y divergenceijt = |Yit − Yjt|, (10)
where Yij is one of the three economic fundamental growth rates described above.
Intuitively, this measure captures how dissimilar economic growth rates are between
two states in any given year. A lower value suggests more synchronized economic
growth between the two states. Panel B-D of Figure 4 presents time series plots of
the evolution of the three real economic synchronization measures from 1977 to 2016.
As the trend lines show, the divergences of all growth measures decline from 1977 to
2016. This confirms the well-documented trend in the economics literature that the
state economic growths have become more synchronized in the U.S. (e.g., Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992).
To check the robustness of our findings, we construct an alternative measure of real
economic synchronization: absolute differences in economic growth residuals between
a state pair. In Section 5, we show that our results are robust to these alternative
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measures of economic synchronization.
2.2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 15 reports descriptive statistics at the state-pair-year level for the housing
market integration and economic growth convergence measures for the period of 1988-
2016. The sample size is 36,975, which is the total possible number of state pairs for
51 regions spanning 29 years. The average divergence over the sample period is 2.47%
for GSP growth, 2.03% for income growth, and 1.49% for employment growth. By
comparison, the average divergence in HPI growth over the sample period is 3.78%.
Table 16 presents the correlation coefficients between HPI growth divergence and
the divergence of economic growth rates across states. The correlation between the
current or lagged divergence of HPI growth rates and each measure of economic diver-
gence is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This supports a positive
association between house price co-movements and real economic convergence.
Figure 5 plots the relation between HPI growth divergence and real economic
growth divergence measured by GSP, income and employment in Panel A, B, C, re-
spectively. Consistent with a positive correlation between HPI growth divergence and
economic growth divergence, the fitted trend lines in all three panels have a positive
and statistically significant slope. In the following section, we try to establish a causal
effect of housing market integration on real economic convergence by implementing
multivariate analysis through multiple approaches.
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Table 15: Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis. The
sample period is from 1988 to 2016. GSP growth divergence, Income growth divergence, and Em-
ployment growth divergence are the absolute difference in real growth rates between any state pair
in year t, computed using GSP, income, and total employment, respectively. RE − securedloans%
divergence is the fraction of total real estate-secured loans issued in a state over total bank loans
issued in the state; RE− securedloans% (Assets) divergence is similar but over total bank assets in
a state. HPI growth divergence is the absolute difference in Housing Price Index (HPI) growth rates





sik is the market share of bank k in state i, in terms of bank assets. Log of GSP product and Log
of population product are the logs of the products of two states’ GSP and population, respectively.
Difference in log GSP is the absolute difference in the logs of two states’ GSP for any state pair in
year t. GSP growth residual divergence, Income growth residual divergence, Employment growth
residual divergence, and HPI Growth residual divergence are the absolute difference in the residuals
of growth rates between any state pair in year t, computed using GSP, income, total employment,
and HPI growth rates, respectively. The residuals are obtained from regressing the respective growth
rates on state and year fixed effects. Nominal values are converted to real values using the Consumer
Price Index from the BLS. See Appendix for detailed variable definitions.
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. 5% 25% Median 75% 95%
Dependent variables
GSP growth divergence 36975 2.465 2.280 0.200 0.900 1.900 3.400 6.700
Income growth divergence 36975 2.026 1.769 0.140 0.748 1.598 2.836 5.319
Employment growth divergence 36975 1.491 1.288 0.100 0.500 1.200 2.100 3.900
Independent variables
HPI growth divergence 36975 3.782 3.988 0.208 1.102 2.549 5.090 11.472
Banking integration 36975 0.004 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020
Log of GSP product 36975 23.159 1.493 20.712 22.114 23.139 24.203 25.638
Log of population product 36975 30.074 1.449 27.611 29.036 30.099 31.102 32.432
Difference in log GSP 36975 1.190 0.847 0.098 0.499 1.033 1.732 2.810
Difference in Industry Composition 36975 0.012 0.016 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.012 0.041
Alternative variables:
RE-secured loans% divergence 30740 0.161 0.137 0.011 0.058 0.124 0.226 0.446
RE-secured loans% (assets)
divergence 30780 0.121 0.100 0.008 0.045 0.096 0.173 0.321
GSP growth residual divergence 36975 2.358 2.188 0.156 0.815 1.782 3.259 6.333
Income growth residual divergence 36975 1.905 1.732 0.131 0.668 1.468 2.633 5.132
Employment growth residua
divergence 36975 1.335 1.163 0.095 0.485 1.033 1.858 3.590
HPI growth residual divergence 36975 3.803 3.887 0.223 1.150 2.650 5.139 11.326
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Figure 5: The relation between HPI growth divergence and real economic growth
divergence
This figure plots annual averages of real economic growth divergence (Y axis) against HPI growth
divergence (X axis) for the period of 1975 to 2016. HPI growth divergence is the absolute difference
in HPI growth rates between a state pair. Real economic growth divergence is the absolute difference
in real GSP growth rates between a state pair in Panel A, the absolute difference in real income
growth rates between a state pair in Panel B, and the absolute different in employment growth rates
between two states in Panel C.
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Table 16: Correlation matrix
This table reports correlation coefficients between major variables in this study. The variables we
consider include the absolute difference in real GSP (p.c.) growth, real income growth, and total
employment growth, among state pairs. We extract foreign shocks to the real estate market in a
state as the residuals of regressing foreign direct investment (FDI) to the real estate sector of the
state on the overall FDI to the state together with state and year dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) AD in Real GSP Growth 1
(2) AD in Real GSP p.c. Growth 0.80 1
(3) AD in Real Income Growth 0.47 0.27 1
(4) AD in Real Income p.c. Growth 0.26 0.33 0.64 1
(5) AD in Total Employment Growth 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.08 1
(6) AD in Real HPI Growth 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.14 0.07 1
(7) AD in Real HPI Growth - lag 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.54 1
(8) CoHerfindahl - lag 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 1
(9) Product of Log GSP p.c. - lag 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.02 1
(10) Product of Log Population - lag -0.16 -0.18 -0.16 -0.18 -0.15 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 1
(11) AD in Log GSP p.c. - lag 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.23 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.48 -0.36 1
(12) AD in FDI (PPE) Residuals 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.16 -0.01 1
(13) AD in FDI (PPE) Residuals - lag 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.13 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.17 -0.02 0.08 1
2.3 Housing market integration and the convergence of eco-
nomic activity
We use the following multivariate model to examine the influence of house prices
integration on economic synchronization:
Y divergenceijt = β ×HPI growth divergenceijt−1 +X ′ijt−1 ×Θ + γij + δt + εijt,
(11)
where Y Divergenceijt represents the measures of economic synchronization as defined
in equation (2) between states i and j in year t, and HPIGrowthDivergenceijt−1 is
the measure of house prices integration between states i and j in year t1. We also
include year fixed effects (δt) and state-pair fixed effects (γij) in the specification.
The year fixed effects account for the effect of market-wide national shocks and other
time-varying factors that can affect both housing market integration and economic
synchronization patterns in these states. The state-pair fixed effects control for time-
invariant factors that are common to both states, such as cultural and political ties,
geographic proximity, and similarities in institutional administration and industry
structures.
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To control for potential serial correlations in the panel data, standard errors are
clustered at the state-pair level to allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation for each state pair (see also [22]). Furthermore, we control for state-specific
linear time trends that allow each state to have different trends in real economic
growth that could have coincided with the housing price growth.
Vector Xijt1 includes control variables that capture some time-varying factors that
may affect the dynamic evolution of real economic synchronization for a state-pair.
We control for the level of banking integration between two states because the liter-
ature shows that banking integration encourages real economy integration (see, for
example, Morgan, Rime, and Strahan, 2004; Michalski and Ors, 2012). We follow
Landier et al. (2017) and construct a “Co-Herfindahl” measure to capture bank inte-
gration between states. The Co-Herfindahl is defined as the sum of products of banks
market shares for a state pair (i, j), i.e., Σksik × sjk, where sik is the market share of
bank k in state i, in terms of total outstanding loans. A higher Co-Herfindahl implies
a more integrated banking system. Alternatively, we measure banking integration as
the ratio of jointly owned bank loans (or assets) for a state-pair divided by the total
bank loans (or assets) for the state-pair. As in Morgan et al. (2004), we calculate
jointly owned bank loans or assets at the bank holding company level. The results
are very similar for both measures of bank integration. We report results based on
the Co-Herfindahl measure.
We also control for several gravity variables that may influence the economic con-
vergence of two states. Using the product of the two states’ GSP and population
in the previous year, we account for the possibility that our estimates are driven by
states’ receiving excessive capital investment in real estate industry and at the same
time converging to a new steady state. By including the lagged value of the absolute
difference in the log p.c. GSP, we control for the possibility that the positive effect
of housing integration on real integration is simply driven by the fact that housing
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integration increases among dissimilar states, which may also experience difference
growth patterns since poor states will grow faster than rich states. All control vari-
ables are measured in year t-1. The low correlations between HPI growth divergence
and other independent variables as shown in Table 15 suggest that multicollinearity
is unlikely to be a concern in the regressions.
2.3.1 OLS regression results
Table 17 reports the results of estimating Equation (3) using ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions. The dependent variable is GSP growth divergence in Column 1
and 2, income growth divergence in Column 3 and 4 and employment growth diver-
gence in Column 5 and 6. In columns 1, 3, and 5, we run the regression without
controlling for banking integration and the gravity variables. The coefficient of HPI
growth divergence is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all three
models. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that housing market integra-
tion increases real economic convergence. In columns 2, 4, and 6, we include in the
empirical specification the lagged values of the banking integration measure and grav-
ity variables. The coefficient of banking integration is negative. This confirms the
findings in Morgan et al. (2004) and Michalski and Ors (2012) that banking integra-
tion promotes real economic integration. While these control variables clearly have
significant influence on the real economic growth divergence, including them has no
material impact on the coefficient of HPI growth divergence. The coefficient on HPI
growth divergence remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for all
three columns. The influence of HPI growth divergence is economically significant as
well. For example, based on the coefficient estimate in Column 2, 4, and 6, moving
from the median to the 95th percentile of the housing market divergence distribution
leads to seven percentage points, nine percentage points, and four percentage points
increase in the median divergence of the two states’ GSP growth, income growth, and
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Table 17: OLS regressions of real economic convergence on housing market integration
This table reports the OLS regression estimates. The sample period is from 1988 to 2016. The
dependent variables are denoted in the column head. GSP growth divergence, Income growth
divergence, and Employment growth divergence are the absolute difference in real growth rates
between any state pair in year t, computed using GSP, income, and total employment, respectively.
HPI growth divergence is the absolute difference in Housing Price Index (HPI) growth rates of any
state pair in year t. Log of GSP product and Log of population product are the logs of the products
of two states’ GSP and population, respectively. Difference in log GSP is the absolute difference in
the logs of two states’ GSP for any state pair in year t. All independent variables are measure in
year t-1. Standard errors are clustered at the state-pair level. *, **, and *** denote statistically
difference zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GSP growth Income growth Total employment growth
divergence divergence divergence
HPI growth divergence 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Banking integration -1.281* -0.717 -0.401
(0.772) (0.636) (0.315)
Log of GSP product 3.500*** 1.586*** 0.199
(0.302) (0.186) (0.138)
Log of population product -2.957*** 0.486 0.364
(0.737) (0.511) (0.391)
Difference in log GSP -0.217* -0.083 0.008
(0.115) (0.086) (0.061)
Difference in industry composition 17.629*** 8.087*** 9.560***
(3.316) (2.821) (2.123)
State-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36,975 36,975 36,975 36,975 36,975 36,975
Adj.R2 0.214 0.222 0.252 0.256 0.200 0.201
employment growth, respectively.
2.3.2 Endogeneity concerns
The OLS results in Table 17 show a strong positive relation between housing growth
divergence and economic synchronization. Although this result is robust to a variety
of control variables, additional endogeneity concerns may still pose challenges on
interpreting the relation as casual.
First, we may not have fully controlled for some time-varying latent variables
that may simultaneously influence the housing market integration and real economic
convergence across states. For example, the banking integration measure captures the
75
similarity of bank asset shares in two states, but it does not reflect the actual capital
flows between the states nor does it tell how well developed are the banking systems in
the states. Moreover, while state-pair fixed effects control for the geographic proximity
between two states, they do not necessarily capture the possible changes in social,
cultural, and economic ties between the states.
Second, a possible concern emerges from reverse causality. Cotter et al. (2014)
show that income and employment fundamentals contribute to housing market inte-
gration after the housing bubble burst in 2000s. This suggests that converging eco-
nomic fundamentals between two states may encourage housing market integration.
To mitigate the concerns for reverse causality, in our panel estimates we use lagged
values of housing growth divergence. However, it is not an ideal solution because (i)
business cycles do not shift on a yearly basis, which means that last years economic
growth patterns may well continue into later years; (ii) anticipation of converging
business cycles between two states can also affect future house prices co-movement.
Third, the HPI data only covers changes in residential real estate prices. Some
studies argue that prices changes in the commercial real estate segment are more
important for real synchronization than residential real estates prices. If this is the
case, it has two implications for our study. First, the fact that we find strong influence
using only residential housing prices makes the effect of real estate market on economic
synchronization even more robust as the effect of commercial real estate is likely
stronger. Second, though commercial indices are highly correlated with residential
indices with a correlation coefficient more than 0.5 (Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar,
2012), there are still some omitted variations in the commercial real estate prices
that are not captured by the HPI indices. This measurement error in our variable
may introduce an omitted variable bias in our estimation too.
To address these additional endogeneity concerns, we undertake two sets of em-
pirical analyses: (i) the IV/2SLS estimation; and (ii) targeted analyses on a few
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alternative explanations that are directly related to the potential hidden factors dis-
cussed above. The specific empirical approach and findings of these two types of
analyses are discussed in the following two subsections.
2.3.3 2SLS/IV estimation
2.3.3.1 Instrumental variable
The various endogeneity problems discussed in the previous section all suggest that
the omitted variable bias may be present in our analysis. With a valid instrumental
variable, however, one can adequately address the omitted variable bias using the
2SLS estimation approach. The ideal instrumental variable is one that only affects
the housing market integration of different states (the relevance restriction), but is
not related to the states’ real economic convergence through channels other than
the housing market integration (the exclusion restriction). Identifying such a valid
instrument is very challenging as most policy or regulation shocks to the housing
market in the U.S. are often economic policies that are likely to influence the growth
of the state economies. Moreover, as the endogeneity issues involve a wide variety
of local and nation-wide economic, geographic, and even cultural factors, it is hard
to come up with an instrumental variable that is exogenous to all these potential
omitted variables. Further adding to the challenge, the instrumental variable should
be exogenous to each of the three dependent variables, i.e., the growth rates of GSP,
income, and employment.
Given these challenges, we utilize foreign instead of domestic shocks to construct
the instrumental variable. To identify foreign shocks to the local real estate markets,
we use the foreign direct investment (FDI) data from BEA. Specifically, we employ the
annual state-industry level value of “Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE)
of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Parents” as a proxy for the magnitude of FDI (from all
foreign countries) in real estate sector. A states FDI level could be high because of
the state’s overall economic development is attractive to foreign investors. If this is
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the case, the FDI to the real estate sector could be endogenous if it simply takes a
share in the overall FDI investment as a response to the states economic conditions.
To remove the general trend of FDI into a state, we use the following empirical
specification:
∆RE − FDIit = β ×∆OverallFDIit + η ×HPI residualit + γi + δt + εit, (12)
where ∆RE − FDIit represents the growth rate in real estate-related FDI in state
i in year t, and we use ∆Overall − FDIit to control for the overall growth of for-
eign investment that reflects state-level economic conditions in state i in year t. In
addition, we add state fixed effects (γi) and year fixed effects (δt). The state effects
account for time-invariant factors such as cultural and political ties formed between
state i and foreign investors and other unobservable factors that can have an impact
on patterns of foreign investment in the real estate industry of state i. The year
fixed effects account for the effect of overall worldwide shocks and other time-varying
common factors that affect both economic conditions in the U.S. (and in state i) and
countries of foreign investors. We also use HPI residual it to account for the fact that
real estate industry in state i in year t is particularly attractive to foreign investors.
In particular, we use the following specification to estimate HPI growth residuals:
∆HPIit = ζi + ηi + νit, (13)
where ∆HPIit is the housing price index growth rate in state i in year t. We add
state fixed effects (ζi) and year fixed effects (ηt) to account for the average house price
growth in each state and year, respectively. Thus, ν it is the HPI residual for state i
in year t in Equation (4).
We then use the FDI residual, εit, in Equation (4) to construct the instrumental
variable for housing market integration. The instrumental variable is the absolute
difference of FDI residuals for state i and j, i.e., AD in RE − FDI Resdijt = |εitεjt|,
where εit and εjt are estimated separately using Equation (4) for state i and j. Because
78
the PPE data series from the BEA is only available till 2007, our instrumental variable
is constructed for the period of 1987 to 2007.6 By construction, the residuals are
orthogonal to state-level economic conditions and are driven by shocks in foreign
countries that lead to investment in the real estate market of U.S. states. For example,
the slowdown of Chinese economy have driven investors from China to invest in the
U.S. real estate market. We expect the instrumental variable to relate positively to
our interest variable, house prices co-movements, because related residual FDI flows
across states is likely to generate correlations in house prices in these states. For
example, capital flows from China to the housing markets of Georgia and Texas will
likely increase the house price correlation between these two states.
We formally evaluate the validity of the instrumental variable in the following
section. We posit the following first-stage relationship between state-pair difference in
real estate-related FDI residuals (AD in RE−FDI Resd defined above) and housing
growth divergence:
HPI growth divergenceijt−1 =β × AD in RE − FDI residijt−1
+X ′ijt−1 ×Θ + γij + δt + θijt−1. (14)
The state-pair difference in real estate-related FDI residuals serves as a valid instru-
ment if: i) it is significantly correlated with housing growth divergence, and ii) condi-
tional on other factors, state-pair difference in real estate-related FDI residuals affect
economic cycle divergence through housing growth divergence (i.e., COV (AD in RE−
FDI Resdijt−1, εijt|Xijt−1, γij, δt) = 0, where ijt is the error term in the second stage
(Equation (3)). Because lagged values are used in equation (6), the data period for
the 2SLS estimation is from 1988 to 2008 as the instrumental variables is available
from 1987 to 2007, which includes 20,690 observations. Panel A of Table 18 presents
the results of first-stage regressions. As in Table 18, we estimate two models, one
6The PPE data becomes available again in 2015 and 2016. We add these two years of data and
obtain similar results.
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without (Column 1) and one with (Column 2) control variables. The coefficient on
RE-FDI resd. divergence is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in
both models. This suggests that states that diverge in the residual growth rates of
real estate-related FDI also have higher HPI growth divergence. The intuition is as
follows: if state i receives a large amount of real estate FDI that is driven by shocks
in foreign countries during certain period and state j does not get these foreign shock
induced real estate FDIs, house prices in state i would most likely increase while house
prices in state j would remain the same, ceteris paribus. As a result, the growth rates
of house prices in states i and j diverge. The Cragg-Donald F statistic is above 10
for both models, suggesting that the instrument is not weak (see Staiger and Stock,
1997; Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002).
Panel B of Table 18 reports the second-stage estimates. The dependent variable
is GSP growth divergence in Column 1 and 2, income growth divergence in Column 3
and 4, and employment growth divergence in Column 5 and 6. Regardless of whether
we include the control variables or not, the coefficient on HPI growth divergence in
all columns is positive and statistically significant. This confirms our findings from
OLS regressions that real economic convergence follows housing market integration.
Moreover, we note that the economic significance implied from the IV/2SLS estimates
are comparable to those of OLS estimates. Based on the coefficient estimate in
Column 2, 4, and 6, moving from the median value to the 95th percentile of the
predicted house price divergence results in four percentage points, twelve percentage
points, and four percentage points increase in the median divergence of GSP growth,
income growth, and employment growth, respectively.
2.3.3.2 Potential hidden factors: Banking integration and geographic proximity
To further establish the validity of our results, we explore a few alternative expla-
nations for the positive relation between housing market integration and economic
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Table 18: IV/2SLS regressions of real economic convergence on housing market inte-
gration
This table reports the first stage (Panel A) and second stage (Panel B) results of 2SLS estimates.
The sample period is from 1988 to 2008. Panel A reports the first-stage regression results. The
dependent variable is the HPI growth divergence. Panel B reports the second-stage regression results.
The dependent variables are denoted in the column head. GSP growth divergence, Income growth
divergence, and employment growth divergence are the absolute difference in real growth rates
between any state pair in year t, computed using GSP, income, and total employment, respectively.
All independent variables are measure in year t-1. Standard errors are clustered at the state-pair
level. *, **, and *** denote statistically difference zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level,
respectively.
Panel A. First-stage results
(1) (2)
HPI growth divergence




Log of GSP product 3.674***
(0.780)
Log of population product -2.752
(2.907)
Difference in log GSP 0.286
(0.298)
Difference in industry composition 5.083
(7.529)
State-Pair FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
State Time Trends Yes Yes
Observations 20,690 20,690
Adj. R2 0.439 0.440
Panel B. Second-stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GSP growth Income growth Total employment
divergence divergence growth divergence
HPI growth divergence 0.606*** 0.597*** 0.874*** 0.877*** 0.217** 0.209**
(0.208) (0.208) (0.254) (0.256) (0.092) (0.092)
Banking integration -0.537 -3.786** -0.226
(1.497) (1.878) (0.689)
Log of GSP product -1.615* -1.851 -0.465
(0.968) (1.189) (0.435)
Log of population product -5.339** 3.831 -1.921*
(2.385) (2.794) (1.011)
Difference in log GSP 0.027 -0.428 -0.061
(0.256) (0.307) (0.110)
Difference in industry composition 18.131*** 9.932*** 14.123***
(6.290) (3.495) (3.235)
State-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,690 20,690 20,690 20,690 20,690 20,690
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convergence in this section. The first alternative explanation is that increases in bank-
ing integration can lead to both housing market integration (Landier et al. 2017) and
real economic convergence (Morgan et al. 2004)) or divergence (e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan
et al, 2013; Mian, Sufi, and Verner, 2017b), depending on whether credit supply or
credit demand shocks predominate. Thus, banking integration is a potential hidden
factor that could simultaneously affect both housing market integration and real eco-
nomic convergence. Although this concern is mitigated in our analysis as we include a
measure of banking integration as a control variable, we employ a subsample analysis
to directly examine if banking integration is driving our results. We use the banking
integration measure (i.e., Co-Herfindahl) in Landier et al. (2017) and classify a sub-
sample of state pairs as having a low bank integration if the Co-Herfindahl measure
between the two states is zero. If banking integration is driving our results, the effect
of HPI growth divergence on economic growth divergence should not be present or
at least much weaker for this subsample of state pairs. The results are presented in
columns 1, 5, and 9 of Panel A for OLS regressions and Panel B for 2SLS estimations
in Table 19. The sample period for OLS regressions is from 1988 to 2016. As discussed
in Section 3.2.1, due to IV data availability, the sample period for 2SLS regressions
is from 1988 to 2008. In untabulated results, we verify that results are similar when
we run the OLS regressions in the 2SLS sample. As shown in the two panels, the
coefficient on HPI growth divergence is positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level for both OLS and 2SLS estimates. While the OLS coefficient (0.012) in Column
1 of Table 19 is a little smaller than the one documented in Column 2 of Table 17
(0.015), a Wald test on the equality of the two regression coefficients suggests that the
two coefficients are not statistically different from each other. When the dependent
variable is income growth divergence or employment growth divergence, the coeffi-
cient on HPI growth divergence in Column 5 or 9 of Table 19 is the same or even
larger than the corresponding coefficient documented in Table 17. These results show
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Table 19: Potential hidden factors: banking integration and geographic proximity
This table examines alternative explanations and reports results based on both OLS (Panel A) and
IV/2SLS (Panel B) regressions. The sample period is from 1988 to 2016 (except for indicated). In
both panels, the dependent variables are denoted in the column head. Columns 1, 5, and 9 focus
on the subsample of state pairs with banking integration measure of zero. Columns 2, 6, and 10
focus on the subsample of state pairs with banking integration measure of zero during the sample
period of 1988-1993. Columns 3, 7, and 11 focus on the subsample of state pairs with above median
capital city distance. Columns 4, 8, and 12 focus on the subsample of state pairs that do not share
a common state boarder. HPI growth divergence is the absolute difference in Housing Price Index
(HPI) growth rates of any state pair in year t. Log of GSP product and Log of population product
are the logs of the products of two states’ GSP and population, respectively. Difference in log GSP
is the absolute difference in the logs of two states’ GSP for any state pair in year t. All independent
variables are measure in year t-1. Standard errors are clustered at the state-pair level. *, **, and
*** denote statistically difference zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively.
Panel A. OLS results
Bank integration Geographic Bank integration Geographic Bank integration Geographic
measure=0 proximity measure=0 proximity measure=0 proximity
Full 1988- Large Non- Full 1988- Large Non- Full 1988- Large Non-
sample 1993 distance adjacent sample 1993 distance adjacent sample 1993 distance adjacent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable: GSP growth divergence Income growth divergence Employment growth divergence
HPI growth divergence 0.012*** 0.028*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.045*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.008*** 0.004** 0.008*** 0.005***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Bank integration 0.200 -1.323 -0.556 -0.890 -0.964** -0.575*
(1.407) (0.864) (1.202) (0.722) (0.409) (0.338)
Log of GSP product 3.564*** 21.824*** 4.275*** 3.629*** 1.344*** 13.378*** 1.189*** 1.586*** 0.251 2.496*** 0.266 0.172
(0.337) (2.159) (0.399) (0.315) (0.211) (1.845) (0.256) (0.195) (0.162) (0.449) (0.180) (0.145)
Log of population product -3.358*** -19.575*** -3.607*** -3.142*** 0.617 25.697*** 1.733** 0.543 0.914** -0.657 0.332 0.529
(0.825) (5.610) (1.054) (0.772) (0.572) (3.878) (0.728) (0.533) (0.445) (0.937) (0.523) (0.403)
Difference in log GSP -0.363*** -0.514 -0.421*** -0.317*** -0.092 -2.691*** -0.087 -0.141 0.010 -0.359** -0.001 0.002
(0.137) (1.110) (0.150) (0.119) (0.108) (0.706) (0.104) (0.091) (0.078) (0.163) (0.082) (0.064)
Difference in industry 18.506*** 50.478** 17.632*** 16.840*** 9.597*** 7.254* 1.131 8.245*** 12.533*** -2.358 5.133* 9.899***
composition (4.160) (21.272) (5.843) (3.397) (2.963) (4.346) (3.813) (2.607) (2.408) (2.960) (2.975) (2.182)
State-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28,120 5,520 18,502 33,901 21,680 5,520 14,025 25,718 21,680 5,520 14,025 25,718
Adj. R2 0.232 0.279 0.212 0.222 0.269 0.439 0.253 0.255 0.269 0.231 0.253 0.255
that the effect of HPI growth divergence on economic convergence in the low banking
integration subsample is comparable to the effect of HPI growth divergence in the
whole sample.
As discussed earlier, we use the data consolidated at the bank holding company
(BHC) level to compute the banking integration measure. This approach makes the
implicit assumption that commercial banks do not operate outside the borders of the
state where they are located. This assumption is reasonable until the enactment of
the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, which allowed BHCs to consolidate activities in more
than one states into a single commercial bank (e.g., Morgan et al., 2004). Thus, after
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Table 19: (Cont.) Potential hidden factors: banking integration and geographic
proximity
Panel B. 2SLS results
Bank integration Geographic Bank integration Geographic Bank integration Geographic
measure=0 proximity measure=0 proximity measure=0 proximity
Full 1988- Large Non- Full 1988- Large Non- Full 1988- Large Non-
sample 1993 distance adjacent sample 1993 distance adjacent sample 1993 distance adjacent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable: GSP growth divergence Income growth divergence Employment growth divergence
HPI growth divergence 0.419*** 0.597*** 0.618** 0.532*** 0.559*** 0.418*** 0.642** 0.753*** 0.083 0.028 0.148 0.205**
(0.128) (0.207) (0.243) (0.176) (0.137) (0.136) (0.255) (0.211) (0.058) (0.091) (0.096) (0.082)
Bank integration 2.938 -0.566 -3.814* -4.257** -0.051 -0.375
(2.048) (1.568) (2.239) (1.838) (0.875) (0.735)
Log of GSP product -0.215 5.602 0.236 -1.100 -0.541 2.368 -0.861 -1.385 0.299 -0.870 0.778* -0.471
(0.783) (3.777) (1.069) (0.898) (0.787) (2.197) (0.996) (1.050) (0.358) (1.364) (0.417) (0.424)
Log of population product -5.583** -42.230*** -15.086*** -5.950** 4.983** 7.052 0.091 3.453 -2.962*** 11.357* -5.170*** -2.160**
(2.406) (14.657) (4.259) (2.384) (2.510) (9.663) (3.605) (2.623) (1.084) (6.269) (1.427) (1.065)
Difference in log GSP -0.169 9.710*** 0.071 0.060 -0.178 2.661 -0.181 -0.339 -0.009 -4.238*** -0.079 -0.047
(0.282) (2.842) (0.348) (0.246) (0.276) (1.890) (0.303) (0.274) (0.123) (1.292) (0.128) (0.111)
Difference in industry 22.675*** 30.487 13.673 18.574*** 11.583*** -42.246 0.051 9.872*** 17.187*** -23.469 7.297* 14.828***
composition (6.980) (48.432) (9.888) (6.073) (4.407) (28.203) (4.729) (3.613) (3.488) (18.661) (4.024) (3.261)
State-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,526 4,353 9,756 18,883 14,526 4,353 9,756 18,883 14,526 4,353 9,756 18,883
1994, the location data at the BHC level are less reflective of the actual locations of
bank assets, which may introduce measurement errors to the Co-Herfindhal variable
in the later period of our sample. To ensure that the bank consolidation started in
1994 does not affect our ndings, we redo the OLS and 2SLS regressions for a sample
period prior to 1994, i.e., from 1988 to 1993. Results based on OLS (2SLS) regressions
are reported in columns 2, 6, and 10 of Panel A (B) in Table 19. Again, the coefficient
on HPI growth divergence is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for
all three dependent variables in both panels. Taken together, the results in the first
two columns of Table 19 show that the effect of house price divergence on economic
growth divergence remains very strong in the subsample of states that are likely to
have very low bank integration, which does not support banking integration as a
confounding factor behind our findings.
The second alternative explanation is that the states that are geographically close
to each other can drive our results. Saiz (2010) suggests that geography is a key
factor that influences house prices and economic development in the Unites States.
States that are geographically close to each other are likely to have similar geographic
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endowments that may induce similar growth patterns in the housing market and the
real economy. Using international data, Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) find that
geographic distance is important in explaining the business cycle co-movements across
countries. Although state-pair fixed effects can account for the time-invariant factors
across state-pairs including geographic distance, concerns about omitted variables
may remain. For example, closely located states may share similarities in economic
and social characteristics that can affect both the real economy and the housing
market. These commonalities between the states could be changing over time as the
states develop economically and socially. The fixed effects also may not fully control
for the variations in the easiness of commute between the two states, which again
could be changing over the years.
To rule out the neighboring states effects, we focus on state pairs that are relatively
far from each other (above the median geographic distance of the sample). We collect
information on state capital cities’ latitudes and longitudes for 50 U.S. states plus
Washington D.C., and employ the “Haversine” formula to calculate the great-circle
distance between two points i.e., the shortest distance over the earths surface. If
the omitted variables related geographic proximity drive our results, we should find
weaker effect of HPI growth divergence on real economic growth divergence for the
subsample of state pairs that are more distant from each other. Columns 3, 7, and 11
in Panel A (OLS) and B (2SLS) of Table 19 report the results for the large distance
subsample. The coefficient on HPI growth divergence is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level in all columns in Panel A. Both coefficient magnitude and
statistical significance are not any weaker than those of the whole sample. In Panel
B, the coefficient on HPI growth divergence is positive and statistically significant
at the 5% level for GSP growth divergence and income growth divergence and it is
positive but not statistically significant at a conventional level for employment growth
divergence. The weaker coefficient from the 2SLS estimation for employment growth
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divergence might be a result of smaller sample size and/or the higher sensitivity of
this result to the endogeneity control.
One potential issue of using the geographic distances of capital cities is that capital
cities in large states may have larger distance to capital cities in other states even
if they share common borders. To mitigate this bias, we use an alternative measure
that determines the geographic closeness of state pairs based on whether they are
contiguous to each other (i.e., adjacent states). We then repeat our analysis in the
state pairs that are non-adjacent. Results are presented in columns 4, 8, and 12 of
Panel A (OLS) and B (2SLS) in Table 19. The coefficient on HPI growth divergence
is positive for these non-adjacent state pairs, and is statistically significant at the 1%
level in all columns except for column 12 in Panel B, which is significant at the 5%
level. The magnitudes of both the OLS and 2SLS coefficients are comparable to those
in Table 17 and 18. Taken together, results in Table 19 do not support the argument
that the relations between HPI growth divergence and economic growth divergence
measures are driven by geographic proximity.
2.4 Economic mechanism
2.4.1 The collateral channel
Results thus far support our hypothesis that real economic convergence follows hous-
ing market integration. In this section, we examine whether housing market integra-
tion affects real economic convergence through the collateral channel. The basic idea
is that real estate properties are often used as collaterals for debt financing. Firms
and households owning properties in integrated housing markets may experience cor-
related fluctuations in their debt capacity. We expect these correlated fluctuations in
debt capacity to lead to correlated economic activity. Intuitively, in state pairs with
integrated housing markets, increases in the property values allow borrowers in these
states to borrow more and consequently, invest and hire more (Chaney et al., 2012;
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Mian and Sufi, 2014; Corradin and Popov, 2015; Adelino et al., 2015; Schmalz et al
2017).
Formally, models of credit constraints where net worth is a measure of such con-
straints yield similar predictions (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler 1989; Kiyotaki and
Moore 1997). For example, if the banking sector requires firms and households to
have sufficient net worth as collateral for borrowing, an increase in collateral value
leads to increase in net worth, which relaxes the credit constraints on the growth
of economic activity. Extending this argument to housing market integration, when
housing markets are more integrated across states, the co-movement in house prices
is likely to generate correlated changes in collateral values, which in turn results
in correlated shifts in credit constraints across states, leading to the convergence of
economic growth.
Moreover, even in the absence of new debt issuance, the changes in the collateral
values could affect the existing loan to value ratios. For example, the recent housing
market crisis has substantially depreciated house values, which results in high loan to
value ratios (even negative equity) for many household (e.g., Melzer, 2017). The high
loan to value ratios create the classical debt overhang problem (Myers 1977). Melzer
(2017) finds that debt overhang reduces homeowners incentives to invest in their
property, even when they appear financially unconstrained. Donaldson et al. (2016)
demonstrate theoretically how debt overhang may amplify unemployment by engaging
levered households in risk-shifting by searching for jobs with high wages but low
employment probabilities. Bernstein (2017) provides empirical evidence consistent
with the predictions. Moreover, debt overhang may also lock in workers to their
current locations, and reduce labor mobility and supply (Stein, 1995). Brown and
Matsa (2017) find empirical evidence consistent with suboptimal job search patterns
in depressed housing markets during the Great Recession. These papers collectively
suggest that changes in collateral values could amplify economic downturn by reducing
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investment and employment.
If housing market integration influences economic convergence through the col-
lateral channel, we would expect increased convergence in borrowing activities and
loan structures when there is a convergence in collateral values between the states.
We use two measures to capture a states loan structure. Real estate secured loans
and home equity lines are two alternative ways of borrowing against house values.
We construct one measure to capture the prevalence of real estate-secured loans in a
state and another measure to capture the prevalence of the home equity line of credit
(HELOC) in a state. The data on the amount of real estate-secured loans and the
drawn HELOC are from the Call Reports.7
The first measure, RE − securedLoans%, is the fraction of total real estate-
secured loans issued in a state over total bank assets (or bank loans) in the state.
The second measure, HELOC%, is the drawn HELOC over total loans in the state.
To measure the divergence of loan types across states, we calculate the absolute
difference in these two measures between a state pair respectively. The absolute
difference in RE − securedLoans% is the dependent variable in Column 1 and 2 and
the absolute difference in HELOC% is the dependent variable in Column 3 and 4 of
Panel A (OLS) and Panel B (2SLS) in Table 20. To support the collateral channel,
we expect HPI growth divergence to increase the divergence in the proportion of real
estate backed loans or HELOC between the states, i.e., a positive coefficient on the
HPI growth divergence measure. The intuition is as follows: if state i experiences
a growth in house prices while state j does not, then the divergence of house price
growth in states i and j increases. Since there will be increases in real estate backed
borrowing in state i because of higher collateral values, the gap in the proportion of
7To the best of our knowledge, no data exist on all HELOCs originated in the United States. We
obtain HELOCs on banks’ balance sheets from the Call Report but we do not have information on
securitized HELOCs. Thus, the results on HELOCs should be interpreted with caution as we do
not have the complete data on total HELOCs.
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Table 20: The collateral channel
This table examines the collateral channel and reports OLS results in Panel A and 2SLS results in
Panel B. The sample period is from 1988 to 2016. In both panels, the dependent variable in columns
1-2 is RE-secured loans% divergence, defined as the absolute difference in the fraction of total real
estate-secured loans issued in a state over total bank assets in the state; the dependent variable in
columns 3-4 is the absolute difference in the fraction of HELOC over total loans between two states.
HPI growth divergence is the absolute difference in Housing Price Index (HPI) growth rates of any
state pair in year t. Log of GSP product and Log of population product are the logs of the products
of two states GSP and population, respectively. Difference in log GSP is the absolute difference in
the logs of two states GSP for any state pair in year t. All independent variables are measured in
year t-1. Standard errors are clustered at the state-pair level. *, **, and *** denote statistically
difference zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively.
OLS results 2SLS results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RE-secured loans% HELOC/Gross loans RE-secured loans% HELOC/Gross loans
(assets) divergence Divergence (assets) divergence Divergence
HPI growth divergence 0.033** 0.034** 0.013*** 0.013*** 1.607** 1.658** 0.650*** 0.644**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.677) (0.689) (0.252) (0.254)
Bank integration -0.919 1.840 -4.251 5.155**
(3.725) (1.235) (5.063) (2.116)
Log of GSP product 2.936** 1.469*** -1.892 4.007***
(1.298) (0.381) (3.333) (1.223)
Log of population product 2.069 -2.950*** 39.876*** 0.926
(5.157) (1.031) (8.294) (2.642)
Difference in log GSP 1.314 0.593*** -0.864 0.844**
(0.843) (0.229) (1.011) (0.370)
Difference in industry -68.185*** -10.975* -84.922*** -8.987
composition (19.969) (5.610) (28.951) (8.315)
State-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,258 33,258 33,213 33,213 20,690 20,690 20,690 20,690
Adj.R2 0.554 0.555 0.503 0.504
real estate secured loans or HELOC for states i and j will widen as well. Supporting
this prediction, the coefficient on HPI growth divergence is positive and statistically
significant for both OLS and 2SLS estimations in Table 20. These results show that
housing market integration increases the convergence in loan structures across states,
which supports the collateral channel as a mechanism that transfers changes in house
prices to the real economy.
2.4.2 Alternative channels
We consider two alternative channels through which housing market integration may
influence real economy synchronization. First, the results may be mechanically driven
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by the boom and bust of the real estate industry itself, especially when the real estate
industry accounts for a large proportion of the economy in a state. If this concern is
valid, the effect of housing growth divergence is not on overall economy and is on real
estate industry instead, and the removal of real estate industry in computing economic
growth can result in insignificant results. We test this hypothesis by excluding real
estate industry and compute the output (i.e., GSP) growth. Column 1 in Table 21
reports the result. The dependent variable is the absolute difference in real GSP
growth with real estate industry excluded for states i and j in year t. We continue
to account for the gravity controls and the difference in log GSP per capita, as well
as state-pair fixed effects, year fixed effects and state-time trend. The coefficient
on housing growth divergence remains positive and significant. Interestingly, the
magnitude of the coefficient (0.693) is even slightly larger as opposed to the coefficient
in column 4 in Table 17 Panel A (0.654). This result implies that our results are not
driven by the mechanical issue of real estate effects perse.
Another alternative channel is changes in local demand. Since increases in real
estate prices may improve the perception of firms and individuals on their future
wealth, they may increase their current consumption level and drive up local demand
for goods (Campbell and Cocco, 2007) and employment in non-tradable industries
(Mian and Sufi, 2014). Based on these arguments, one may have the following conjec-
ture: the convergence of housing market growths between two states leads to converg-
ing demand for local services (e.g., local construction, retail trade, or personal and
business services), and these converging local demand may create co-movements in
the growth of state economies. If the relation between housing market integration and
real economic convergence is mainly driven by this local demand channel, instead of
the collateral channel, we should find weaker results when we remove from our sample
non-tradable industries that are more sensitive to local demands. We follow Mian and
Sufi (2014) to define non-tradable industries and exclude them from the estimation
90
Table 21: Alternative channel explanations: real estate industry and local demand
This table examines alternative channel explanations and reports the OLS (columns 1 to 4) and
2SLS results (columns 5 to 8). The sample period is from 1988 to 2016. The dependent variable
is GSP growth divergence, i.e., the absolute difference in GSP growth rates between any state-pair
in year t for various subsamples: Columns 1 and 5 exclude the real estate sector; columns 2 and 6
focus on the GSP growth after excluding non-tradable sectors; columns 3 and 7exclude construction
industry; columns 4 and 8 exclude both non-tradable and construction sectors. We follow Mian and
Sufi (2014) to identify the non-tradable sectors. HPI growth divergence is the absolute difference in
Housing Price Index (HPI) growth rates of any state pair in year t. Log of GSP product and Log
of population product are the logs of the products of two states GSP and population, respectively.
Difference in log GSP is the absolute difference in the logs of two states GSP for any state pair in
year t. All independent variables are measured in year t-1. Standard errors are clustered at the
state-pair level. *, **, and *** denote statistically difference zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significant
level, respectively.
OLS Results 2SLS Results
Local demand driving the results Local demand driving the results
Exclude Exclude Exclude Only Exclude Exclude Exclude Only
RE non-trad. constr. Manuf. RE non-trad. constr. Manuf.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HPI growth divergence 0.007* 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.051*** 0.642*** 0.503** 0.653*** 3.685***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.224) (0.202) (0.217) (1.190)
Bank integration -1.033 -1.540* -1.547** 0.771 -0.566 -0.246 -0.628 -5.150
(0.799) (0.825) (0.725) (2.611) (1.598) (1.373) (1.590) (8.333)
Log of GSP product 3.590*** 3.546*** 3.434*** -1.071 -2.075** -1.573* -2.103** -24.608***
(0.320) (0.330) (0.300) (0.991) (1.042) (0.935) (1.007) (5.399)
Log of population product -3.301*** -2.615*** -2.365*** 2.392 -3.002 -3.762* -2.112 35.736***
(0.786) (0.813) (0.728) (2.234) (2.527) (2.266) (2.467) (11.972)
Difference in log GSP -0.265** -0.337*** -0.371*** -0.781** 0.113 0.042 -0.007 -0.723
(0.122) (0.123) (0.113) (0.388) (0.271) (0.245) (0.265) (1.262)
Difference in industry composition 18.704*** 16.905*** 18.253*** 21.362*** 20.985*** 16.669*** 20.825*** 17.536
(3.366) (3.318) (3.271) (7.849) (6.450) (5.796) (6.509) (29.255)
State-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36,975 36,975 36,975 36,975 20,690 20,690 20,690 20,690
Adj. R2 0.220 0.219 0.222 0.238
of GSP growth divergence.8 Results based on this alternative real economic growth
divergence measure is presented in Column 2 and 6 of Table 21. In Column 3 and
7, we present results after excluding the construction industry, which is also highly
related to the local demand. In Column 4 and 8, we present results after excluding
both non-tradable and construction industries. The coefficient on HPI growth diver-
gence is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all six columns for
8Specifically, our classification of non-tradable sectors is obtained from the Online Appendix
Table A2 of Mian and Sufi (2014). Non-tradable sectors include retail trade, accommodation and
food services, and hospitals and residential care facilities. We download the industry-level output
data from the BEA and calculate annual growth rates after excluding non-tradable sectors.
91
both OLS and 2SLS estimates. These results show that the impact of HPI growth
divergence on economic divergence remains strong after we remove industries that
are more sensitive to changes in local demand, which suggests that changes in local
demand is unlikely to be the main channel through which housing market integration
influences real economic convergence in the remaining industries.9
2.5 Additional robustness checks
In this section, we show that our results are robust to a few additional robustness
checks. In the first set of robustness checks, we consider a few alternative measures
of the dependent and independent variables. In the second set of robustness checks,
we consider a few alternative sample periods. In the last set of robustness checks, we
use an alternative instrumental variable and redo our analysis at the metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) level. For all robustness checks reported, we only report the
coefficients of housing market integration measures in Table 22 to preserve space, but
all regressions include control variables and fixed effects as in Table 17. Only OLS
results are report for the first two sets of robustness checks, but we note that the
untabluated results from the 2SLS estimation are very comparable to those reported
in Table 17.
We first show that our results are robust to alternative integration measures. As
discussed in Section 2, we constructed four housing market integration measures: (i)
the absolute difference in HPI growth rates between two states, (ii) the correlation
of quarterly HPI growth rates between a state pair over a rolling 5-year (20-quarter)
window, (iii) the covariance of quarterly HPI growth rates between a state pair over
a rolling 5-year (20-quarter) window, and (iv) the absolute difference in HPI growth
residuals between two states. We also construct two sets of real economic convergence
9Our analysis here cannot rule out the possibility that changes in local demand may be a motive
or an outcome of the collateral channel. Increases in local demand may be a motivation for local
firms or households to borrow and invest. As an outcome of the borrowing and investing activities,
local economy may be simulated and demand could increase.
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Table 22: Additional robustness checks
This table presents OLS results for various robustness checks. Panel A reports alternative integration
measures. The dependent variables are GSP growth residual divergence in columns 1 and 2 and
Income growth residual divergence in columns 3 and 4, and Employment growth residual divergence
in columns 5 and 6. These variables are the absolute difference in the residuals of real growth rates
between any state-pair in year t, computed using GSP, income, and total employment growth rates,
respectively. The residuals are obtained from regressing the real growth rate on state and year fixed
effects. 5-yr HPI correlation (covariance) is the pairwise correlation (covariance) of real estate price
growth across U.S. states computed over a five-year-backward rolling window with quarterly data.
HPI Growth residual divergence are the absolute difference in the residuals of Housing Price Index
(HPI) growth rates between any state-pair in year t. The residuals are obtained from regressing the
HPI growth rate on state and year fixed effects. Panel B reports an alternative sample period of
1975-2016. Panel C reports an alternative sample period of 1995-2016. Panel D reports the MSA-
level results during the sample period of 2001-2016. In all panels, we only report the coefficient
on HPI growth divergence to preserve space. HPI growth divergence is the absolute difference in
Housing Price Index (HPI) growth rates of any state pair in year t. When noted, the regressions
include the four control variables as in prior tables. Standard errors are clustered at the state-pair
level. *, **, and *** denote statistically difference zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level,
respectively.
Panel A. Alternative integration measures (36,975 obs.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: GSP growth divergence Income growth divergence Employment growth divergence
5-yr HPI correlation -0.219*** -0.201*** -0.236*** -0.234*** -0.102*** -0.102***
(0.051) (0.049) (0.041) (0.040) (0.027) (0.027)
Adj.R2 0.214 0.222 0.252 0.256 0.200 0.201
Dependent variable: GSP growth divergence Income growth divergence Employment growth divergence
5-yr HPI covariance -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.036***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Adj.R2 0.214 0.222 0.251 0.255 0.200 0.201
Dependent variable: GSP growth residual divergence Income growth residual divergence Employment growth residual divergence
HPI growth residual 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.007*** 0.007***
divergence (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Adj.R2 0.212 0.220 0.255 0.262 0.200 0.201
Panel B. Alternative Sample 1975-2016
GSP growth divergence Income growth divergence Employment growth divergence
HPI growth divergence 0.005** 0.004** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 49,725 49,725 52,275 49,725 51,000 49,725
Adj.R2 0.224 0.237 0.279 0.276 0.185 0.189
Panel C. Alternative Sample 1995-2016
GSP growth divergence Income growth divergence Employment growth divergence
HPI growth divergence 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.008** 0.008** 0.006*** 0.006**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 28,050 28,050 28,050 28,050 28,050 28,050
Adj.R2 0.252 0.254 0.260 0.263 0.196 0.202
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
State-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 22: (Cont.) Additional robustness checks
Panel D. MSA-level results
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HPI growth divergence 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Log of GSP product 0.867*** 0.476** -0.319**
(0.276) (0.225) (0.144)
Log of population product -6.981*** -4.883*** 2.199***
(0.676) (0.646) (0.524)
Difference in log GSP -0.458** 0.854*** 0.329***
(0.198) (0.167) (0.108)
State-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 58,740 58,740 62,656 58,740 62,656 58,740
R-squared 0.245 0.247 0.343 0.351 0.374 0.378
r2 a 0.188 0.190 0.296 0.303 0.331 0.332
IV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HPI growth divergence 0.931*** 0.993*** 0.098 0.134 0.316*** 0.263***
(0.190) (0.205) (0.106) (0.101) (0.078) (0.066)
Log of GSP product -3.984*** -0.147 -1.574***
(1.109) (0.555) (0.360)
Log of population product -23.561*** -7.012*** -2.089
(4.038) (1.787) (1.373)
Difference in log GSP 0.826* 1.019*** 0.661***
(0.497) (0.210) (0.162)
State-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 58,740 58,740 62,656 58,740 62,656 58,740
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measures: (i) the absolute difference in GSP, income, or employment growth rates
between a state pair, and (ii) the absolute difference in GSP, income, or employ-
ment growth residuals between a state pair. Results in prior sections are based on
the respective first measure for either housing market integration or economic con-
vergence, i.e., the absolute difference in growth rates between two states. We show
regression results based on these alternative integration measures in Panel A of Table
22. The upper part of Panel A presents results based on the 5-year correlation of
HPI growth rates between a state pair, the middle part presents results based on the
5-year covariance of HPI growth rates between a state pair, and the lower part present
results based on the absolute difference of growth residuals between a state pair. The
coefficients on the HPI correlation and covariance measures are negative and the co-
efficients on the growth residual based housing market divergence are positive. All
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. These findings are consistent
with our hypothesis that housing market integration (higher correlation/covariance
or lower HPI residual divergence) decreases economic divergence.
Next, we consider the robustness of our results for alternative sample periods.
The sample period in baseline analyses is from 1988 to 2016. As a robustness check,
we start our main sample from 1995 to mitigate the influence of bank deregulation on
our results because the cross-state bank deregulations start in 1975 and are completed
in 1994. We also repeat our analysis in Table 17 for a longer sample period: 1978 to
2016. The GSP data from 1978 to 1987 are backed out from the Quantity Indexes
data for Real GDP by state from the BEA. As reported in Panel B and C of Table 22,
all our results in Table 17 hold in these two alternative sample periods. Specifically,
the coefficient on HPI growth divergence is positive and statistically significant at
the 5% level or better in all specifications. These results suggest that the effect of
housing market integration on real economic convergence is not just an artifact of the
particular sample period we use, 1988 to 2016.
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Lastly, we use the MSA-level elasticity of land supply developed by Saiz (2010) as
an alternative instrument to identify exogenous variations in changes in house prices.
Saiz (2010) uses satellite generated data on terrain elevation and presence of water
bodies to estimate the elasticity of land supply in the U.S. The elasticity of land supply
has been used as an instrument for house prices in many studies (e.g., Mian and Sufi,
2011, 2014; Chaney et al., 2012; Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo, 2012; Robb and
Robinson, 2013; Adelino et al., 2015; Loutskina and Strahan 2015). Following the
ideas in these papers, the alternative instrument we use for house price divergence is
the absolute difference in land supply elasticity between two MSAs interacted with
the change in the aggregate interest rate (IR) for MSAs i and j in year t.
We first discuss the relevance of this instrument. When interest rates decrease,
the demand for real estate increases. If the local supply of land is very elastic, the
increased demand will likely translate into more construction (more quantity) rather
than higher land prices. If the supply of land is very inelastic on the other hand, the
increased demand will likely translate into higher prices rather than more construc-
tion. If two MSAs differ in land supply elasticity, changes in aggregate interest rates
will likely result in different house prices in these two areas (i.e., the absolute differ-
ence in HPI growth rates increases). Thus, the interaction between the differences
in land supply elasticity and changes in interest rate affects the divergence in house
prices, satisfying the relevance requirement of an instrument.
The exclusion restriction of the instrumental variable requires that the elastic-
ity of the housing supply affects real economic activities only through its effect on
house prices. This exclusion restriction has been assumed in the studies that uti-
lize this instrument because the geographic location and characteristics of an MSA
is considered exogenous to its local economic and social development. However, as
shown in Saiz (2010), the land supply elasticity measure is a function of both phys-
ical and regulatory constraints. These constraints may directly affect the activities
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in both the housing market and the real economy, which may render the instru-
ment non-exogenous to changes in house prices. Moreover, Davidoff (2013) finds that
the cross-sectional price variation in U.S. housing markets during the 2000s housing
market cycle does not relate to the land supply elasticity, which casts doubt on the
relevance of this instrument to changes in house prices. Nevertheless, to be consistent
with the literature, we use the land supply elasticity to construct an alternative in-
strumental variable to examine if our results hold with this alternative IV. Because of
the endogeneity concern, however, these results should be interpreted with caution.
The regression results based on this alternative IV are reported in Panel D of Table
22. The housing supply elasticity measure in Saiz (2010) is available for 95 MSAs.
We are able to match 89 of these 95 MSAs with MSA-level output and income data
from the BEA and MSA-level employment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). The MSA-level output data are only available from 2001 onwards. As a result,
the sample for this alternative IV has 3,916 MSA pairs and 58,740 MSA pair year
observations for the period of 2001 to 2016. We report the OLS results in the upper
half of Panel D and the second stage IV estimation results in the lower half of Panel
D. The coefficient of HPI growth divergence is positive and significant at the 1%
level across all the OLS specifications. For the 2SLS estimations, the coefficient on
HPI growth divergence is positive and significant at the 1% level for GDP growth
divergence and employment growth divergence. For income growth divergence, the
coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. Collectively, results in Table 22
confirm the robustness of our main finding that housing market integration increases
economic convergence across states.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
Motivated by the growing trend of housing market integration, our paper examines
whether and how housing market integration influences real economy synchronization
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between U.S. states. We find that housing market integration increases economic
synchronization. Using an instrumental variable that is orthogonal to local economic
conditions but is highly related to housing market integration, we show that influence
of housing market integration on economic synchronization is causal. This influence
of housing market on economy is not subsumed by banking integration or geographic
proximity between the states. Supporting the collateral channel as the main mecha-
nism through which housing market integration influences economic synchronization,
we find that the influence of housing market concentrates in the collateral intensive
industries and housing market integration increases the convergence of loan structure
across states. Theory and empirical evidence show that real estate collateral can am-
plify production shocks and thus exaggerate business cycle volatility (e.g., [20]; [39]).
Our paper suggests that the convergence of real estate growth cycle creates common
shocks in collateral values, which increases the synchronization of states’ business
cycles.
Both the global economy and the U.S. domestic economy have become increasingly
integrated in the past several decades. To some extent, the nexus of these market
integrations characterizes the modern economy. The literature has documented the
importance of capital market integration, in particular, banking integration, to eco-
nomic synchronization (e.g., [9], [145]). Our results point to the contribution of the
real estate market integration to economic convergence. More studies are needed to
understand the interactions of various types of market integrations.
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CHAPTER III
GLOBAL DIVERSIFICATION WITH LOCAL STOCKS: A
ROAD LESS TRAVELED
3.1 Introduction
Since the classic works of [91], [123], and [161], numerous studies have documented
the significant gains from international portfolio diversification, using various sam-
ple markets over different sample periods. The rising awareness among investors of
potentially large benefits from international diversification, together with the steady
dismantling of barriers to cross-border capital flows, led to remarkable growth of in-
ternational portfolio investments. In recent years, however, researchers increasingly
found that the gains from international diversification, within the universe of devel-
oped stock markets at least, have become largely insignificant (e.g., [63], [69], [41],
[42], and [48]). This is likely due to the increased correlations and also the con-
vergent risk-return attributes among the developed markets, reflecting the advanced
global integration of these markets. In his pioneering work, [161] stated: “Several
authors have shown that movements in stock prices in different countries are almost
uncorrelated: Changes in price on the Paris Bourse appear independent of stock price
fluctuations on the London exchange and so on.” During our study period of 1995-
2014, by comparison, the monthly return correlation between the two European stock
market indices has fluctuated at around 0.89 in U.S. dollar terms. Apparently, the
correlations between stock markets rose rather dramatically during the intervening
years, largely eliminating room for gainful diversification.
In an effort to explore new ways of capturing benefits from international diversi-
fication, various studies have documented that investors may still gain significantly
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if they diversify into emerging or frontier markets that are obviously much less in-
tegrated globally than developed markets (e.g., [67], [93], [65], [63], [17], [41], and
[19]). Investments in emerging and frontier markets, however, are often hampered
by poor governance, political risks, lack of information, foreign exchange restrictions,
and other barriers. In this paper, we propose another way of capturing benefits from
international diversification within the familiar confines of developed markets, i.e.,
using “local” stocks of developed markets that are least driven by the common global
factors.
Specifically, in this paper, we (i) estimate the degree of global financial integra-
tion at the firm-level to identify “local” stocks, in contrast to the prevailing practice
of measuring the global integration mostly at the country-level, and (ii) utilize the
estimated firm-level integration measures and its distributions for the purpose of op-
timal international portfolio diversification. In doing so, we estimate R-squares, our
measure of global integration, from regressions of weekly individual stock returns (in
dollars) on common global factors for a sample of about 51,000 individual firms from
nine developed countries over our whole sample period, 1995-2014. We identify the
global factors using the principal components extracted from nine country stock mar-
ket indices, ten industry indices, and nine style indices (large vs. small and value vs.
growth). Recognizing that stock returns may be driven by industry, style, as well
as country attributes, all three sets of indices are utilized in identifying the global
factors, not just the market indices as has usually been done in the literature. We oth-
erwise closely follow the R-square method for measuring global financial integration
proposed by [151].
Our findings regarding the R-squares show: First, the adjusted R-squares esti-
mated for our pooled sample of international stocks are very widely distributed with
the mean of 0.193 and standard deviation of 0.214. This implies that the degree
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of global integration varies greatly across individual firms, generating nearly a con-
tinuum of individual stocks distributed across the scale of R-squares. In fact, the
adjusted R-square ranges from -0.506 to 0.930 across our international sample firms,
with a fairly low median, 0.166. This stark heterogeneity in integration at the firm
level is observed in each of our sample countries as well. Second, our ANOVA anal-
ysis indicates that the firm-level integration measure is significantly affected by each
of the three categories of firm attributes tested - country, industry, and style. For
instance, domicile of a firm in Japan (Germany) has a significantly positive (nega-
tive) effect on the firm’s R-square, while a firm’s classification as health care (energy)
has a negative (positive) effect on its R-square. As can be expected, large-(small-)
cap classification of a firm has a positive (negative) effect on the R-square, across
value-growth spectrum. Overall, style attribute has the greatest (absolute) effect on
the firm-level integration, followed by country and industry attributes. The integra-
tion effects of the three attributes are time-varying—on average, industry attribute
has the most stable effect, albeit the weakest, while country attribute has the most
volatile effect.
Our prior findings showing the strong heterogeneity in global integration at the
firm level have immediate implications for international portfolio diversification: In
principle, investors should be able to (i) minimize the portfolio risk by diversifying
their portfolios using international pool of local stocks whose returns are least driven
by the common global factors and also (ii) enhance the mean-variance efficiency of
investment portfolios by optimally holding those local stocks.
We closely follow [161]’s procedure to examine the first implication. Specifically,
we construct equally weighted portfolios with the varying numbers of stocks, rang-
ing from 1 to 50 stocks, and compute the portfolio variance using weekly returns.
To compute the variance of the portfolio with a particular number of stocks, we
randomly pick stocks and compute the variance. This procedure is repeated 5,000
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times. We then compute the average variance based on such simulations. For com-
parison purpose, we randomly pick stocks from three separate pools of stocks, i.e.,
local stocks, global stocks, both from all sample countries, and U.S. domestic stocks.
Local (global) stocks are those classified into the bottom (top) decile portfolio sorted
on R-squares. The simulation results show that on average, the variance of a fully
diversified portfolio comprising local, global, and U.S. stocks is, respectively, about
6.3%, 22.3%, and 13.1% of the average variance of individual stocks. This implies
that local stocks are far more effective in reducing the portfolio risk compared with
either global or U.S. stocks. It is also noteworthy that the gains from international
risk diversification with local stocks remain robust during the recent crisis years, such
as 2000 (dotcom bubble burst) and 2008-2012 (U.S. subprime mortgage crisis and
European sovereign debt crisis).1 Furthermore, using 25 portfolios more finely sorted
on R-squares, we show that the higher R-square of the portfolio is, the higher is the
un-diversifiable (systematic) risk of the portfolio. Previous studies (e.g., [110] and
[16]), however, show that most investors actually tend to tilt toward holding stocks
with global, rather than local, attributes.
To effectively exploit the heterogeneity in global integration among individual
stocks and enhance the mean-variance efficiency of the portfolio, which is the second
implication of our earlier findings, we let investors hold “local portfolios” optimally
in conjunction with country stock market indices. To implement this strategy, we
systematically identify ‘local’ stocks, as explained previously, and construct the “local
portfolio” comprising only those stocks classified into the last decile in terms of R-
squares. Local portfolio is constructed for each country, industry, and style. Investors
then may optimally allocate their funds across local portfolios and country market
indices.
1For instance, in 2008 when the global financial crisis started by the U.S. subprime mortgage
crisis was at its height, the variance of weekly percentage returns was 9.51 (33.67) for the fully
diversified ‘local’ (‘global’) stock portfolio. Refer to Figure 3B for further details.
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When investors optimize their portfolio choice only over stock market indices, the
gains from international diversification as measured by the increase in the Sharpe
ratio relative to the U.S. stock market index turn out to be insignificant, with or
without short sales, which is consistent with the previous findings (e.g., [52]). How-
ever, once stock market indices are augmented by country local portfolios from the
same set of countries, the resulting optimal portfolio has a monthly Sharpe ratio of
0.381 (0.247) with (without) short sales over the holding period 1995-2014, which is
compared with a Sharpe ratio of 0.236 (0.159) for the optimal portfolio comprising
stock market indices only, with (without) short sales. The test proposed by Gibbons,
Ross, Shanken (GRS) shows that the increase in the Sharpe ratio is significant at the
5 (1) percent level with (without) short sales. When stock market indices are aug-
mented with industry or style local portfolios, rather than country local portfolios,
the Sharpe ratio increases a bit more, probably reflecting some additional gains from
diversifying across different dimensions. Furthermore, when investors simultaneously
optimize over stock market indices plus all three sets of local portfolios constructed
along country, industry, and style dimensions, the Sharpe ratio rises sharply to 0.723
(0.303) with (without) short sales. Increases in the Sharpe ratio are significant at
the 1 percent level. By comparison, the Sharpe ratio of the U.S. market index is
0.152 over the same holding period. The preceding result suggests that local port-
folios organized along country, industry, and style lines are not redundant, but they
rather may complement each other to further span the mean-variance space. Results
from our portfolio analysis show that investors can still benefit greatly from interna-
tional diversification without leaving the familiar environments of developed markets
with generally better governance and less currency and political risks than the more
venturesome markets at the far corners of the world.
Our robustness checks confirm that the analyses using [72] three-factor, [28] four-
factor, or [73] five-factor models, in lieu of the Pukthuanthong-Roll method, generate
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(i) very similar patterns of heterogeneity in global financial integration measures
across individual firms and (ii) significant gains from international diversification
with the local portfolios constructed with R-squares that are computed based on the
Fama-French-Carhart global factors. To check if our main findings pertaining to the
portfolio analysis are also robust to the use of alternative base currencies, apart from
the U.S. dollar, we replicate the portfolio analysis using each of the eight currencies
matching our international sample countries as the base currency. We find that most
of the major findings from using the U.S. dollar as the base currency remain robust
to the use of alternative base currencies. Particularly, in case investors optimize their
portfolio selection using all three types of local portfolios, GRS tests indicate that
the increase in the Sharpe ratio relative to the benchmark case of optimization with
country market indices is statistically significant at the 5% level or better, with or
without short sales, for every alternative base currency tested, without exception.
To sum up, our paper contributes to the long line of literature on international
portfolio diversification by documenting the following two main points: (i) Individual
stocks differ greatly in the degree of global integration and there are plenty of highly
local stocks that are minimally exposed to the common global factors in developed
markets, and (ii) despite the evident globalization of stock markets in recent decades,
investors can still benefit greatly by systematically identifying these local stocks and
holding them optimally, within the familiar confines of developed markets. Our paper
thus sheds rather positive light on the value of developed markets for investors’ global
diversification. By taking the granular, bottom-up approach to global asset alloca-
tion, we show that investors can span the mean-variance space much beyond what’s
feasible with stock markets indices that are disproportionately affected by global in-
tegration. Thus, inferences of the gains from international diversification solely from
stock market indices, the usual practice among practitioners and academics, are likely
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to significantly understate the true magnitude of the benefits that world stock mar-
kets can provide. From our findings, we can also derive a practical, albeit a little
counterintuitive, advice that should be beneficial for investors: Take a road less trav-
eled by holding local stocks for global diversification, rather than globally oriented
stocks that many investors are known to hold for their global investments. At the
macro level, local stocks can play an important role of countervailing against the
rising, pervasive effect of the common global factors on the behavior of asset returns
that accompanies financial integration. This would help to keep global risk sharing
effective.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
sample selection. Section 3 measures global financial integration at the firm level and
examines the effects of country, industry, and style attributes on the degree of firm-
level integration. Section 4 estimates the effectiveness of international local stocks
for portfolio risk diversification based on simulations, while Section 5 estimates the
mean-variance gains from international diversification using local portfolios. Section
6 discusses robustness checks. Lastly, Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
3.2 Data and Sample Selection
We utilize the data on individual stocks and stock market indices from nine developed
countries of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Switzerland,
the U.K., and the U.S. during the period of 1995-2014. It is noted that during
this period, there existed relatively few formal barriers to international investment
in our sample countries. The firm-level data are from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT for the U.S and from Thomson Financial’s
Datastream for the rest of sample countries. Specifically, we use U.S. dollar-based
weekly and monthly returns of all available individual stocks in the nine sample
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countries.2 In addition, we obtain the one-year U.S. Treasury yield from Federal
Reserve Economic Data and use it as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate.
We apply certain filters to select only common stocks that are traded in their home
countries. For U.S. stocks from CRSP, we require that the share code (SHRCD) is
equal to 10 or 11 to keep only ordinary common shares and that the exchange code
(EXCHCD) is equal to 1, 2, or 3 to keep only the stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX,
or NASDAQ. For non-U.S. stocks from Datastream, we use the following filters:3
(i) We require that the type of instruments is classified as equity (TYPE=EQ); (ii)
we exclude stocks with firm names (NAME) indicating that they are not common
stocks such as preferred stocks or warrants; (iii) we filter out stocks that are traded
in foreign countries by restricting the geography groups (GEOG) to be their home
countries; (iv) we eliminate stocks with industry names (INDM) and codes (INDC6)
for investment vehicles, such as mutual funds, unit trusts, and other forms; (v) when a
stock has multiple classes, we select the primary class by requiring the major security
flag (MAJOR) to be 1; (vi) we also apply some country-specific filters to exclude non-
equity stocks.4 Also, to eliminate data errors in Datastream, we apply the following
filters:5 (i) For weekly or monthly returns, if both conditions of a) rt or rt−1 > 100%
and b) (1+rt−1)(1+rt)−1 < 20% are met, then both rt and rt−1 are set to missing; (ii)
any weekly or monthly return greater than 200% is treated as missing; (iii) for each
pair of country and year, we construct the distribution of individual stock returns and
treat as missing the weekly or monthly returns that fall out of the 0.1% and 99.9%
quantile range.
2For U.S. firms, the weekly stock returns are calculated by compounding the daily stock returns
obtained from CRSP Daily over the trading days in the corresponding week; for non-U.S. stocks,
the weekly returns are obtained from Datastream.
3Our filters are similar to those employed by [90] and [111].
4The list of keywords in firm names as filters is provided in Panel A of Table A2. The list of
keywords in industry names and codes as filters is provided in Panel B of Table A2. The list of
country-specific filtering keywords is provided in Panel C of Table A2.
5Our empirical results are robust to other thresholds within a reasonable range.
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Table 23: Descriptive Statistics
This table describes the equity markets of our nine sample countries: Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Switzerland, U.K. and U.S. All reported numbers are the annual
averages over our sample period 1995-2014. Panel A reports the average of (i) the size of stock
markets in terms of the number as well as the aggregate market capitalization of our filtered sample
firms (first two columns) and (ii) the summary statistics of the cross-sectional distribution of market
capitalization and book-to-market ratio of individual stocks for each of the nine sample countries.
Panel B summarizes the industry distribution in each of our nine sample countries. After we classify
individual stocks into 10 industries, determined by Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS)
10 Sector codes – energy, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health
care, financials, information technology, telecommunication services, and utilities –, we compute (i)
count-based industry distribution: the ratio of the number of firms in each industry to the total
number of firms in that country and (ii) value-based industry distribution: the ratio of the total
market value of firms in each industry to the total market value of that country. The last column
reports the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which is computed by summing over the
squared count-(value-)based industry shares in each country.
Panel A. Number of firms, market value, firm size and book-to-market
ratio
No. of Aggregate Firm Size ($M) Book-to-Market Ratio
Sample Market 1st 3rd 1st 3rd
Firms Size ($B) Mean Quartile Median Quartile Mean Quartile Median Quartile
Australia 1,107 709.71 618.01 8.52 29.18 150.63 0.83 0.29 0.58 1.05
Canada 697 1,597.93 2,079.44 44.14 225.91 1,148.60 0.79 0.31 0.56 0.97
France 689 1,382.19 2,005.73 24.30 92.88 499.93 0.87 0.36 0.65 1.10
Germany 724 1,240.07 1,876.55 21.72 83.39 425.75 0.91 0.34 0.63 1.14
Hong Kong 790 968.67 1,138.68 39.25 104.48 377.86 1.39 0.45 0.98 1.91
Japan 3,356 3,488.22 1,101.72 56.49 149.79 507.80 1.25 0.64 1.07 1.66
Switzerland 225 850.78 3,817.12 124.86 387.02 1,301.15 1.17 0.50 0.87 1.44
U.K. 1,224 2,429.55 1,969.19 27.62 108.01 571.24 0.72 0.22 0.47 0.94
U.S. 5,316 12,701.24 2,668.82 65.85 259.12 1,100.96 0.68 0.36 0.59 0.88
All Countries 14,127 25,368.35 1,664.84 34.23 129.91 598.82 0.98 0.36 0.68 1.18
After applying the filters above, we obtain a total of 51,118 individual stocks from
the nine sample countries, or 14,127 individual stocks per year on average. Table 23
describes our sample data. All reported numbers are the annual averages over our
sample period 1995-2014. Panel A of Table 23 reports the average of (i) the size of
stock markets in terms of the number as well as the aggregate market capitalization
of our filtered sample firms (first two columns) and (ii) the summary statistics of
the cross-sectional distributions of market capitalization and book-to-market ratio of
individual stocks in each of the nine countries. In our sample, the average number
of common stocks in the U.S. (5,316) is more than one third of that from all nine
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Table 23: (Cont.) Descriptive Statistics
Panel B. Industry distribution in each of sample countries
Consumer Consumer Health Information Telecom Industry
Energy Materials Industrials Discretionary Staples Care Financials Technology Services Utilities HHI
Australia Count 0.091 0.336 0.097 0.155 0.039 0.055 0.170 0.024 0.018 0.015 0.189
Value 0.052 0.206 0.082 0.115 0.043 0.031 0.332 0.005 0.113 0.019 0.191
Canada Count 0.146 0.255 0.082 0.124 0.040 0.045 0.219 0.025 0.026 0.038 0.163
Value 0.151 0.105 0.071 0.099 0.045 0.008 0.346 0.008 0.069 0.096 0.184
France Count 0.013 0.044 0.193 0.317 0.082 0.061 0.182 0.063 0.024 0.021 0.188
Value 0.009 0.024 0.118 0.195 0.097 0.057 0.181 0.021 0.070 0.211 0.148
Germany Count 0.030 0.058 0.130 0.240 0.059 0.045 0.307 0.087 0.022 0.023 0.187
Value 0.006 0.076 0.078 0.117 0.023 0.056 0.524 0.033 0.037 0.050 0.309
Hong Kong Count 0.029 0.077 0.130 0.358 0.075 0.034 0.204 0.041 0.036 0.015 0.204
Value 0.051 0.043 0.097 0.210 0.053 0.013 0.321 0.030 0.140 0.043 0.186
Japan Count 0.006 0.081 0.217 0.358 0.086 0.042 0.115 0.074 0.012 0.009 0.210
Value 0.013 0.069 0.122 0.313 0.055 0.051 0.246 0.039 0.053 0.038 0.190
Switzerland Count 0.006 0.049 0.165 0.189 0.073 0.093 0.327 0.045 0.010 0.043 0.190
Value 0.002 0.042 0.078 0.059 0.122 0.260 0.386 0.009 0.022 0.020 0.244
U.K. Count 0.047 0.064 0.184 0.305 0.046 0.048 0.205 0.054 0.020 0.028 0.184
Value 0.019 0.096 0.082 0.150 0.108 0.083 0.255 0.012 0.074 0.120 0.142
U.S. Count 0.064 0.064 0.125 0.154 0.040 0.130 0.189 0.187 0.024 0.023 0.138
Value 0.079 0.047 0.106 0.121 0.103 0.122 0.164 0.174 0.047 0.038 0.120
sample countries (14,127) and the market capitalization of the U.S. ($12,701B) is
almost 50% of the aggregate market capitalization of the nine developed countries
($25,368B). The cross-sectional distribution of firm size is highly right skewed in each
of the nine countries. The mean of market capitalizations across individual stocks is
much larger than not only the median but also the third quartile of those in every
country. Also, firm size differs greatly across countries. For example, the average
firm size in Switzerland ($3,817M) is about six times as large as that in Australia
($618M). Regarding the book-to-market ratio, stocks in the U.S. and the U.K. markets
have relatively low book-to-market ratios of 0.68 and 0.72, respectively. In contrast,
the corresponding ratios for the two Asian markets of Hong Kong and Japan are
substantially higher at 1.39 and 1.25, respectively. We find that the cross-sectional
distribution of book-to-market ratios is skewed to the right but not as much as that
of firms’ market capitalization. The mean of book-to-market ratios is between the
median and the 3rd quartile of those in each country.
Panel B of Table 23 reports the industry distribution of sample firms in each
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of our nine sample countries. After we classify individual firms into 10 industries,
determined by Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 10 Sector codes—
energy, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care,
financials, information technology, telecommunication services, and utilities—, we
compute (i) count-based industry distribution, i.e., the ratio of the number of firms
in each industry to the total number of firms in that country and (ii) value-based
industry distribution, i.e., the ratio of the total market value of firms in each industry
to the total market value of that country. In the last column of Panel B, we report
the count-based as well as value-based industry Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)
as a measure of industry concentration in a given country.6
As can be seen from Panel B of Table 23, the industry distribution of firms varies
substantially from country to country. Specifically, the count-based HHI ranges from
0.138 for the U.S. to 0.210 for Japan, while the value-based HHI ranges from 0.120 for
the U.S. to 0.309 for Germany. Clearly, the U.S. has the most diversified firm pop-
ulation across industry lines, whereas Japan and Germany have substantially more
concentrated firm population. The cross-country variation is also observed in each
industry. For example, the count-(value-) based share of materials is quite high for
both Australia and Canada, i.e., 33.6% (20.6%) and 25.5% (10.5%), respectively, re-
flecting heavily resource-based nature of the two economies. No other countries have
the shares of materials exceeding 10% in either count or value. In Germany, the value-
based share of financials is strikingly high at 52.4%, which may be due to a small
number of gigantic banks in Germany, holding both debts and equities of many Ger-
man companies.7 In Japan, consumer discretionary accounts for 35.8% (31.3%) of the
6The industry HHI is computed by summing over the squared count-(value-)based industry
shares.
7As of the end of 2014, Deutsche Bank’s market capitalization is 6.05% of the aggregate market
capitalization of all of our sample stocks traded in Germany. It is followed by Commerzbank and
KfW Bankengruppe, with the value proportions of 5.10% and 5.08%, respectively. This strong
concentration of market capitalization on financial firms seems to be related to the German corporate
governance system where banks play important roles as large equity holders.
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total count (value) of sample firms, higher than any other industries. By comparison,
consumer discretionary accounts for 12.4% (9.9%) of the total count (value) of sample
firms in Canada. Due to the importance of banks in Switzerland, financials has the
highest share in both count (32.7%) and value (38.6%) in the country. Perhaps re-
flecting the Silicon Valley effect, information technology has about the highest share
in both count (18.7%) and value (17.4%) in the U.S. among all industries, which is far
higher than the corresponding shares in all other countries; in Australia, for example,
the count-(value-) based share of information technology is only 2.4% (0.5%). The
variations in the industrial composition of national stock markets documented here
suggest that firms’ industry attributes may play an important role in international
asset allocation strategies.
3.3 Heterogeneity in Global Integration at the Firm Level
Previous studies show that the degree of global integration differs across countries,
industries, and styles (i.e., value vs. growth and large- vs. small-cap). These studies,
e.g., [110], [30], [151], [16], and [29], collectively suggest that country, industry, and
style may all be important dimensions affecting global integration at the firm level.
In this section, we measure the degree of global integration for individual firms, by
evaluating the effects of these dimensions separately and also together. We then
formally test whether each of these dimensions significantly affects the degree of global
integration across firms. If so, we estimate the magnitude and temporal behaviors of
these effects.
3.3.1 Measuring global integration across individual firms
To measure the degree of global integration for each firm, we closely follow [151] and
use the adjusted R-square from the regression of stock returns on the global factors.
Specifically, for each year over our 1995–2014 sample period, we regress the weekly
returns of each stock on the global factors obtained from each of the three dimensions,
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i.e., country, industry, and style. The adjusted R-square from the regression then
measures the firm’s degree of global integration. Hereafter, the adjusted R-square
will be referred to as R2 for simplicity.
To construct the global factors of the country dimension, following [151], we first
estimate the weightings from the market indices of our nine sample countries during
1994 and apply the estimated weightings to the market index returns of 1995 to form
the out-of-sample principal components. We then extract the first five principal com-
ponents (FCj,t, j = 1, · · · , 5) as proxies for the global factors of the country dimension
in 1995, which explain at least 90% of the total volatility in the covariance matrix of
the nine country market indices in 1994. We repeat this procedure each year over the
whole sample period of 1995–2014 and extract the first five principal components as
proxies for the global factors of the country dimension. To construct the global factors
of the industry dimension, we first form the ten industry indices by value-weighting
the stock returns in each industry classified by GICS. Then, similar to the procedure
used in the construction of the global factors of the country dimension, we extract
the first four principal components from the ten industry indices (F Ij,t, j = 1, · · · , 4)
as proxies for the global factors of the industry dimension, which explain at least 90%
of the total volatility in the covariance matrix of the ten industry indices in 1994.
Similarly, to construct the global factors of the style dimension, we first classify all
individual stocks within each of our nine sample countries into 3×3 size and book-to-
market styles by independent sorting on the firm size and book-to-market ratios with
the breakpoints chosen as 30%, 70% quantiles of the firm size and book-to-market
ratios within each country. Then, we combine the stocks with the same style across
the nine sample countries and form nine style indices by value-weighting the stock
returns in each style.8 The first two principal components (F Sj,t, j = 1, 2) are then
8Based on the construction of the style indices, we have nine styles: small-value, small-core,
small-growth, middle-value, middle-core, middle-growth, large-value, large-core, and large-growth.
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extracted from the nine style indices as proxies for the global factors of the style-
dimension, which explain at least 90% of the total volatility in the covariance matrix
of the nine style indices in 1994.
For our main analysis of the global integration, we pool the three sets of global
factors constructed separately from the country, industry, and style dimensions and
use them as the global factors to estimate the R2s for individual firms.9,10
To estimate the R2s, we regress weekly stock returns on the global factors from

























































jt are the global factors
extracted from country-, industry-, and style-dimension, respectively; the superscripts
“C”, “I”, “S”, and “A” for a, b, and e indicate that the regressors are the global
factors from country (C), industry (I), style (S), and all (A) of the three dimensions,
respectively. Thus, the R2s from regressions (1a) to (1d) represent the degrees of
firm global integration measured from country, industry, style, and all of these three
dimensions, respectively. A stock has to have at least 30 weekly returns in the sample
year to enter a regression.
The cross-sectional distributions of the R2s estimated from regressions (1a) to (1d)
are summarized in Table 24. In particular, the table provides the time-series mean
9The results from the analysis of variance in Subsection 3.2 show that all three dimensions are
indeed statistically significant in estimating firm’s degree of globalization.
10Robustness checks for the alternative global factors are provided in Section 6.
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and standard deviation of the cross-sectional average R2s of all sample firms for each
dimension, along with the minimum, 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles,
maximum, and skewness of the R2s. Panel A of Table 24 reports the results from the
entire sample period, 1995–2014, while Panels B and C of Table 24 report the results
from the two equally divided sub-sample periods, 1995–2004 and 2005–2014.
Table 24: Distribution of Firm-level R2 Measured from Country, Industry, Style, and
All Three Dimensions
This table summarizes the cross-sectional distribution of R2s for country, industry, style, and all of
these three dimensions. The summary statistics in the row of country, industry, style, and all of the
three dimensions are computed from the cross-sectional distribution of R2 estimated from equations
(1a), (1b), (1c), and (1d), respectively. Reported numbers in Panel A are the averages over the
entire sample period of 1995-2014. Corresponding numbers from the two equally divided sub-sample
periods of 1995-2004 and 2005-2014 are presented in Panels B and C, respectively.
Mean Std Minimum 5th 25th Median 75th 95th Maximum Skewness
percentile percentile percentile percentile
Panel A: 1995 to 2014
Country 0.151 0.183 -0.196 -0.069 0.012 0.107 0.252 0.523 0.936 0.993
Industry 0.128 0.171 -0.156 -0.064 0.000 0.082 0.211 0.482 0.923 1.229
Style 0.131 0.157 -0.074 -0.037 0.008 0.085 0.211 0.453 0.903 1.259
All 0.193 0.214 -0.506 -0.111 0.033 0.166 0.331 0.590 0.939 0.496
Panel B: 1995 to 2004
Country 0.115 0.162 -0.196 -0.075 -0.004 0.076 0.197 0.445 0.936 1.149
Industry 0.095 0.144 -0.156 -0.068 -0.011 0.058 0.163 0.392 0.874 1.305
Style 0.095 0.128 -0.074 -0.038 -0.004 0.057 0.160 0.359 0.857 1.292
All 0.157 0.196 -0.506 -0.121 0.012 0.132 0.280 0.520 0.938 0.530
Panel C: 2005 to 2014
Country 0.186 0.196 -0.190 -0.061 0.033 0.145 0.306 0.572 0.917 0.804
Industry 0.160 0.187 -0.152 -0.059 0.015 0.112 0.261 0.543 0.923 1.042
Style 0.165 0.175 -0.074 -0.034 0.027 0.120 0.263 0.520 0.903 1.046
All 0.229 0.224 -0.480 -0.098 0.060 0.205 0.380 0.637 0.939 0.392
A few things are noteworthy from Panel A of Table 24. Most importantly, our
individual sample firms exhibit a very wide range of distribution in the degree of global
integration over the whole sample period of 1995-2014. Specifically, the (adjusted)
R2 estimated from all three dimensions ranges from -0.506 to 0.939, with a relatively
modest median (mean) R2 value of 0.166 (0.193), while the 5th and 95th percentiles
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of estimated R2s are -0.111 and 0.590, respectively. Also, the distribution shows a
skewness to the right. The wide distribution of R2 implies that some firms are highly
globally integrated but, at the same time, there are plenty of other firms with only
limited exposures to the common global factors. The same stark heterogeneity in
the firm-level integration is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows that individual firms
are essentially distributed continuously on the integration scale. As will be shown in
the following sections, the relatively ‘local’ stocks prove to be very useful for global
diversification.
It is also noted from Panel A of Table 24 that the time-series mean of cross-
sectional average R2 (0.193) estimated from all three dimensions is substantially
higher than the mean R2 estimated from each separate dimension, i.e., country
(0.151), industry (0.128), or style (0.131); the mean R2s estimated separately from
each of the three dimensions are roughly comparable to each other, although the mean
R2 from the country-dimension is somewhat higher than those from the industry or
style dimensions. Similarly, the range of distribution of R2s estimated from the all
the dimensions is much greater than that estimated separately from each dimension,
although each separately estimated R2s still exhibit a strong heterogeneity, albeit
attenuated, across individual firms. The R2 distribution from all three dimensions
shows a skewness that is much more modest than that from each separate dimension,
making the R2 distribution much more symmetric. Our results here again broadly
suggest that all three dimensions may be important in assessing the degree of global
integration even if they may not be orthogonal to each other.
It is well recognized that stock markets have become more integrated in recent
decades (e.g., [15], [151], [69], and [8]). This raises an important question: Did global
integration previously documented diminish or even eliminate the heterogeneity in
global integration across firms? To examine this question, we compare the distribu-
tions of the degree of firm-level integration between two equally divided subsample
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A. Distribution of R2 over the whole sample period, 1995-2014
B. Distribution of R2 over two sub-sample periods, 1995-2004 and 2005-2014
Figure 6: Distribution of the Firm-level R2
This figure plots the empirical density of R2 measured from equation (1d) for all firms in our nine
sample countries over the entire sample period of 1995-2014 (Figure 1A), and two sub-sample periods
of 1995-2004 and 2005-2014 (Figure 1B). For Figure 1B, the solid line represents the distribution
over the earlier sub-sample period, and the dashed line represents the distribution over the recent
sub-sample period.
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periods, 1995-2004 and 2005-2014. The results are provided in Panels B and C of
Table 24 and also in Figure 6B. As can be seen from the panels, the mean (median)
R2 estimated from all three dimensions increased from 0.157 to 0.229 (0.132 to 0.205)
over the two subsample periods, ranging from -0.506 to 0.938 in the earlier period
and from -0.480 to 0.939 in the later period. Thus, both the mean and median of
R2s have increased somewhat over time, consistent with the increased integration at
the firm-level, although its range remains very stable. Even in the later subsample
period, the distribution of R2 is widespread from negative to positive. Thus, there
still exist plenty of individual stocks that are highly immune to the common global
factors in the recent years.
To further investigate the heterogeneity in globalization at the firm-level, we gen-
erate the distribution of R2s estimated from all three dimensions within each of our
nine sample countries and summarize their distributions over the entire sample pe-
riod and two sub-sample periods in Table 25. As shown in the table, firms exhibit
wide ranges of R2s over the whole sample period and two sub-sample periods in each
country, pointing to the heterogeneous degrees of integration across firms within each
country. For example, the R2 ranges from -0.483 to 0.932 in Australia over the whole
sample period, -0.480 to 0.915 in Germany, and -0.464 to 0.934 in the U.S. It is also
noted that different countries show different distributions of globalization over time.
For example, Canada, Switzerland, and the U.S. became much more integrated over
time, compared to the other countries. In contrast, Hong Kong and Japan show very
stable distributions of R2s over time. Within each country, however, individual firms
show stark differences in the degree of globalization. We also examine the distribution
of firm-level R2s within each industry and style and find similarly strong heterogeneity
in the degree of global integration across firms within each industry and style.
Overall, the distributions of the R2s indicate a strong heterogeneity in the de-
gree of global integration at the firm-level. Although firms, in general, have become
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Table 25: Distribution of Firm-level R2 within Each Sample Country
This table reports the summary statistics of the cross-sectional distribution of R2 from equation
(1d) averaged over the periods of 1995-2014 (Panel A), 1995-2004 (Panel B), and 2005-2014 (Panel
C) for each of our nine sample countries –Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan,
Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. Std, Min, Max, and Skew represent standard deviation, mini-
mum, maximum, and skewness, respectively.
percentile
Country Mean Std Min 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th Max Skew
Panel A: 1995 to 2014
Australia 0.165 0.210 -0.483 -0.138 0.012 0.139 0.295 0.558 0.932 0.529
Canada 0.242 0.232 -0.399 -0.092 0.065 0.213 0.399 0.672 0.919 0.418
France 0.173 0.215 -0.440 -0.124 0.018 0.141 0.295 0.590 0.922 0.672
Germany 0.147 0.208 -0.480 -0.144 -0.002 0.121 0.268 0.542 0.915 0.610
Hong Kong 0.154 0.206 -0.506 -0.136 0.003 0.127 0.282 0.540 0.938 0.564
Japan 0.245 0.200 -0.441 -0.065 0.098 0.232 0.383 0.595 0.885 0.216
Switzerland 0.224 0.212 -0.392 -0.091 0.071 0.207 0.356 0.621 0.883 0.382
U.K. 0.134 0.202 -0.482 -0.155 -0.009 0.111 0.251 0.516 0.939 0.603
U.S. 0.186 0.216 -0.464 -0.104 0.022 0.150 0.322 0.601 0.934 0.649
Panel B: 1995 to 2004
Australia 0.124 0.183 -0.483 -0.147 -0.006 0.107 0.239 0.450 0.860 0.423
Canada 0.151 0.187 -0.399 -0.123 0.016 0.132 0.266 0.500 0.894 0.490
France 0.117 0.174 -0.440 -0.131 -0.008 0.100 0.219 0.439 0.892 0.643
Germany 0.118 0.179 -0.455 -0.150 -0.009 0.105 0.225 0.437 0.840 0.473
Hong Kong 0.161 0.208 -0.506 -0.141 0.011 0.139 0.286 0.545 0.938 0.531
Japan 0.247 0.202 -0.441 -0.067 0.099 0.236 0.387 0.595 0.885 0.178
Switzerland 0.175 0.192 -0.392 -0.102 0.040 0.160 0.287 0.526 0.842 0.517
U.K. 0.091 0.174 -0.482 -0.169 -0.030 0.077 0.199 0.398 0.869 0.457
U.S. 0.137 0.187 -0.464 -0.117 -0.002 0.106 0.249 0.495 0.903 0.697
Panel C: 2005 to 2014
Australia 0.192 0.222 -0.408 -0.130 0.028 0.166 0.332 0.606 0.932 0.471
Canada 0.299 0.238 -0.396 -0.060 0.114 0.283 0.474 0.710 0.919 0.222
France 0.231 0.236 -0.400 -0.113 0.055 0.201 0.387 0.667 0.922 0.424
Germany 0.167 0.223 -0.480 -0.141 0.002 0.136 0.303 0.584 0.915 0.569
Hong Kong 0.151 0.204 -0.462 -0.135 -0.001 0.122 0.280 0.538 0.920 0.582
Japan 0.243 0.199 -0.399 -0.063 0.097 0.230 0.380 0.596 0.856 0.249
Switzerland 0.265 0.219 -0.379 -0.077 0.102 0.257 0.412 0.658 0.883 0.217
U.K. 0.176 0.217 -0.420 -0.135 0.018 0.152 0.307 0.583 0.939 0.515
U.S. 0.261 0.234 -0.414 -0.076 0.078 0.233 0.428 0.685 0.934 0.377
117
more globally integrated over time, there still exist a large number of firms that are
minimally exposed to the common global factors. As we will discuss later in detail,
stocks of these local firms would allow investors to achieve effective international
diversification.
3.3.2 The effects of country, industry, and style attributes on the degree
of global integration
Preceding analysis documents that firms are highly heterogenous in the degree of
global integration, and country, industry, and style dimensions may be all important
in determining the degree of integration. In this subsection, we formally test whether
the country, industry, and style dimensions indeed significantly affect the degree of
global integration at the firm level. If so, we then examine how individual country,
industry, and style affect the degree of globalization.
To formally test the effect of country, industry, and style on the degree of global
integration at the firm-level, we apply the analysis of variance (ANOVA) and consider
the following model,






lt + εit, (2)
where R2it is the degree of global integration for the i-th firm in year t estimated
from equation (1d); the i-th firm belongs to the j-th country, k-th industry, and l-th




lt represent the effects of country j, industry k, and style
l, respectively, in year t; εit is the firm-specific component and αt is a common effect
that all firms share.
For each year from 1995 to 2014, we estimate α, βC , βI , and βS by running a
cross-sectional regression of the R2s of all sample firms on a set of country, industry,
and style dummy variables,















il + εi, (3)
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where ICij = 1 if firm i belongs to country j (zero otherwise), I
I
ik = 1 if firm i belongs
to industry k (zero otherwise), and ISil = 1 if firm i belongs to style l (zero otherwise).













l = 0 in the estimation and then we test the
following three null hypotheses each year over our whole sample period of 1995–2014,
(i) H0 : β
C
j = 0 for all j = 1, · · · , 9, (ii) H0 : βIk = 0 for all k = 1, · · · , 10, and
(iii) H0 : β
S
l = 0 for all l = 1, · · · , 9. The test results for the hypothesis (i), (ii),
and (iii) are summarized in the ANOVA column in Panels A, B, and C, respectively,
in Table 26. For each hypothesis, the frequency of rejections is reported with the
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels over the 20 years during the
period of 1995-2014. As shown in Table 26, each of the hypotheses (i), (ii), and (iii) is
rejected at the 1% significance level each year over the 20-year sample period, without
exception, indicating that all three dimensions — country, style, and industry —
have statistically significant effects on the global integration at the firm-level. This
is consistent with our preceding findings and also indirectly justifies our choice of
equation (1d) to measure the degree of global integration at the firm-level considering
all three dimensions, rather than equations (1a)-(1c).
Now, to examine how individual country, industry, and style attributes affect the
degree of firm global integration, following [96], we choose to estimate the individual
country (βCj ), industry (β
I
k), and style (β
S
l ) effects on firm global integration relative
to the common factor (α), which represents the proportion-weighted average degree
of global integration over all sample firms.11 In other words, the common factor α in
equation (3) can be regarded as a benchmark — the “average firm” with the degree
of global integration equal to α. Specifically, in the estimation of equation (3), we




l in equation (4).
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Table 26: The Effects of Firms’ Country, Industry, and Style Attributes on the Degree
of Global Integration
For each year over the entire sample period of 1995-2014, we estimate country (β̂Cj ), industry (β̂
I
k),



















il + εi. The ANOVA column of Panels A, B, and C reports the test results
on the following three hypotheses: (i) H0 : β
C
j = 0 for all j = 1, · · · , 9, (ii) H0 : βIk = 0 for all
k = 1, · · · , 10, and (iii) H0 : βSl = 0 for all l = 1, · · · , 9, respectively. We report the frequency of
rejections is reported with the statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level over the 20 years
during the entire sample period. Estimates and test results of the individual estimates for βCj for
j = 1, · · · , 9, βIk for k = 1, · · · , 10, and βSl for l = 1, · · · , 9 are summarized in the following columns.
We report the averages over 1995- 2014 of the country effects (Panel A), the industry effects (Panel
B), the style effects (Panel C) along with the rejection frequencies on the null of no effects at the
1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels.
Panel A: Country
ANOVA Australia Canada France Germany Hong Kong Japan Switzerland U.K. U.S.
Mean of βCj -0.040 0.021 -0.022 -0.057 -0.031 0.053 0.026 -0.060 0.008
No. of rejections at 1% 20 15 16 14 19 19 18 6 16 18
No. of rejections at 5% 20 17 16 15 20 19 19 7 18 18
No. of rejections at 10% 20 18 17 15 20 19 20 8 18 18
Panel B: Industry
ANOVA Energy Materials Industrials Consumer Consumer Health Financials Information Telecom Utilities
Discretionary Staples Care Technology Services
Mean of βIk 0.051 0.023 0.005 -0.013 -0.048 -0.040 0.012 0.019 -0.003 -0.014
No. of rejections at 1% 20 16 13 12 14 20 17 13 13 9 10
No. of rejections at 5% 20 20 16 12 16 20 17 15 14 13 11
No. of rejections at 10% 20 20 18 14 16 20 17 15 15 15 14
Panel C: Style
ANOVA Small Small Small Mid Mid Mid Large Large Large
Growth Core Value Growth Core Value Growth Core Value
Mean of βSl -0.107 -0.102 -0.111 -0.035 -0.017 -0.019 0.101 0.123 0.116
No. of rejections at 1% 20 20 20 20 18 15 14 20 20 20
No. of rejections at 5% 20 20 20 20 19 15 16 20 20 20
No. of rejections at 10% 20 20 20 20 19 16 17 20 20 20
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first set βC9 = 0, β
I
10 = 0, and β
S















l = 0, (4)




l are the proportions of firms in country j, in industry k, and in
style l among all sample firms in terms of the number of firms.12
The time-series means of the country effects β̂Cj , j = 1, · · · , 9, the industry effects
β̂Ik , k = 1, · · · , 10, and the style effects β̂Sl , l = 1, · · · , 9 over the whole sample period
of 1995–2014 are provided in Table 26, along with the rejection frequencies of the null
of no effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
As shown in Table 26, country, industry, and style attributes exert very different
effects on the degree of global integration at the firm-level. In particular, for the
country attribute, firms from Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the U.S., on average,
tend to be more integrated than the average firm (with the degree of integration
given by α̂) by 0.021, 0.053, 0.026, and 0.008, respectively, while firms from Australia,
France, Germany, Hong Kong, and the U.K. are less integrated than the average firm
by 0.040, 0.022, 0.057, 0.031, and 0.060, respectively. For the industry attribute,
firms in the consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care, telecom services,
and utilities are, on average, less integrated than the average firm by 0.013, 0.048,
0.040, 0.003, and 0.014, respectively. These results are largely as expected since the
above industries are generally considered less or non-tradable industries. In contrast,
firms in the energy, materials, industrials, financials, and information technology
are more integrated than the average firm by 0.051, 0.023, 0.005, 0.012, and 0.019,
respectively. For the style dimension, small-growth, small-core, and small-value firms
are, on average, less integrated than the average firm by 0.107, 0.102, and 0.111,
respectively. Also, mid-growth, mid-core, and mid-value firms are less integrated
than the average firm by 0.035, 0.017, and 0.019, respectively, which are somewhat













weaker than small firms. In contrast to small- and middle-size firms, large-growth,
large-core, and large-value firms are more integrated than the average firm by 0.101,
0.123, and 0.116, respectively. Remarkably, the coefficients for small as well as large
size firms are all significant at the 1% level each year over the entire sample period,
without exception. These results are consistent with the findings of previous literature
that large firms tend to be more integrated globally, as these firms have high liquidity,
low information asymmetry, few barriers in trading, and good governance (e.g., [110]
and [29]).
In order to examine the time trends in the country, industry, and style effects on
the degree of firm global integration, following [155], we compute the mean absolute













l |β̂Sl |. The time-series of country,
industry, and style MADs over our whole sample period, 1995-2014, are plotted in
Figure 7. As shown in the figure, the style dimension has, on average, the largest
effect on the degree of global integration followed by the country dimension and the
industry dimension. The country and style MADs have larger volatility than the
industry MAD.
To further investigate the time trends in the country, industry, and style effects on
the degree of firm global integration, we examine the time-trend for each individual
country, industry, and style attribute. As shown in the table, different countries,
industries, and styles show different time trends in their effects on the degree of
global integration at the firm-level. For example, the effect of the U.S. on the firm
global integration is negative, relative to the average firm, during the earlier years,
but became positive from 2007, probably reflecting the sub-prime mortgage crisis and
the Great Recession. Information technology shows positive effects during the earlier
years, but became negative during the recent years, implying that firms in information
technology did not become more integrated over time. Small (large)-growth, -core,
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Figure 7: The Aggregate Effects of Country, Industry, and Style Attributes on the
Firm-level R2
This figure plots the time-series of country, industry, and style mean absolute deviations (MAD)
over our entire sample period of 1995-2014. First, we estimate country (β̂Cj ), industry (β̂
I
k), and style
































l |β̂Sl |, where ωCj is the
proportion of firms in country j among all firms in our nine sample countries in terms of market
capitalization, ωIk is the proportion of firms in industry k, and ω
S
l is the proportion of firms in style
l.
and -value styles show negative (positive) effects on the global integration among firms
for each of the 20 years over our whole sample period, thus exhibiting very consistent
effects of style attribute on the degree of global integration at the firm-level.
Overall, all three dimensions of firm attributes, i.e., country, industry, and style,
are statistically significant in explaining the degree of firm global integration. The
style dimension has the largest aggregate effect on the degree of global integration
at the firm-level, while the industry dimension has the smallest aggregate effect.
Meanwhile, individual country, industry, and style attributes have different, time-
varying effects on the firm-level global integration in terms of the magnitude and
direction (i.e., positive or negative) of the effect.
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3.4 Portfolio Risk Diversification with Local Stocks
Having documented a strong heterogeneity in the degree of global integration at the
firm level, we now turn to some of the practical implications of this heterogeneity for
international portfolio investment. In particular, we estimate the potential gains in
terms of risk reduction from international diversification with “local stocks” whose
returns are least driven by common global factors. Based on the wide distribution
of R2 at the firm level, shown in the previous section, we conjecture that if investors
systematically identify local stocks and form portfolios with these stocks, they are
most likely to benefit significantly in terms of extra risk reduction beyond the con-
ventional diversification gains with purely domestic stocks. To test this conjecture,
we compare the effectiveness of portfolio diversification with three distinct groups of
individual stocks, i.e., global, local, and U.S. stocks.
Specifically, we use the simulation method employed by [161]. As described in
Section 3, we first regress weekly stock returns on the global factors and estimate
R2 of each individual stock at the end of each year over our sample period 1995-
2014. Then, we define global (local) stocks as those belonging to the top (bottom)
decile sorted on R2 among our international sample stocks. Following [161], we then
randomly choose a varying number of stocks (ranging from 1 to 50) with replacement,
from each of the three separate groups of stocks, to form equal-weighted portfolios
and compute the variances of weekly portfolio returns.13 By repeating the simulation
procedure 5,000 times, we obtain so many realizations of the variance for each portfolio
consisting of a certain number of stocks.
Figure 8A plots the ratio of the average of portfolio variances to the average of
individual stock variances as a function of the number of stocks in a given portfolio
for each of the three stock groups: global (top 10% in R2), local (bottom 10% in R2),
13Since stocks in the top (global) or bottom (local) decile change each year, we resample stocks
in each year, generating the portfolio returns over the 20-year sample period from 1995 to 2014.
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A. Effectiveness of portfolio risk diversification with global, local, and U.S. stocks
B. The time-series of systematic portfolio variances for global, local, and
U.S. stocks
Figure 8: Portfolio Risk Diversification with Local Stocks
125
C. Systematic portfolio variance and the diversification gains
Figure 8: (Cont.) Portfolio Risk Diversification with Local Stocks
This figure shows the effectiveness of portfolio variance reduction using local stocks in comparison
with using either global stocks or U.S. stocks. Figure 8A plots the ratio of the average of portfolio
variances to the average of individual stock variance as a function of the number of stocks in a
given portfolio for each of the three stock groups: global (top 10% in R2), local (bottom 10% in
R2), and U.S. domestic stocks. The three solid lines represent the average of the ratios across 5,000
simulations and the color-shaded areas represent the associated 95% confidence intervals. R2 of each
individual stock is measured by regressing weekly stock returns on global factors at the end of each
year over our whole sample period of 1995-2014. Following [161], we then randomly choose a varying
number of stocks (ranging from 1 to 50) with replacement, from each of the three separate groups
of stocks, to form equal-weighted portfolios and compute the variances of weekly portfolio returns.
Figure 8B illustrates how the systematic portfolio variance (N=50) — the variance limit in Figure
8A — has been evolved over time for each of the three groups of stocks. Finally, Figure 8C plots (i)
the systematic portfolio variance (solid line) computed from fully diversified portfolios (N=50) and
(ii) the gains from international diversification (dashed line) over P1 through P25, where the gains
from international diversification is measured by the systematic portfolio variance from U.S. stocks
(9.266%2/week) minus the systematic portfolio variance from each of the 25 portfolios sorted on R2.
P1 (P25) comprises the most local (global) stocks, representing the bottom (top) 4% of our sample
international stocks sorted on R2.
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and U.S. stocks. The figure clearly shows that local stocks are much more effective
in reducing the portfolio risk than global stocks. In fact, the average variance of
fully diversified portfolios (N=50) comprising local stocks is only about 6.3% of the
average variance of individual stocks, whereas the ratio goes up to 22.3% when we
use global stocks.14 With U.S. stocks, the ratio is 13.1%, falling in between the two
ratios.
The first key message from Figure 8A is that U.S. investors may not necessarily
benefit from international diversification per se. In fact, domestic diversification with
U.S. stocks is much more effective in reducing the portfolio risk than international
diversification with global stocks. This is likely due to the fact that some of U.S.
stocks are not much affected by global factors, i.e., local, while global stocks are
significantly driven by the common global factors. The second important message is
that U.S. investors may continue to benefit significantly from ‘selective’ international
diversification with local stocks that are minimally affected by the global factors.
Furthermore, it is noted that the 95% confidence intervals for the systematic risks
for the three “fully diversified” portfolios do not overlap each other. This implies
that the gains from international diversification with local stocks, relative to U.S.
domestic diversification, can be reliably achieved by simply holding a sufficiently
large number of local stocks. This additional advantage of diversification with local
stocks is likely due to the fact that, by construction, local stock returns are mostly
driven by idiosyncratic risks. As a result, the correlations among these stocks will
tend to be reliably low, keeping the systematic portfolio risk low and stable.15 Figure
14Figure 8A indicates that for each stock group, the portfolio variance converges to the system-
atic (i.e., undiversifiable) portfolio variance level when the portfolio contains about 40 individual
stocks. Thus, a portfolio can be considered fully diversified if it contains 40 or more stocks. To
be conservative, however, we compute the systematic portfolio variance at N=50 in the ensuing
analysis.
15The average pairwise correlation of weekly individual stock returns within the global (top 10%
in R2) and local (bottom 10% in R2) portfolios are 0.280 and 0.063, respectively, during our sample
period of 1995-2014.
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8A indeed shows that the confidence interval for the systematic risk of the local stock
portfolio is very tight.
Next, we examine the time-series pattern in the systematic variance of portfo-
lios (N = 50) consisting of global, local, and U.S. stocks. At the end of each year,
we form decile portfolios based on individual stock R2s eatimated in that year, and
randomly pick 50 stocks from U.S. stocks, global stocks (top 10% in R2), and local
stocks (bottom 10% in R2) and calculate equal-weighted portfolio returns using se-
lected stock returns in the next year. We repeat this process 5,000 times. Figure
8B illustrates how the systematic portfolio variance has evolved over time for each
of the three types of stocks. The figure reveals a consistent pattern that the system-
atic portfolio variance is always highest for global stocks and lowest for local stocks,
with the systematic variance for U.S. stocks falling in between. Remarkably, the sys-
tematic portfolio variance of local stocks did not increase noticeably even during the
crisis years, such as 1998 (the aftermath of Asian/Russian financial crises), 2000-2001
(the dotcom bubble burst and the 9/11 incident), and 2008-2011 (the U.S. subprime
mortgage crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis). It is noteworthy that the
systematic portfolio variance of local stocks rose only modestly during 1998 and 2000,
and also during 2008-2009. In a sharp contrast, the systematic portfolio variances
of both global and U.S. stocks rose dramatically in each of those years, instigating
negative comments from investors like, “Where are the diversification benefits when
we need it most?” However, as shown in Figure 8B, local stocks can serve as an
effective safe-haven (if not completely calm) from the extreme volatilities observed
during those global financial crises. At the height of sub-prime mortgage crisis in
2008, for instance, the variance of the local stock portfolio returns (computed from
weekly returns in dollar terms) was 9.51%2, strikingly lower than 27.85 (33.67)%2
for the U.S. (global) stock portfolio. In other words, the gains from international
risk reduction with local stocks, relative to domestic diversification with U.S. stocks,
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remain robust during the crisis periods, a valuable trait for local stocks.
Incidentally, the results in Figures 8A-8B suggest that there can be a systematic
relation between stock market integration and the magnitude of systematic portfolio
variance (and thus the gains from international diversification). To pursue this point
further, we construct 25 portfolios (P1 through P 25) more finely sorted on R2 and
investigate how the systematic portfolio risk may be related to the degree of global
integration of stocks. These portfolios are constructed essentially in the same way as
the decile portfolios used in the above analysis except we use 25 portfolios. P1 (P25)
comprises the most local (global) stocks, representing the bottom (top) 4% of our
sample international stocks sorted on R2. Figure 8C plots the systematic portfolio
variance computed from fully diversified portfolios (N=50) over the entire spectrum
of integration, P1 through P25. Along with the systematic portfolio variance, we over-
lay the gains from international diversification where the gains are measured by the
systematic portfolio variance from U.S. stocks (13.1%2/week) minus the systematic
portfolio variance from each of the 25 portfolios sorted on R2.16 Figure 8C indicates
that as the degree of global integration increases, the systematic portfolio variance
(solid line) rises at a slow pace until about P17, but afterwards increases at a much
faster rate, probably reflecting the right skewness of the firm-level R2 distribution doc-
umented in the previous section (see Figure 6). On the other hand, the gains from
international diversification (dotted line) behave as a mirror image of the systematic
portfolio risk over P1 through P25, initially declining slowly but then at a faster rate
later. It is noteworthy, however, that the diversification gains remain positive untill
P22 and turn negative only for the most integrated portfolios, P23-P25.
Table 27 provides detailed numerical information pertaining to the relation il-
lustrated in Figure 8C, including (i) the systematic portfolio variance, estimated at
16[46] propose a similar method in measuring the gains from housing portfolio diversification.
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Table 27: Characteristics of 25 Portfolios Sorted on the Firm-level R2
This table provides detailed numerical information pertaining to the relation illustrated in Figure
8C, including (i) the systematic portfolio variance, estimated at N=50, along with the associated
95% confidence interval, and the magnitude of diversification gains for each portfolio relative to
the well-diversified U.S. portfolio and (ii) the averages of R2, pairwise correlation, and the variance
of (weekly) returns for individual stocks comprising each portfolio. R2 of each individual stock is
measured by regressing weekly stock returns on global factors at the end of each year over our sample
period 1995-2014. P1 (P25) comprises the most local (global) stocks, representing the bottom (top)
4% of our sample international stocks sorted on R2. We then randomly choose 50 stocks with
replacement, from each of 25 portfolios to form equal-weighted returns and compute the variances of
weekly portfolio returns. The systematic portfolio variance is the average, across 5,000 simulations,
of the variances of weekly portfolio returns comprising the 50 selected stocks in each simulation. We
also obtain the 95% confidence interval from the same simulation exercise.
Systematic 95% Confidence Interval Diversification Averages over Individual Stocks
Portfolio Lower Upper Gains Degree of Pairwise Variance
Variance Limit Limit (%2/week) Integration Correlation (%2/week)
(%2/week) (R2)
P1 5.665 5.086 6.350 3.601 0.123 0.058 91.740
P2 5.874 5.304 6.710 3.393 0.171 0.066 92.736
P3 5.957 5.347 6.639 3.309 0.199 0.073 90.450
P4 6.004 5.410 6.733 3.263 0.221 0.076 88.699
P5 6.013 5.392 6.711 3.254 0.241 0.079 86.234
P6 6.083 5.462 6.765 3.184 0.258 0.085 85.331
P7 6.103 5.374 6.716 3.163 0.275 0.090 83.821
P8 6.157 5.643 6.990 3.109 0.291 0.095 81.553
P9 6.204 5.475 6.833 3.063 0.307 0.099 77.135
P10 6.258 5.592 6.990 3.009 0.322 0.105 79.766
P11 6.291 5.622 6.934 2.976 0.337 0.109 76.027
P12 6.395 5.816 7.233 2.871 0.353 0.119 75.849
P13 6.455 5.863 7.265 2.812 0.369 0.122 73.784
P14 6.508 5.701 6.996 2.758 0.385 0.131 71.220
P15 6.569 5.814 7.118 2.698 0.402 0.137 67.974
P16 6.661 6.012 7.360 2.606 0.420 0.144 69.008
P17 6.747 6.090 7.474 2.519 0.438 0.149 67.522
P18 6.950 6.239 7.638 2.317 0.457 0.159 63.278
P19 7.271 6.575 8.019 1.996 0.479 0.174 61.493
P20 7.617 6.890 8.382 1.650 0.502 0.182 60.501
P21 8.077 7.185 8.742 1.190 0.528 0.193 58.119
P22 8.578 7.801 9.407 0.688 0.558 0.211 55.996
P23 9.357 8.660 9.929 -0.090 0.594 0.222 52.866
P24 10.569 9.524 11.367 -1.302 0.642 0.260 49.483
P25 12.657 11.656 13.734 -3.391 0.730 0.329 46.074
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N=50, along with the associated 95% confidence interval, and the magnitude of di-
versification gains for each portfolio relative to the well-diversified U.S. portfolio and
(ii) the averages of R2, pairwise correlation, and the variance of (weekly) returns for
individual stocks comprising each portfolio. While much of the information provided
in Table 5 is largely self-explanatory, it is noteworthy that the average pairwise corre-
lation among individual stock returns is only 0.058 for P1 but much higher at 0.329 for
P25. Thus, although the individual stock volatility is obviously much higher, on aver-
age, for P1 (91.740%2/week) than for P25 (46.074%2/week), the systematic portfolio
variance is much higher for P 25 (12.655%2/week) than for P1 (5.672%2/week).17
3.5 Mean-variance Optimization with Local Stocks
In the previous sections, we document a strong heterogeneity in the degree of global
integration at the firm-level (Section 3) and the gains in terms of extra portfolio
risk diversification from using local stocks (Section 4). Our goal in this section is
to show how investors can effectively exploit the heterogeneity in global integration
across individual firms and enhance the mean-variance efficiency of their portfolios
by holding “local portfolios” optimally in conjunction with country market indices.
3.5.1 Construction of local portfolios
In this subsection, we describe how to construct the local portfolios that will be used
in our mean-variance analysis and discuss the distributional properties of the local
portfolio returns.
Based on our earlier finding that each of the three dimensions of firm attributes, i.e,
country, industry, and style, matters in determining the degree of global integration
17The relation depicted in Figure 8C as well as the information provided in Table 27 strongly
points to an intriguing possibility: Global financial integration may be self-defeating in the long run,
in a way, as greater integration may eventually lead to higher correlations among stocks, thereby
diminishing the diversification benefits. It is, however, beyond the scope of the current paper to
formally investigate this possibility.
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at the firm-level, we estimate the R2s based on equation (1d) that uses as the global
factors the three separate sets of principal components representing each of the three
dimensions of firm attributes. We then form the (value-weighted) local portfolio for
each country, industry, and style group using the bottom decile of firms sorted on the
R2s of individual sample firms classified into the group. Altogether, we form 28 local
portfolios, comprising nine country, ten industry, and nine style local portfolios.
Table 28: Summary Statistics of Country Market Indices and Country-local, Industry-
local, and Style-local Portfolios
This table summarizes the properties of the monthly returns of the nine country market indices and
28 (= 9 country + 10 industry + 9 style) local portfolios. Panel A reports the mean, the standard
deviation (Std), and the Sharpe ratio of the monthly returns of the nine country market indices.
Panels B, C, and D present those statistics of value-weighted monthly returns of local portfolios from
country, industry, and style dimensions, respectively. Panel E reports the correlation matrix of the
nine country market indices and the 28 local portfolios. Mean and Std are reported in percentage
per month. Sharpe ratios are expressed in a monthly unit. The average monthly risk-free rate in
our sample period is 0.23%.
Panel A. Country market indices
Australia Canada France Germany Hong Kong Japan Switzerland U.K. U.S. Average
Mean 1.035 1.110 0.930 0.907 0.945 0.170 0.978 0.780 0.941 0.866
Std 6.334 5.991 6.205 6.937 7.129 5.668 5.106 5.054 4.783 5.912
Sharpe ratio 0.130 0.150 0.115 0.100 0.103 -0.008 0.150 0.112 0.152 0.111
Panel B. Country local portfolios
Australia Canada France Germany Hong Kong Japan Switzerland U.K. U.S. Average
Mean 1.173 1.798 1.020 0.325 0.804 0.529 1.245 0.927 1.276 1.011
Std 9.006 6.902 5.264 5.637 7.857 5.512 5.244 5.824 5.043 6.255
Sharpe ratio 0.107 0.229 0.153 0.020 0.075 0.057 0.196 0.122 0.211 0.130
Panel C. Industry local portfolios
Consumer Consumer Health Information Telecom
Energy Materials Industrials Discr. Staples Care Financials Technology Services Utilities Average
Mean 0.798 0.598 0.754 0.982 0.967 1.567 1.047 1.897 1.133 1.308 1.105
Std 8.235 7.204 4.548 4.934 4.435 6.020 4.096 8.412 8.102 5.217 6.120
Sharpe ratio 0.071 0.053 0.119 0.156 0.170 0.225 0.203 0.200 0.113 0.210 0.152
Panel D. Style local portfolios
Small Small Small Middle Middle Middle Large Large Large
Growth Core Value Growth Core Value Growth Core Value Average
Mean 0.173 0.551 1.022 0.701 0.967 1.331 0.925 1.132 1.233 0.893
Std 6.888 5.737 4.951 5.613 4.826 4.432 3.760 3.606 4.673 4.943
Sharpe ratio -0.006 0.059 0.163 0.087 0.156 0.252 0.189 0.255 0.218 0.153
Table 28 provides summary statistics of the monthly returns of the nine country
market indices and the 28 sample local portfolios. In particular, Panel A reports
the mean, the standard deviation, and the Sharpe ratio of the monthly returns of
each of the country market indices. Panels B, C, and D present the same statistics
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Table 28: (Cont.) Summary Statistics of Country Market Indices and Country-local,
Industry-local, and Style-local Portfolios
Panel E. Correlation matrix
Country Indices Country Locals Industry Locals Style Locals




France 0.74 0.76 1.00
Germany 0.71 0.77 0.91 1.00
Hong Kong 0.71 0.71 0.59 0.62 1.00
Japan 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.46 0.47 1.00
Switzerland 0.68 0.68 0.82 0.79 0.55 0.51 1.00
U.K. 0.83 0.82 0.89 0.85 0.68 0.52 0.80 1.00
U.S. 0.75 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.65 0.51 0.74 0.84 1.00
Country Locals
Austrailia 0.81 0.72 0.57 0.55 0.64 0.44 0.53 0.69 0.58 1.00
Canada 0.62 0.75 0.60 0.58 0.51 0.33 0.56 0.66 0.59 0.60 1.00
France 0.49 0.54 0.64 0.60 0.35 0.33 0.54 0.58 0.44 0.50 0.50 1.00
Germany 0.43 0.39 0.50 0.46 0.26 0.28 0.48 0.46 0.28 0.42 0.42 0.55 1.00
Hong Kong 0.54 0.57 0.41 0.45 0.64 0.38 0.37 0.51 0.46 0.57 0.41 0.38 0.32 1.00
Japan 0.38 0.28 0.33 0.25 0.32 0.82 0.39 0.32 0.27 0.35 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.26 1.00
Switzerland 0.57 0.61 0.67 0.63 0.43 0.38 0.72 0.65 0.54 0.52 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.39 0.28 1.00
U.K. 0.58 0.61 0.60 0.55 0.49 0.35 0.49 0.69 0.48 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.38 0.45 0.23 0.60 1.00
U.S. 0.65 0.73 0.65 0.68 0.54 0.43 0.60 0.70 0.78 0.56 0.59 0.47 0.27 0.49 0.23 0.54 0.56 1.00
Industry Locals
Energy 0.59 0.65 0.51 0.49 0.44 0.38 0.48 0.60 0.46 0.63 0.59 0.49 0.41 0.53 0.28 0.53 0.56 0.51 1.00
Materials 0.62 0.68 0.53 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.54 0.59 0.50 0.64 0.64 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.31 0.61 0.57 0.59 0.62 1.00
Industrials 0.65 0.70 0.68 0.65 0.55 0.57 0.64 0.72 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.46 0.55 0.46 0.57 0.63 0.70 0.63 0.65 1.00
Cons. Disc. 0.60 0.64 0.65 0.60 0.54 0.57 0.56 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.53 0.54 0.39 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.60 0.68 0.51 0.51 0.70 1.00
Cons. Stpl. 0.48 0.43 0.50 0.45 0.37 0.39 0.54 0.53 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.38 0.31 0.41 0.52 0.41 0.44 0.39 0.40 0.50 0.44 1.00
Health Care 0.41 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.37 0.30 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.35 0.44 0.34 0.20 0.33 0.17 0.46 0.54 0.62 0.34 0.35 0.55 0.44 0.24 1.00
Financials 0.64 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.54 0.47 0.58 0.67 0.55 0.63 0.55 0.58 0.50 0.49 0.40 0.56 0.61 0.56 0.54 0.60 0.68 0.61 0.48 0.35 1.00
Info. Tech. 0.46 0.60 0.51 0.54 0.47 0.45 0.39 0.53 0.58 0.46 0.42 0.38 0.20 0.43 0.33 0.41 0.51 0.65 0.37 0.43 0.57 0.60 0.23 0.50 0.39 1.00
Tele. Serv. 0.53 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.39 0.46 0.55 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.36 0.29 0.44 0.31 0.39 0.40 0.52 0.41 0.37 0.49 0.52 0.31 0.36 0.44 0.48 1.00
Utilities 0.34 0.37 0.31 0.33 0.27 0.22 0.32 0.36 0.26 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.37 0.20 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.37 0.35 0.42 0.33 0.30 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.23 1.00
Style Locals
Small Growth 0.60 0.62 0.55 0.52 0.55 0.49 0.45 0.59 0.52 0.64 0.54 0.54 0.36 0.63 0.39 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.64 0.63 0.39 0.45 0.61 0.56 0.48 0.31 1.00
Small Core 0.54 0.62 0.54 0.52 0.46 0.42 0.46 0.57 0.50 0.58 0.50 0.54 0.41 0.56 0.29 0.55 0.66 0.58 0.49 0.56 0.65 0.61 0.36 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.43 0.25 0.65 1.00
Small Value 0.55 0.66 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.44 0.46 0.60 0.55 0.61 0.53 0.54 0.40 0.53 0.28 0.55 0.69 0.63 0.58 0.59 0.71 0.66 0.36 0.52 0.60 0.59 0.44 0.34 0.61 0.71 1.00
Mid Growth 0.65 0.73 0.65 0.66 0.59 0.54 0.54 0.67 0.67 0.62 0.56 0.57 0.35 0.59 0.39 0.57 0.68 0.72 0.54 0.59 0.75 0.71 0.39 0.62 0.57 0.73 0.52 0.33 0.70 0.71 0.74 1.00
Mid Core 0.67 0.73 0.63 0.64 0.55 0.49 0.57 0.69 0.60 0.67 0.63 0.60 0.45 0.60 0.36 0.64 0.71 0.67 0.67 0.74 0.78 0.67 0.45 0.53 0.67 0.58 0.49 0.37 0.69 0.77 0.75 0.80 1.00
Mid Value 0.68 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.54 0.48 0.63 0.74 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.46 0.59 0.37 0.62 0.70 0.73 0.70 0.67 0.87 0.72 0.51 0.58 0.72 0.56 0.49 0.47 0.67 0.69 0.76 0.76 0.81 1.00
Large Growth 0.57 0.61 0.68 0.64 0.48 0.51 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.48 0.59 0.47 0.35 0.41 0.43 0.56 0.51 0.67 0.41 0.50 0.69 0.69 0.62 0.51 0.60 0.47 0.47 0.39 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.58 0.58 0.69 1.00
Large Core 0.70 0.74 0.77 0.74 0.60 0.61 0.77 0.80 0.75 0.60 0.66 0.56 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.62 0.58 0.71 0.60 0.64 0.78 0.69 0.62 0.49 0.71 0.50 0.51 0.42 0.59 0.53 0.58 0.66 0.70 0.78 0.78 1.00
Large Value 0.64 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.50 0.46 0.66 0.74 0.70 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.39 0.41 0.30 0.54 0.58 0.70 0.54 0.58 0.69 0.61 0.40 0.48 0.60 0.47 0.37 0.42 0.52 0.52 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.74 0.59 0.73 1.00
for the local portfolios from country, industry, and style dimensions, respectively.
Panel E reports the correlation matrix among all our sample market indices and local
portfolios.
Panel A shows that measured by the Sharpe ratio, the U.S. market index (0.152)
performed the best, followed by Canada (0.150), Switzerland (0.150), Australia (0.130),
France (0.115), the U.K. (0.112), Hong Kong (0.103), Germany (0.100), and Japan
(-0.008) during our sample period 1995-2014. Japan is the only country with a neg-
ative Sharpe ratio, which is due to its exceptionally low mean return, 0.170%, which
is compared with the sample cross-country average mean return of 0.866%. This low
mean return of the Japanese market index is probably reflective of the so-called lost
decades of the country. With its relatively modest mean return, the strong perfor-
mance of the U.S. market is attributable to its low risk; the standard deviation of
returns of the U.S. market index (4.783%) is the lowest among all our sample market
indices.
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Panels B, C, and D indicate that each of the three types of local portfolios, on
average, has a substantially higher Sharpe ratio than the country market indices —
in particular, the average Sharpe ratio is 0.111 for the country market indices, which
is compared with 0.130 for the country local portfolios, 0.152 for the industry local
portfolios, and 0.153 for the style local portfolios. It is noteworthy from the panels
that quite a few individual local portfolios registered very strong performances — in
particular, the large-core local portfolio has the highest Sharpe ratio (0.255) among all
the local portfolios, followed by the middle-value local (0.252), Canada local (0.229),
health care local (0.225), large-value local (0.218), U.S. local (0.211), utilities local
(0.210), financials local (0.203), and information technology local (0.200). It is also
interesting to note that value-oriented local portfolios and also local portfolios from
less- or non-traded industries, such as health care and utilities, are well represented
among the top performing local portfolios. During our sample period, the above local
portfolios substantially outperformed the best performing country market index, i.e.,
the U.S. index with a Sharpe ratio of 0.152.
Panel E presents the correlation matrix for the nine country market indices, nine
country local portfolios, ten industry local portfolios, and nine style local portfolios.
The correlation matrix indicates that the average correlation is 0.44 among country
local portfolios and also among industry local portfolios, which is substantially lower
than the average correlation among the country market indices, 0.70. On the other
hand, the average correlation among style local portfolios is relatively high at 0.66.
The correlation matrix also indicates that the U.S. market index is substantially less
correlated with each foreign country local portfolio than with the matching country
market index; for instance, the correlation of the U.S. market index is 0.59 (0.82)
with the Canadian local portfolio (market index), 0.28 (0.82) with the German local
portfolio (market index), 0.27 (0.51) with the Japanese local portfolio (market index),
and 0.48 (0.84) with the U.K. local portfolio (market index). The U.S. market index
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also has relatively low correlations with some of the industry local portfolios; for
instance, the correlation is 0.46 with the energy local portfolio, 0.42 with the consumer
staples local portfolio, 0.49 with the health care local portfolio, and 0.26 with the
utilities local portfolio.
The key parameter values presented in Table 28 strongly suggest that investors
should be able to benefit in terms of the enhanced mean-variance efficiency by in-
cluding the local portfolios in their overall portfolio holdings. We formally test this
proposition in the following subsection.
3.5.2 Mean-variance optimization with local portfolios
In this subsection, we formally test if investors can benefit in terms of mean-variance
efficiency from holding international local portfolios. In doing so, we assume that
investors would like to consider local portfolios to augment the stock market indices
of our sample of nine developed countries. Thus, focus is on deciding if local portfolios
may allow investors to further span the mean-variance space beyond whats feasible
with country stock market indices. As inputs for solving for the optimal portfolios,
we utilize the mean, standard deviation, and correlations of the returns from country
market indices and local portfolios provided in Table 28. It is recalled that these
parameters are computed over the period of January 1995–December 2014.
Specifically, we use the F -test proposed by [82] to test the significance of the
mean-variance gains from adding the “test assets” of local portfolios to the “bench-
mark assets” of stock market indices. If short sales are allowed, the F -tests can be
implemented in terms of the maximal Sharpe ratios, θ1 and θ2 attainable in the set of
N1 and N2 assets, respectively, where N1 is the number of base assets, and N2(≥ N1)









where T is the number of time series observations, and N = N2 − N1. The F -test
corresponds to the joint hypothesis of zero intercepts in a system of multivariate
regression of the additional N asset returns on the original N1 asset returns, and the
test statistic has an F -distribution with (T −N2;N) degrees of freedom. However, if
short sales are not allowed, the test statistic above does not follow any conventional
distribution. Hence, in approximating the unknown distribution with simulation,
we follow the procedure proposed by [86].18 For simplicity, we call both (with and
without short sales) tests as GRS tests.
As a first step of our analysis, we solve for the optimal international portfolio
comprising nine country stock market indices and test if investors may significantly
benefit from holding the resulting optimal portfolio as opposed to just holding the U.S.
stock market index. As can be seen from Panel A of Table 29, the optimal portfolio
returns have the mean of 2.31% (1.01%), standard deviation of 8.74% (4.82%), and
a Sharpe ratio of 0.236 (0.159) if short sales are (not) allowed. Recall that U.S.
market index has a Sharpe ratio of 0.152 from Panel A of Table 28. GRS test results
indicate that the mean-variance gains from holding the optimal international portfolio
comprising stock market indices are statistically insignificant, whether short sales are
allowed or not, which is consistent with the previous findings in the literature. This
result motivates considering local portfolios as a way of augmenting stock market
indices.
Panel B of Table 29 shows that when investors choice set is augmented with the
nine country local portfolios, the augmented optimal portfolio has a Sharpe ratio
18We implement the simulation process as following: First, (i) the betas and the associated residual
covariance matrix of test assets on the benchmark assets and (ii) the first two moments of bench-
mark asset returns are derived from the historical data. Assuming that the alphas of test assets
against the benchmark assets are all zeros, random samples of joint returns over T time periods
are drawn from a multivariate standard normal distribution with the estimated parameters. From
these simulated returns, we compute the maximum Sharpe ratios of θ̂22 and θ̂
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, is recorded. The empirical distribution of the test-statistic under the null
is approximated by repeating this process 2,000 times.
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Table 29: Mean-Variance Optimization with Local Portfolios
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E
Benchmark Assets U.S. Mkt Index Country Indices Country Indices Country Indices Country Indices
Test Assets 8 Other Mkts Country Locals Industry Locals Style Locals All Three Locals
Short Sales Short Sales Short Sales Short Sales Short Sales
With Without With Without With Without With Without With Without
Country Indices
Australia 0.463 0.000 0.350 0.000 0.192 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.250 0.000
Canada 0.868 0.310 -0.226 0.000 0.260 0.000 0.036 0.000 -0.049 0.000
France 0.591 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.192 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.160 0.000
Germany -1.107 0.000 -0.433 0.000 -0.437 0.000 -0.311 0.000 -0.360 0.000
Hong Kong 0.070 0.000 0.150 0.000 -0.072 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.030 0.000
Japan -1.097 0.000 -1.083 0.000 -0.426 0.000 -0.426 0.000 -0.189 0.000
Switzerland 1.446 0.413 0.193 0.000 0.401 0.000 -0.032 0.000 -0.213 0.000
U.K. -1.513 0.000 -0.726 0.000 -0.791 0.000 -1.018 0.000 -0.687 0.000
U.S. 1.279 0.277 0.526 0.000 0.275 0.000 0.328 0.000 0.167 0.000
Country Locals
Australia -0.206 0.000 0.117 0.000
Canada 0.548 0.397 0.333 0.148
France 0.432 0.009 0.420 0.000
Germany -0.447 0.000 -0.321 0.000
Hong Kong -0.036 0.000 0.155 0.000
Japan 0.770 0.000 0.082 0.000
Switzerland 0.577 0.252 0.479 0.000
U.K. -0.050 0.000 -0.163 0.000
U.S. 0.603 0.342 -0.208 0.000
Industry Locals
Energy -0.067 0.000 -0.320 0.000
Materials -0.250 0.000 -0.351 0.000
Industrials -0.435 0.000 -0.719 0.000
Cons. Disc. 0.056 0.000 0.018 0.000
Cons. Stap. 0.360 0.152 0.138 0.075
Health Care 0.338 0.264 0.299 0.217
Financials 0.708 0.149 0.301 0.020
Information Technology 0.308 0.120 0.437 0.093
Telecom Serv. -0.017 0.000 0.028 0.000
Utilities 0.405 0.315 0.201 0.297
Style Locals
Small Growth -0.440 0.000 -0.571 0.000
Small Core -0.153 0.000 -0.264 0.000
Small Value 0.211 0.000 0.109 0.000
Middle Growth -0.306 0.000 -0.712 0.000
Middle Core 0.206 0.000 0.475 0.000
Middle Value 0.792 0.406 0.982 0.000
Large Growth 0.145 0.000 -0.364 0.000
Large Core 1.183 0.522 1.048 0.150
Large Value 0.210 0.072 0.262 0.000
Optimal portfolio returns
Mean (%/month) 2.305 1.009 2.705 1.473 2.401 1.356 2.553 1.220 4.201 1.434
Std(%/month) 8.744 4.823 6.475 4.978 4.819 3.786 5.027 3.763 5.476 3.939
Sharpe ratio 0.236 0.159 0.381 0.247 0.448 0.294 0.460 0.260 0.723 0.303
GRS tests
Test-statistic 0.978 0.116 2.092 0.900 3.052 1.381 3.655 1.063 3.348 0.490
p-value 0.454 0.750 0.031 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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of 0.381 (0.247) if short sales are (not) allowed. GRS tests indicate that the mean-
variance gains from augmented international diversification relative to the benchmark
case are statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level when short sales are (not) al-
lowed. If short sales are not allowed, the augmented optimal portfolio is comprised of
Canada local (39.7%), Switzerland local (25.2%), and the U.S. local (34.2%); country
market indices optimally receive zero weights.
When investors simultaneously optimize their portfolio holdings across nine coun-
try market indices and ten industry local portfolios, the Sharpe ratio of the aug-
mented optimal portfolio becomes even higher, i.e., 0.448 (0.294) when short sales
are (not) allowed. As can be seen from Panel C of Table 29, GRS tests indicate that
the gains from augmented diversification is significant at the 1% level, regardless of
whether short sales are allowed. It is also noted that when short sales are not allowed,
the augmented optimal portfolio is comprised of local portfolios of consumer staples
(15.2%), health care (26.4%), finance (14.9%), information technology (12.0%), and
utilities (31.5%); it is noted that the composition of the augmented optimal portfolio
is strongly tilted toward less- or non-tradable industries like utilities, health care,
and consumer staples. Again, country market indices receive zero weights when short
sales are not allowed; when short sales are allowed, however, five country indices
(Australia, Canada, France, Switzerland, and U.S.) receive positive weights while the
remaining four country indices receive negative weights.
When investors augment the nine country market indices with nine style local
portfolios and optimize their portfolio selection, the Sharpe ratio becomes higher than
that of the benchmark case, i.e., 0.460 (0.260) when short sales are (not) allowed. As
shown in Panel D of Table 29, the gains from augmented optimization are statistically
significant at the 1% level, whether or not short sales are allowed. When short sales
are not allowed, the augmented optimal portfolio is comprised of middle-value local
(40.6%), large-core local (52.2%), and large-value local (7.2%). Clearly, value-oriented
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portfolios are given substantial weights, with no weights allocated to growth oriented
portfolios. Unexpectedly, when short sales are not allowed, no small-cap oriented
portfolios are given any positive weights despite their low R2s, due to quite low mean
returns for small-growth and small-core portfolios, as shown in Panel D of Table 28.
It is noted that small-value portfolio receives a positive weight when short sales
are allowed, while small-growth and small-core portfolios receive negative weights
in the optimal portfolio. Remarkably, country market indices receive no positive
weights at all in Panel B-D if short sales are not allowed. This observation suggests
that during our sample period, country market indices could have contributed to the
mean-variance efficiency only when short sales are allowed.
Panel E of Table 29 provides the results from simultaneous portfolio optimization
across nine country market indices and three sets of local portfolios, i.e., 9 country
local portfolios, 10 industry local portfolios, and 9 style local portfolios. The aug-
mented optimal portfolio has a Sharpe ratio of 0.723 (0.303) when short sales are
(not) allowed, which is much higher than the Sharpe ratio of any of the three aug-
mented optimal portfolios discussed in Panels B-D of Table 29. When short sales
are not allowed, country market indices receive zero weights and positive weights are
concentrated in industry local portfolios such as consumer staples (7.5%), health care
(21.7%), information technology (9.3%), and utilities (29.7%). Apart from these in-
dustry local portfolios, Canada local and big-core local portfolios receive 14.8% and
15.0% weights, respectively. The increase in the Sharpe ratio relative to the bench-
mark case is significant at the 1% level, with or without short sales. Our findings
here suggest that the three types of local portfolios complement each other to span
the mean-variance space.
Figure 9 illustrates the effects of adding local portfolios on enhancing the mean-
variance efficiency. Adding country local portfolios to the portfolio consisting of
country market indices expands investment opportunity significantly. Adding all
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Figure 9: Efficient Frontiers of International Portfolios: The Effects of Local Portfolios
This figure plots the efficient frontier of portfolios comprising the nine country market indices (green
solid line), and that of portfolios comprising country market indices and country local portfolios
(blue solid line), and that of a portfolio comprising country market indices and three sets of local
portfolios (red solid line). The dotted lines represent the capital market lines with the risk-free asset
for each of the three portfolios. The risk-free rate is proxied by the average of the one-year U.S.
Treasury yields during the period 1995-2014.
three types of local portfolios increases the mean-variance efficiency much further.
Overall, our findings presented in Table 29 and Figure 9 send a clear message that
investors can significantly benefit from augmented international diversification with
country market indices and local portfolios of our sample of developed markets.
Table 30 further examines the robustness of our findings in portfolio analysis in
two subsample periods: 1995-2004 and 2005-2014. Panel A shows that in both sub-
samples the nine country market indices can be spanned by the U.S. market index. In
particular, it shows that the Sharpe ratio of the optimal portfolio consisting of nine
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Table 30: Mean-Variance Optimization with Local Portfolios: Subsample Analysis
This table reports the optimal weight of portfolios comprising country market indices and local
portfolios, the summary statistics of the optimal portfolio returns, and GRS test results with and
without short sales for two subsample periods, 1995-2004 and 2005-2014. In Panel A, the benchmark
asset is the U.S. market index and the test assets are country market indices of the eight other
countries. Across Panels B, C, D, and E, we use the nine country market indices as the benchmark
assets. We use country local, industry local, and style local portfolios as the test assets for Panels
B, C, and D, respectively. In Panel E, we consider all of 28 local portfolios as the test assets.
Mean and standard deviation (Std) are estimated from monthly optimal portfolio returns over the
corresponding sub-sample periods. Sharpe ratios are computed with the risk-free rate proxied by
the one year U.S. Treasury yield. The test-statistic and the associated p-value at the bottom of each
panel provide the results of testing the null hypothesis that the maximum Sharpe ratio attainable
with the augmented assets is the same as that attainable with the benchmark assets.
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E
Benchmark Assets U.S. Mkt Index Country Indices Country Indices Country Indices Country Indices
Test Assets 8 Other Mkts Country Locals Industry Locals Style Locals All Three Locals
Short Sales Short Sales Short Sales Short Sales Short Sales
With Without With Without With Without With Without With Without
First subsample: 1995-2004
Optimal portfolio returns
Mean (%/month) 2.862 1.233 3.815 2.044 2.998 1.521 3.184 1.615 6.144 1.878
Std (%/month) 7.624 4.698 6.188 4.472 4.407 3.338 5.297 3.884 5.147 3.717
Sharpe ratio 0.328 0.186 0.558 0.377 0.599 0.348 0.533 0.323 1.124 0.409
GRS tests
Test-statistic 1.109 0.113 2.105 1.283 2.305 0.920 1.821 0.835 3.118 0.414
p-value 0.362 0.600 0.036 0.000 0.017 0.003 0.073 0.003 0.000 0.000
Second subsample: 2005-2014
Optimal portfolio returns
Mean (%/month) 1.755 0.946 3.469 1.139 3.166 1.619 2.563 1.107 4.026 1.527
Std (%/month) 6.795 5.139 8.105 4.579 5.526 4.322 4.068 3.831 4.593 3.988
Sharpe ratio 0.240 0.160 0.413 0.222 0.551 0.346 0.600 0.257 0.850 0.352
GRS tests
Test-statistic 0.557 0.117 1.217 0.284 2.364 1.013 3.263 0.486 1.878 0.310
p-value 0.810 0.643 0.293 0.128 0.015 0.003 0.002 0.018 0.015 0.005
country market indices is lower in the more recent period than that in the earlier sub-
sample period. This finding is consistent with the view that country market indices
have become more integrated over time, thus reducing the diversification benefits
across country market indices. Panel B shows that adding country local portfolios
to the benchmark portfolio consisting of nine country market indices provides sig-
nificant gains only in the early subsample period. Panels C, D, and E of Table 30
confirm our finding in Table 29 that the local portfolios organized along industry and
style dimensions are very effective in further spanning the mean-variance space and
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generate extra gains relative to the benchmark portfolio.
In this section, we systematically identify local stocks and construct local port-
folios based on the granular, bottom-up analysis of heterogeneous integration across
individual firms. We then show that the local portfolios, comprised of stocks least
driven by the common global factors, allow investors to span the mean-variance space
much beyond whats feasible with stock market indices. Thus, inferences of the gains
from international diversification solely from stock market indices, the usual practice
among practitioners and academics, are likely to very much understate the true mag-
nitude of benefits that world stock markets can provide. At the macro level, local
stocks can play an important role of countervailing against the rising, pervasive effect
of the common global factors on the asset prices that accompanies financial integra-
tion. This may keep global risk sharing effective and also help to keep the cost of
capital from rising around the world.19
3.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, we conduct robustness checks of the previous findings, focusing on
the effets of (i) using alternative proxies for the global factors and (ii) measuring
investment returns in alternative base currencies, apart from the U.S. dollar.
3.6.1 Alternative proxies for the global factors
Our previous analysis of the gains from augmented international diversification is
based on using the local portfolios constructed from the ‘principal components’ as
proxies for the global factors. Since there are alternative proxies we can use for the
global factors, it would be important to check the robustness of the previous portfolio
results to using alternative proxies for the global factors. To that end, we replicate
19As in most previous studies, we also implicitly assume here that investors bear the currency risk,
rather than hedge against the risk. As shown by the existing studies, e.g., [70], if investors judiciously
hedge the currency risk, the gains from international diversification may be further enhanced.
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our portfolio analysis using the global versions of [72] three factors, [28] four factors,
and [73] five factors obtained from French database to proxy for the global factors,
in lieu of the principal components extracted from various stock indices.
Specifically, we first convert daily global factors to weekly factors and then regress
weekly stock returns on Fama-French three factors, Carhart four factors, or Fama-
French five factors to estimate R2s for individual firms. The R2s thus computed, not
shown here for brevity, are widely distributed, albeit somewhat less widely than those
shown in Figure 1, still confirming the strong heterogeneity of global integration at
the firm-level. Similar to Figure 1, the distributions of R2s shift to the right in more
recent years, reflecting a greater degree of global integration among our sample firms.
Using the bottom deciles of stocks sorted on the R2s, we construct three sets of local
portfolios representing country, industry, and style dimensions, based on each of the
three sets of alternative proxies for the global factors metioned above.
As was done previously, we solve for the augmented optimal portfolio alternatively
using each set of local portfolios, together with the nine stock market indices. We
then test the null hypothesis that the maximal Sharpe ratio attainable with the
augmented local portfolios is the same as that attainable with the benchmark assets
of nine country market indices. Results are reported in Table 31. Specifically, Table
31 provides the mean, standard deviation, and the Sharpe ratio of each of the three
augmented optimal international portfolios, with and without short sales. In addition,
the last two rows of the table report GRS test statistics and the associated p-values.
A few things are noteworthy in Table 31. First, as indicated by p-values, the
increase in the Sharpe ratio due to the augmented diversification is statistically sig-
nificant at the conventional levels in every case, regardless of which alternative proxies
are used for the global factors. Thus, our portfolio results presented in Table 29 are
robust to the use of alternative proxies for the global factors. The Sharpe ratio, how-
ever, tends to be highest for Fama-French five factors followed by Carhart four factors
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Table 31: Mean-Variance Optimization with Local Portfolios Constructed from the
Alternative Global Factors
This table reports the optimal portfolios comprising country market indices and local portfolios
constructed from Fama-French three global factors, Carhart four global factors, and Fama-French
five global factors, with and without short sales. We first convert these daily global factors to
weekly factors and then regress individual firm weekly returns in year t on Fama-French or Carhart
factors and estimate individual firm’s R2. Then we select firms with lowest 10% R-squares in
each country, industry, and style dimension and form Fama-French, or Carhart Local Portfolios
and calculate value-weighted monthly portfolio returns. The performance measures of the optimal
portfolios comprising country market indices and local portfolios constructed by each of three sets
of alternative factors are reported in this table. Mean and standard deviation (Std) are estimated
from monthly returns of optimal portfolio that has maximum Sharpe ratio over the sample period
from 1995:01 to 2014:12. Sharpe ratios are computed with the risk-free rate proxied by one year U.S.
T-bill rate. The F -statistic and p-value at the bottom of each panel provide results of testing the
null hypothesis that the maximum Sharpe ratio attainable with the augmented assets is the same
as that attainable with the benchmark assets.
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
Benchmark Assets Country Indices Country Indices Country Indices Country Indices
Test Assets Country Locals Industry Locals Style Locals All Three Locals
Short Sales Short Sales Short Sales Short Sales
With Without With Without With Without With Without
Fama-French 3 factors
Optimal portfolio returns
Mean (%/month) 2.260 1.137 1.932 1.050 2.271 1.092 2.759 1.066
Std (%/month) 5.534 3.949 4.445 3.197 5.428 3.737 4.703 3.050
Sharpe ratio 0.365 0.227 0.380 0.253 0.374 0.228 0.536 0.270
GRS tests
Test-statistic 1.817 0.656 1.872 0.868 1.974 0.664 1.594 0.353
p-value 0.066 0.013 0.050 0.005 0.043 0.005 0.036 0.003
Carhart 4 factors
Optimal portfolio returns
Mean (%/month) 3.340 1.274 2.486 1.264 2.263 1.165 3.702 1.293
Std (%/month) 7.902 4.182 5.104 3.809 5.049 3.660 5.691 3.557
Sharpe ratio 0.392 0.247 0.440 0.268 0.400 0.252 0.608 0.296
GRS tests
Test-statistic 2.302 0.895 2.898 1.051 2.456 0.964 2.166 0.459
p-value 0.017 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.000
Fama-French 5 factors
Optimal portfolio returns
Mean (%/month) 3.059 1.219 2.710 1.374 2.518 1.244 3.533 1.404
Std (%/month) 7.309 4.157 5.389 3.735 5.161 3.769 5.193 3.572
Sharpe ratio 0.385 0.235 0.458 0.303 0.441 0.266 0.634 0.326
GRS tests
Test-statistic 2.180 0.754 3.240 1.500 3.260 1.143 2.386 0.595
p-value 0.024 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
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and Fama-French three factors. Consider, for instance, the case where investors op-
timally augment their portfolios using all three types of local portfolios (i.e, country,
industry, and style.). As can be seen in Panel D of Table 31, the resulting optimal
portfolio has a Sharpe ratio of 0.634 (0.326) when short sales are (not) allowed if
Fama-French five factors are used to proxy the global factors. If Carhart four factors
are used as the proxies, the Sharpe ratio would be 0.608 (0.296), while the Sharpe
ratio would be 0.536 (0.270) when Fama-French three factors are used as the proxies.
In comparison, the Sharpe ratio is 0.723 (0.303), as shown in Panel E of Table 29, if
the principal components (PCs) are used to proxy the global factors. Comparison of
the results presented in Tables 29 and 31 indicates that the Sharpe ratios from Fama-
French five factors and the PCs used in our main analysis are largely comparable. As
a practical matter, investors thus may use Fama-French five factors, as well as the
PCs, for the purpose of identifying local stocks and optimally holding them.
It is recalled that to proxy the global factors, we previously extracted the principal
components (PCs) from the country market indices, industry indices, and style indices
‘separately’. To check the robustness of our results to an alternative way of extracting
PCs, we first form a pool of 28 indices, comprising nine country, ten industry, and nine
style indices, and extract PCs from the pooled indices. In particular, we extract the
first six PCs which can explain at least 90% of the total volatility in the covariance
matrix of the 28 indices and replicate the portfolio analysis as in Table 29. Our
un-tabulated results indicate that the empirical findings reported in Table 29 are
robust to the use of these alternative PCs extracted from the pooled approach as
proxies for the global factors. In other words, the increases in the Sharpe ratios
of the optimal international portfolios augmented with the local portfolios remain
statistically significant when the pooling approach is used. More often than not,
however, the Sharpe ratios tend to be somewhat lower than those reported in Table
29, implying that it may be advantageous to extract PCs separately, thereby ensuring
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to capture information from each of the three dimensions.
3.6.2 Alternative base currencies
In our previous analysis, we employed stock and index returns measured in U.S. dol-
lars, possibly raising the concern that our key findings reported in Table 29 may not
necessarily hold for international investors who would measure investment returns in
different currencies. To address this legitimate concern, we replicate our portfolio
analysis using each of the eight currencies matching our sample countries as the al-
ternative base currency. The results, provided in Table 32, show that our findings
reported in Table 29 remain robust, to a large extent, to the use of different base cur-
rencies.20 Specifically, our GRS test results indicate that the increase in the Sharpe
ratio due to the augmented diversification with the local portfolios is always statisti-
cally significant at the conventional significance levels, with and without short sales,
for those investors who use the Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Hong Kong dollar,
Japanese yen, Swiss franc, or the U.K. pound as their base currencies.
As can be seen in Table 32, the results are a little different for the French and
German investors who share the common European currency, the euro, during much
of our sample period. For the French investors, the increase in the Sharpe ratio is
insignificant when they diversify using either country or style local portfolios when
short sales are not allowed. Also, the increase in the Sharpe ratio is insignificant
when the French investors use industry local portfolios for diversification when short
sales are allowed. For the German investors, the Sharpe ratio increase is insignificant
when they diversify using industry local portfolios when short sales are allowed or
using style local portfolios when short sales are not allowed. The portfolio perfor-
mance results are not identical for the French and German investors because in the
20To be consistent with the use of alternative base currencies, we use proxies for the local risk-free
rates in our portfolio analysis here. The local risk-free rate proxy we use is 1-year deposit rate for
Australia, Germany, Hong Kong, and Switzerland, 1-year T-bill rate for Canada and France, 1-year
discount rate for Japan, and 3-month T-bill rate for the U.K.
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Table 32: Mean-Variance Optimization with the Alternative Base Currencies
This table reports the summary statistics of the optimal portfolio returns based on currencies of
our eight other sample countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan,
Switzerland, and the U.K.), and GRS test results with and without short sales. The benchmark
assets are the nine country market indices. For Panels A, B, and C, we use country local, industry
local, and style local portfolios as the test assets, respectively. In Panel D, we consider all of 28
local portfolios as the test assets. Mean and standard deviation (Std) are estimated from monthly
optimal portfolio returns from 1995:01 to 2014:12. Sharpe ratios are computed with the risk-free
rate proxied by the one year U.S. Treasury yield. The test-statistic and the associated p-value at the
bottom provide the results of testing the null hypothesis that the maximum Sharpe ratio attainable
with the augmented assets is the same as that attainable with the benchmark assets.
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
Benchmark Assets Country Mkt Indices Country Mkt Indices Country Mkt Indices Country Mkt Indices
New Assets Country Locals Industry Locals Style Locals All Three Locals
Short Sales Short Sales Short Sales Short Sales
With Without With Without With Without With Without
Australia
Optimal portfolio returns Mean (%/month) 2.436 1.225 3.687 1.518 3.792 1.194 7.001 1.550
Std (%/month) 5.732 3.437 7.279 3.866 8.531 3.525 10.616 3.788
Sharpe ratio 0.343 0.220 0.442 0.271 0.389 0.206 0.615 0.285
GRS tests Test-statistic 1.681 0.903 3.153 1.383 2.486 0.748 2.308 0.512
p-value 0.095 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000
Canada
Optimal portfolio returns Mean (%/month) 2.813 1.189 3.230 1.557 2.006 1.115 5.543 1.445
Std (%/month) 6.942 3.465 7.106 4.344 4.674 3.189 7.535 3.445
Sharpe ratio 0.363 0.259 0.413 0.291 0.367 0.258 0.697 0.335
GRS tests Test-statistic 1.853 1.129 2.483 1.414 1.914 1.120 2.990 0.664
p-value 0.060 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000
France
Optimal portfolio returns Mean (%/month) 3.013 1.555 3.637 1.805 4.032 1.214 5.691 1.944
Std (%/month) 7.785 6.543 9.414 6.601 10.369 5.330 9.253 6.995
Sharpe ratio 0.357 0.199 0.360 0.236 0.365 0.181 0.588 0.242
GRS tests Test-statistic 1.686 0.372 1.560 0.688 1.826 0.195 2.004 0.249
p-value 0.094 0.162 0.120 0.018 0.065 0.214 0.003 0.031
Germany
Optimal portfolio returns Mean (%/month) 3.292 1.625 3.579 1.742 3.898 1.207 4.606 1.910
Std (%/month) 8.295 6.757 9.423 6.456 10.113 5.290 7.525 6.938
Sharpe ratio 0.368 0.201 0.352 0.229 0.359 0.178 0.575 0.237
GRS tests Test-statistic 1.895 0.416 1.458 0.639 1.753 0.194 1.911 0.239
p-value 0.054 0.094 0.157 0.023 0.079 0.185 0.006 0.040
Hong Kong
Optimal portfolio returns Mean (%/month) 4.048 1.389 2.649 1.274 2.517 1.137 4.754 1.312
Std (%/month) 9.765 4.353 5.249 3.565 5.833 3.767 7.124 3.659
Sharpe ratio 0.381 0.244 0.443 0.266 0.376 0.215 0.622 0.270
GRS tests Test-statistic 2.211 0.997 3.050 1.144 2.113 0.664 2.319 0.390
p-value 0.022 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.029 0.003 0.000 0.000
Japan
Optimal portfolio returns Mean (%/month) 2.450 1.533 3.269 1.541 2.273 1.234 4.758 1.592
Std (%/month) 6.249 5.343 6.682 4.679 5.627 4.308 7.717 4.782
Sharpe ratio 0.386 0.279 0.483 0.321 0.397 0.277 0.611 0.325
GRS tests Test-statistic 1.844 0.920 3.413 1.373 2.045 0.890 2.074 0.469
p-value 0.062 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.014 0.002 0.001
Switzerland
Optimal portfolio returns Mean (%/month) 2.250 1.047 2.602 1.209 2.161 1.082 3.149 1.156
Std (%/month) 5.700 3.773 5.869 4.002 5.301 3.728 5.451 3.661
Sharpe ratio 0.369 0.239 0.419 0.266 0.380 0.251 0.551 0.276
GRS tests Test-statistic 1.746 0.618 2.378 0.855 1.938 0.768 1.659 0.322
p-value 0.080 0.016 0.011 0.003 0.048 0.001 0.025 0.006
U.K.
Optimal portfolio returns Mean (%/month) 4.332 1.320 2.602 1.289 2.542 1.140 4.927 1.311
Std (%/month) 11.076 4.409 5.150 3.541 5.809 3.679 7.282 3.601
Sharpe ratio 0.360 0.222 0.439 0.268 0.379 0.217 0.630 0.270
GRS tests Test-statistic 1.860 0.758 2.994 1.185 2.185 0.704 2.395 0.396
p-value 0.059 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.024 0.001 0.000 0.000
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early years of our sample period, i.e., 1995-1998, the two countries still had their
separate national currencies; furthermore, they faced different local interest rates. It
is, however, noteworthy from Panel D of Table 32 that when investors diversify using
all three types of local portfolios, the resulting increase in the Sharpe ratio is always
statistically significant for all eight alternative base currencies (as well as for the U.S.
dollar) at the 5% level or better, with or without short sales.
The above results from our robustness checks indicate that the case for interna-
tional portfolio diversification with local stocks is very strong and robust.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
Since the 1980s, developed stock markets have been integrating in earnest, allowing
investors to diversify their portfolios internationally and reap benefits from the en-
hanced risk-return efficiency of their portfolios. Most likely, however, the same global
integration of these markets eventually led to much higher correlations between these
markets, making it difficult for investors to continue to benefit from international
portfolio diversification. To the extent that this is true, global integration of financial
markets, which was once hailed as a new source of welfare gains, can turn out to be
at least partly self-defeating its own rationale in the long run. This concern about the
virtue of international diversification is shared by academics as well as practitioners,
as succinctly expressed by [160]’s article published in Financial Analyst Journal ti-
tled, “Where are the gains from international diversification?” Against this backdrop,
we proposed in this paper a new way to capture significant gains from international
diversification.
Underlying our new diversification strategy is the recognition that the degree of
global integration varies a great deal at the firm level. In other words, there exists
a substantial number of individual stocks that are minimally integrated globally in
each country, industry, and style categories. As a result, if investors systematically
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identify these local stocks that are least driven by common global factors and hold
them optimally, they can still benefit significantly from international diversification
as shown in this paper. In a nutshell, we proposed to take advantage of rich, granular
variations in the degree of global integration at the firm level and conduct discreet
and selective portfolio diversification with local stocks, limiting exposure to global
factors.
Lastly, our analysis of firm-level integration also suggests that each stock market
should be viewed as populated by individual stocks exhibiting continuous degrees of
integration cross-sectionally, instead of comprising stocks that are either uniformly
segmented or integrated or dichotomously distributed between local and global stocks
within each sample country. Since asset pricing critically depends on whether and to
what extent markets are integrated globally, the firm-level heterogeneity in integration
documented in this paper may also have important implications for asset pricing. This





Table A1: Variable definitions
Dependent variables Description Data Source
Jumbo approval rate (count) The fractions of approved jumbo loan applications to total jumbo loan applications across all HMDA
lenders in county i and year t, where the fractions are based on approved jumbo loan counts
Jumbo approval rate (volume) The fractions of approved jumbo loan applications to total jumbo loan applications across all HMDA
lenders in county i and year t, where the fractions are based on approved jumbo loan volumes
Rate Spread The price data take the form of a “rate spread”. Lenders must report the spread (difference) HMDA
between the annual percentage rate (APR) on a loan and the rate on Treasury securities
of comparable maturity - but only for loans with spreads above designated thresholds.
So rate spreads are reported for some, but not all, reported home loans.
NPL/Family loans 1-4 family loans 90 or more days past due plus loans no longer accruing interest/total Call Report
1-4 family loans
NPL/Family loans (first lien only) NPL/family loans calculated only based on first liens Call Report
Family charge-offs/Family loans 1-4 family loans charge-offs/ total 1-4 family loans Call Report
Family charge-offs/Loan charge-offs 1-4 family loans charge-offs/ total loans charge-offs Call Report
Borrower Controls
Log(Applicant Income) The average of the logarithm of applicant income reported in HMDA within county i of year t HMDA
LTI Ratio The average of the ratio of loan amount divided by reported applicant income within HMDA
county i of year t
Minority Fraction The fraction of applicants who are minority over all applicants in county i of year t HMDA
Female Fraction The fraction of applicants who are female over all applicants in county i of year t HMDA
Lender Controls
Log(Assets) The logarithm of bank total assets Call Report
Leverage The bank capital-asset ratio Call Report
Accounting Profits Net income to total assets Call Report
Liquidity Investment and traded securities to total assets Call Report
Loans/Assets Ratio of loans to total assets Call Report
Deposits/Assets Ratio of deposits to total assets Call Report
Deposit Cost Interest expenses on deposits to total deposits Call Report
Letters of credit/Assets Letters of credit in total assets Call Report
Unused Loan Cmt/Assets Unused loan commitments in total assets Call Report
C&I Loans/Assets Share of commercial and industrial loans to total assets Call Report
Real Estate Loans/Assets Share of real estate loans to total assets Call Report
Securitization Ratio The weighted average securitization ratio of banks in a given county (weighted by bank HMDA
market shares), and for each bank the securitization ratio is computed as the total volume
of securitized mortgages divided by the total volume of issued mortgages
County Controls
County Income Mean (’000) County per capita income BEA
County Income Growth (%) County per capita income growth rate BEA
HPI Growth (%) The housing price index growth rate in year t FHFA
HPI Growth Lag (%) The housing price index growth rate in year t− 1 FHFA
151
Table A2: Filters for Excluding Non-common Equity Securities
This table lists keywords for filtering out non-common equity securities in Datastream. If any
keyword is detected in the corresponding variable, the associated security is excluded. Panel A lists
identifiers for firm names (NAME). Panel B lists keywords for industry names (INDM) and codes
(INDC6). Panel C lists country-specific identifiers.
Panel A. Non-common equity security codes
Non-common equity Keywords
Debt DEB DB DCB DEBT DEBENTURES DEBENTURE
Depository Receipts ADR GDR
Duplicates DUPLICATE DUPL DUP DUPE DULP DUPLI 1000DUPL XSQ XET
Expired securities EXPIRED EXPD EXPIRY EXPY
Preferred Stock PREFERRED PF PFD PREF PRF
Rights and Warrants RIGHTS RTS WARRANT WARRANTS WTS WTS2 WARRT
Unit Trusts UT IT RLST IT INVESTMENT TRUST INV TST UNIT UNT UNITS
Other Generic 500 BOND DEFER DEP DEPY ELKS ETF
Identifier Filters FUND FD IDX INDEX LP MIPS MITS MITT MPS NIKKEI NOTE PERQS PINES
PRTF PTNS PTSHP QUIBS QUIDS RATE RCPTS RECEIPTS REIT RETUR
SCORE SPDR STRYPES TOPRS UNIT UNT UTS WTS XXXXX YIELD YLD
Panel B. Investment vehicle industry codes
Industry Name Industry Code Industry Name Industry Code
AUTH. UNIT TRUSTS UNITS INVESTMENT COS. (UK) INVCO
CURRENCY FUNDS CURFD INVESTMENT TRUST UK IVTUK
EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS EXTRF OFFSHORE FUNDS OFFSH
INS.+PROPERTY FUNDS INSPF OPEN ENDED INV.COS. OEINC
INV.TST INTERNATIONAL ITINT OTHER INV. TRUSTS INVTO
INV.TST.EMERGING MKTS ITEMG REAL ESTATE
INV.TST.GEOG.SPECLSTS ITGSP REAL ESTATE DEV. RLDEV
INV.TST.VENTURE + DEV ITVNT SPLIT CAPITAL INV.TST ITSPL
INVESTMENT COS. (6) INVNK VENTURE CAPITAL TRUST ITVCT
Panel C. Country-specific identifiers
Country Keywords
Australia (Rights): RTS (Deferred): DEF DFD DEFF (Full and Partially Paid): PAID PRF
Canada (Rights, Shares, Voting, subordinated voting): RTS SHS VTG SBVTG SUBD
(Receipts are rights to receive stocks or options at a future date): RECPT Receipt
(Exchangeable): EXH EXCHANGEABLE (Series): SR SER
(Split Share Corporations a derivative of common stock): SPLIT
France (certificates of investment or investment trusts): ADP CI CIP ORA ORCI OBSA
OPCSM SGP SICAV FCP FCPR FCPE FCPI FCPIMT OPCVM
Germany GENUSSCHEINE or GSH are securities, which are hybrid securities between a
loan and equity: GENUSSCHEINE GSH
Switzerland (the word USE and converted is always used with a Datastream code and the
reference code always appears to be primary): USE CONVERTED CONV CONVERSION
United Kingdom (ranking for dividend): ranking for dividend (book-keeping entry): PAID (Nonvoting): NV
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Figure A1: The map of the high-cost areas in 2008
This figure shows the map of the counties that are determined as the high-cost areas by the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). Counties that are marked in darker colors are determined as
high-cost areas with higher conforming loan limits. The match between the color and the limit is
listed on the right side of the figure.
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